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INTRODUCTION 
Fifty years ago, the United States took important but divergent 
steps to fundamentally reshape its relationship with Native Nations and its 
management of federal public lands.1  
On July 8, 1970, President Nixon delivered a Special Message to 
the Congress on Indian Affairs.2 The President’s message marked the 
culmination of a years-long and major shift in federal Indian policy and 
the longstanding federal trust obligations toward tribes. For the first time, 
President Nixon’s message formally and expressly rejected the United 
States’ prior approach of forced termination of those obligations in favor 
 
1. Throughout this report, the terms “Native Nations,” “Indian tribes,” 
“Indians,” “Native Americans,” and “indigenous” are used interchangeably to refer to 
the groups and individuals described by federal law as “Indian tribes” and “Indians” 
respectively. We recognize the potential for confusion around these varying terms but 
have incorporated their use to expand upon the limited and sometimes disrespectful 
connotations of the use of “Indian” as a legal term of art. 
2. President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 8, 1970), https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president-nixon 
-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-1970. 




of tribally-defined priorities, including the promotion of tribal sovereignty. 
As the President’s Special Message noted, this about-face was justified by 
the “special relationship between Indians and the Federal government” and 
the “solemn obligations” and “specific commitments” made to the Indian 
people through treaties and other agreements. For their part, said the 
President’s message, the “Indians have often surrendered claims to vast 
tracts of land,” which helps explain why these agreements continue “to 
carry immense moral and legal force.”   
Just a month before President Nixon’s message, the Public Land 
Law Review Commission issued its comprehensive report on the nation’s 
public lands.3 The Commission was charged by Congress to review the 
then-extant laws applicable to the public lands estate and recommend 
revisions.4 The Commission’s influential work laid the groundwork for 
much of the modern legal framework applicable to public lands and the 
federal agencies that manage them. Tellingly, however, neither the 
Commission’s report nor any of its recommendations considered the 
rights, interests, and role of Indian tribes in the management of federal 
public lands or even included any reference to the federal government’s 
trust obligations to those tribes as relevant to such management.5  
Although those reforms ushered in a new era of federal policy 
recognizing tribal sovereignty and a more comprehensive and effective 
scheme for the federal government’s management of public lands, they 
were mostly distinct undertakings that remained rooted in and continued 
the historical exclusion of tribes and their interests from public lands. 
Thus, despite significant advances in tribal sovereignty and self-
determination over the last fifty years, the nation’s obligations to Indian 
tribes and its approach to managing the public domain remain largely 
separate endeavors. While various statutory, regulatory, and policy 
avenues now provide bases from which Indian tribes can seek to influence 
the federal agencies responsible for the management of public lands, none 
of those avenues allow—much less encourage—consistent, effective, and 
broad-based federal-tribal co-management partnerships. 
 
3. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S 
LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW 
REVIEW COMMISSION 158 (1970), https://perma.cc/7R83-JWLF. 
4. Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–606, 78 Stat. 982. 
5. The Commission’s rationale draws a stark line between federal 
Indian law and public lands law and is provided in a short footnote: “The United States 
holds legal title to Indian reservation lands for the benefit of the Indians. A body of 
law has developed for these lands wholly separate from those commonly termed 
public land laws. For these reasons, Indian reservations were specifically excluded 
from the Commission’s study by the Act establishing the Commission.” Pub. Land 
Law Review Comm’n, supra note 3, at 158 n.5.   
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A half-century after President Nixon’s transformative statement 
and the Public Land Law Review Commission’s influential report, the 
time has come to once again rethink public land law and meaningfully 
connect it to the federal government’s treaty-based and long-standing trust 
responsibility to uphold and promote the sovereign and cultural interests 
of Native Nations.  
The history, law, and policy of the United States’ relationships 
with both Indian tribes and the public lands are intimately intertwined and 
historically co-dependent. But for the removal and exclusion of tribes from 
large swaths of their traditional territories, there would be no public lands. 
While the federal policies ushered in by the momentous events of 1970 
largely treat these policy arenas as separate, the future of public lands 
management will be defined by the law’s ability to justly recognize and 
reconcile the historical and legal context of indigenous dispossession 
through a new era of reform that thoughtfully and meaningfully restores 
tribal management to federal public lands.  
This Report intends to support and catalyze that next era of federal 
policy. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Deep ancestral and traditional connections tie many Native 
Nations to the federal government’s public lands. The removal of these 
lands from indigenous control, their acquisition by the federal 
government, and the federal government’s approach to their management 
are largely premised upon the erasure or marginalization of those 
connections. Both physically and legally, Indian tribes have been removed 
from the landscapes they occupied since time immemorial. Rather than 
centering, honoring, and using those connections, the current discussion 
of tribal co-management of federal public lands is mostly bereft of this full 
legal and historical context.  
Compounding these limitations is the considerable discretion 
enabled by the applicable legal framework and exercised by public land 
management agencies. This discretion is most often used in ways that 
place Indian tribes in a reactive and defensive position. Furthermore, in 
exercising that discretion, federal public land management agencies 
regularly disassociate their land management activities from their 
interactions with tribes, viewing the former as a priority and the latter as 
an additional burden or only ancillary to their mission. In order to 
reconnect the management of public lands to the broader legal and 
historical context, these agencies must be compelled—through statute or 
Executive action—to work with tribes on a co-management basis, in the 




same manner as they are compelled to fulfill their other obligations and 
priorities in managing and protecting the lands for which they are 
responsible.   
Furthermore, federal public land law generally provides to state 
governments and private interests broad powers and authorities not yet 
extended to Indian tribes. The intergovernmental dimensions of federal 
public lands management must more fully recognize the federal 
government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes and include sovereign 
tribal governments. The common tools used in “cooperative federalism” 
can help inform the design of tribal co-management legislation and/or 
rulemaking.  
A. Tribal Co-Management 
• The first and foundational principles of federal Indian law and the 
historical development of federal public lands provide a strong and 
unique legal basis for tribal co-management.  
• The term “co-management” is subject to inconsistent interpretations, 
applications, and politics. It is thus important to carefully scrutinize 
conceptions of co-management and pay more attention to how it is 
operationalized.  
• Though definitions are important, especially for the purpose of 
creating mutual understanding and common expectations, what 
matters most are the core principles or attributes of a co-management 
approach. These include:  
(1) Recognition of tribes as sovereign governments,  
(2)  Incorporation of the federal government’s trust 
responsibilities to tribes,  
(3) Legitimation structures for tribal involvement,  
(4)  Meaningful integration of tribes early and often in the 
decision-making process,  
(5) Recognition and incorporation of tribal expertise, and 
(6) Dispute resolution mechanisms.   
These core principles can be configured into creative and accountable 
ways of governing that fit unique historical and legal contexts, 
political realities, and landscapes.  
• There is no bright line that clearly distinguishes between 
congressional and executive powers to authorize, compel, or 
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encourage tribal co-management. The actions that can be taken by the 
President and Congress are also not mutually exclusive.   
• The President has considerable powers and precedent to affirm tribal 
sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust 
obligations through innovations in tribal co-management and shared 
governance.  
• Tribal co-management arrangements can be designed to ensure 
political accountability and legal enforcement while establishing 
positive precedents that all parties want replicated and modified to fit 
unique situations and particular places. Co-management takes place in 
a larger statutory and regulatory context that sets forth the purposes 
and constraints of federal lands management.  
• The “sub-delegation” doctrine limits the ability of executive agencies 
to delegate their final decision-making authorities to other actors. The 
legal limits imposed by this doctrine do not preclude the executive 
branch from using its powers to institutionalize variations of tribal co-
management. Co-management is not defined by a complete and 
unqualified delegation of authority to tribes nor is it a call for tribal 
unilateralism. “To share authority and responsibility” is the most 
common denominator in definitions and applications of co-
management.  
• The Office of Solicitor in the Department of Interior should clarify 
how the subdelegation doctrine and “inherently governmental/ 
federal” limitation applies more specifically to Native Nations as 
contrasted to state and private actors operating on federal public lands. 
The intermixing of federal and tribal powers is best conceived as a 
lawful “sovereignty-affirming subdelegation.” 
• The Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture should issue a Joint Order 
on Tribal Co-Management on Federal Public Lands. The Order will 
pick up where 2016 Secretarial Order No. 3342—on “Identifying 
Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships with 
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal 
Lands and Resources”—left off. Based on first principles of federal 
Indian law, the Order will draw from a more complete accounting of 
existing authorities and more recent cases of innovation to prioritize 
and reward tribal co-management and other forms of cooperation and 
collaboration on federal lands.   
• Tribal co-management on federal lands can also be enabled through 
congressional lawmaking, which could happen through two potential 
pathways: (1) place-based legislation, and (2) system-wide legislation. 
Each option should be premised on the same vision: to shift the 
reactionary tribal consultation paradigm to a more pro-active and 




sovereignty-affirming model in which Indian tribes envision their own 
approach and plans for managing their rights and interests on federal 
lands.   
B. Bridges to Tribal Co-Management 
• The following findings and recommendations will help clarify and 
strengthen the bridges that could be taken to tribal co-management. In 
those cases where tribal co-management is not the objective, these 
recommendations will improve existing processes and programs and 
methods of engagement more generally.   
• Existing legal authorities and processes—such as tribal consultation, 
contracting and compacting, the National Historic Preservation Act, 
and public lands planning—can be strategically used and serve as a 
bridge to variations of tribal co-management.  
C. Tribal Consultation 
• The federal government’s obligations to consult with Indian tribes on 
matters that may affect their interest are rooted in the United States’ 
trust obligations to and treaties with those Native Nations.  
• Notwithstanding those firm legal bases, only in the last few decades 
has the duty to consult become a recognized priority of the federal 
government, largely implemented through executive actions aimed at 
improving agency consultation standards. 
• Despite these developments, the practice, implementation, and 
effectiveness of tribal consultation varies widely across the federal 
government and leave many tribes and tribal leaders frustrated and 
disappointed. 
• Consultation must evolve from the unenforceable, discretionary, and 
variable practice widely criticized by tribes into a meaningful, 
compatible, and continuing conversation between appropriate tribal 
and federal officials. 
• Effective consultation can be facilitated through executive, legislative, 
or judicial mandates requiring federal agencies to incorporate tribes 
into ongoing policy discussion, development, and decision-making, as 
well as day-to-day management, and bridge the procedural nature of 
consultation to more substantive results.  
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D. Contracting and Compacting 
• The ability of Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to 
assume previously federal programs, functions, services, and activities 
is a core aspect of the current policy era of tribal self-determination. 
• These contracts, originally referred to as “638 contracts” after the 
public law that authorized them, have spurred a renaissance in tribal 
governance and technical capacity. 
• To overcome the reluctance and recalcitrance of federal agencies in 
contracting away their duties, Congress adopted various amendments 
and evolved the 638 contracting model into broader tribal authorities, 
including self-governance compacts that offer much more flexibility 
for tribes when considering whether and how to manage previously 
federal programs. 
• Some of these reforms have been expanded into public land 
management agencies, with amendments in the Tribal Forest 
Protection Act and the 2018 Farm Bill including reference to self-
governance authorities for tribes seeking to assume some authorities 
from the United States Forest Service. 
• Although 638 contracts, self-governance compacting, and similar 
authorities have opened new avenues for tribes to take on greater (and 
previously federal) responsibilities, these avenues are mostly limited 
to existing tribal lands and resources and further hamstrung by a lack 
of federal funding, continuing agency recalcitrance, and the 
uncertainty around and inability of tribes to assume so-called 
“inherently federal functions.” The combination of these last two 
factors has particular impact in public lands management, where 
federal agencies often view their responsibility for management 
activities as central to their federal responsibility and, therefore, 
largely unavailable for tribal assumption.  
• Finally, the existing framework of federal contracting necessarily 
limits tribal flexibility and sovereignty in carrying out those programs, 
services, functions, and activities.  
• Clarity and consistency around the ability of federal agencies to 
contract with tribes for tribes to take on broader and meaningful 
management programs, functions, services, and activities across all 
public land management agencies could help invigorate important 
steps toward broader tribal co-management.  
• Like the success of self-determination contracting and self-
governance compacting across nearly every other aspect of federal 
Indian policy, these practices could be an important pathway to more 
extensive tribal involvement in public lands management.  




E. The National Historic Preservation Act and Native American  
Traditional Cultural Properties, Districts and Landscapes 
• The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) is a procedural statute 
affording federal agencies considerable discretion in how rigorously it 
is applied to the protection of sacred places and cultural resources on 
public lands.  
• But the designation of traditional cultural properties, districts, and 
landscapes pursuant to the NHPA provides an important procedural 
framework that can be strategically leveraged to secure more 
substantive protections of these places. Federal public lands planning 
provides one possible way to bridge the procedural nature of the 
NHPA to more substantive protection of traditional cultural 
properties, districts, and landscapes.   
• There are several features of the law—including the structured and 
statutorily-based version of tribal consultation, the principle of 
concurrence in resolving disputes, the important role of Tribal Historic 
Preservation Offices in the administration of the Act, and the external 
role played by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation that 
serve as a check on agency discretion—that could be replicated or 
modified in future place-based or system-wide legislation focused on 
tribal co-management. 
 
F. Federal Public Lands Planning 
• Federal public lands planning needs to be based on a more accurate 
inventory and accounting of cultural resources and the related 
programs within federal land agencies need to be adequately funded 
and prioritized.  
• The executive branch should ensure that federal land planning 
regulations and agency-specific manuals, handbooks, and policies 
related to cultural resources and tribal relations comport with the first 
principles of federal Indian law and the core principles of tribal co-
management. 
• The revision of land use plans provides an important opportunity to 
adequately account for tribal rights and interests on public lands, to 
better integrate the purposes and processes of the National Historic 
Preservation Act, and to engage with Indian tribes on a government-
to-government basis.   
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G. Bridges to a New Era 
• The time has come for a more holistic and inclusive approach to public 
lands management. The legal framework for federal public lands must 
no longer be divorced from and exclude tribes and tribal interests; 
instead, within this statutory space there exists sufficient room to work 
more creatively and substantively with Native Nations and to 
incorporate the core principles of tribal co-management into the next 
chapter of public lands management.   
• Prominent cases referenced in this Report, such as the Badger-Two 
Medicine and Bears Ears, among others, are collectively shaping a 
new, more collaborative way to better protect places that are valued 
by Indians and non-Indians alike. They are innovative and 
constructive efforts at harmonizing sometimes divergent values and 
interests and more effectively draw upon the long-standing tribal 
connections to, and knowledge of, those places.   
• Ultimately, enhancing opportunities for tribal co-management of 
federal public lands is about justice, reconciliation, healing, and 
sharing. While the direct benefits that would flow from an expanded 
tribal role would serve our shared interests by better protecting our 
public lands, tribal co-management also offers a path to a more 
equitable future that promotes and sustains those core values for all 
Americans. After a history of division between tribes and public lands, 
the time has come to build the bridges that connect to that path and to 
a new and brighter future. 
REPORT OVERVIEW 
This Report comes in five parts. Part I presents an overview of the 
central and foundational principles of federal Indian law. This historical 
and legal context has mostly been isolated within that field and left out of 
federal public lands law and policy. As demonstrated in this opening Part, 
however, critical legal standards related to the United States’ treaties with 
Indian tribes and the federal trust obligations recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court since the earliest days of the republic are necessary 
for understanding the interconnectedness of tribal sovereignty and federal 
public lands. In addition, this initial Part relies on examples and case-
studies to illustrate how those foundational legal principles can find 
expression through effective modern mechanisms for tribal co-
management.   
Part II reviews some of the most common approaches to tribal 
engagement on federal public lands, including tribal consultation 




provisions, compacting and contracting authorities, land designations and 
processes pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and 
federal land use planning. In isolation, none of these traditional methods 
of engagement go far enough to provide tribes a more substantive and pre-
decisional role in federal public lands management. Most provide 
considerable discretion to federal land agencies and are most often used in 
ways that place tribes in a reactive and defensive position. But there is an 
opportunity to do much more and each section of this Part concludes by 
demonstrating how these methods of engagement can be strategically 
linked and leveraged in order to build bridges to variations of tribal co-
management.   
The history, law, and politics of tribal co-management is the focus 
of Part III. This Part demystifies the term and describes its use being 
authorized and compelled by judicial decree, statute, treaty, and executive 
action. Though Congress may enable tribal co-management on federal 
public lands through legislation, the Executive is best positioned to quickly 
implement the recommendations made in this Report. The Executive is 
best positioned to quickly implement the precedent and authority to affirm 
tribal sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust 
obligations through shared governance and variations of tribal co-
management. Because the term co-management is conceived of and 
defined so differently in varied legal and managerial contexts, this Part 
focuses instead on the core principles and attributes of tribal co-
management. These principles can be configured into creative and 
accountable ways of governing that fit unique historical and legal contexts, 
political realities, and landscapes. 
Part IV situates tribal co-management in the context of federalism 
and intergovernmental relations. Rarely is co-management examined in 
this context and this Part helps reframe the debate to show how existing 
principles and tools of cooperative federalism applicable in the federal-
state context should be extended to Indian tribes. Most laws fail to 
adequately recognize tribal rights and interests on federal public lands. But 
this Part concludes by showing how this history of marginalization and the 
vacuum left by Congress can be filled with executive rule and 
policymaking.   
The Report’s concluding Part V provides primary 
recommendations and a strategic playbook to be considered by Indian 
tribes, their conservation groups and other partners and allies, as well as 
the President and Congress. This Part begins by explaining the rare 
opportunity provided to the President to more strategically use existing 
authorities and processes as a bridge to tribal co-management and 
variations thereof. Improving existing methods of tribal engagement on 
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public lands will help restore trust regardless of whether co-management 
is the outcome. The Part concludes by charting two potential pathways for 
tribal co-management legislation: place-based and system-wide. Each 
would shift the reactionary tribal consultation paradigm to a more 
proactive and sovereignty-affirming model wherein tribes can creatively 
re-envision management of treaty rights, sacred places, and cultural 
resources on public lands.  
PROJECT BACKGROUND 
This project began as an initial conversation and inquiry with 
Natalie Dawson of Audubon Alaska in spring 2020, who requested from 
us a research prospectus focused on tribal co-management as it applies to 
federal public lands and the legal context of Alaska. We were then asked 
to be part of additional conversations about tribal co-management 
organized by the Center for American Progress. A survey was sent to those 
participating individuals and organizations that identified important goals, 
related work in progress, and most urgent needs and questions related to 
tribal co-management.6 We incorporated this feedback into part of our 
initial scope of work and further refined points of emphasis following 
multiple discussions with tribal and conservation representatives.  
This Report concludes phase I of the project and was expedited to 
ensure that there was sufficient historical context and legal background on 
tribal co-management and specific recommendations that can be 
considered as priorities are established for the next Congress and future 
Presidential administrations. Phase I of the project was administered as a 
grant agreement between National Audubon Society, Inc. and the 
University of Montana Foundation (the Bolle Center for People and 
Forests and the Margery Hunter Brown Indian Law Clinic at the 
University of Montana). The Agreement requested from us the political 
and legal context of tribal co-management in the United States with 
selected cases and examples, a review of existing processes and authorities 
relevant to tribal co-management, and identification of potential 
legislative and executive actions. We were provided autonomy within this 
 
6. Initial participation included representatives from the Bears Ears 
Inter-Tribal Coalition, Conservation Colorado, Conservation Lands Foundation, 
Earthjustice, Montana Wilderness Association, Native American Rights Fund, 
National Audubon Society, National Congress of American Indians, National Parks 
Conservation Association, Natural Resources Defenses Council, National Wildlife 
Federation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Resources Legacy Fund, Sustainable Northwest, 
The Wilderness Society, and the Yurok Tribe.   
 




framework and the analysis and conclusions are ours alone, though we 
benefitted greatly from the multiple discussions we had with those 
working in the areas and places discussed herein.  
Phase II of the project is set for 2021 and will focus more on the 
complexities of tribal co-management in Alaska. Though it helped inform 
the shape of this Report, we believe the international context of tribal co-
management, especially the innovation going on with First Nations in 
Canada, will be particularly instructive in the Alaska phase of research. 
This will also be the point to provide more in-depth coverage of the 
intersection between tribal co-management and the National Wildlife 
Refuge System.   
Not included in this phase of research is the issue of restoring 
federal public lands to tribal trust ownership. Tribal land restoration 
efforts—past, present and future—are uniquely suited to address distinct 
histories, circumstances, and facts related to the tribal rights and interests 
on particular pieces of public lands. The issue deserves its own discrete 
analysis with a review of individual cases, such as the restoration of the 
National Bison Range in Montana. Also not reviewed in the Report are 
proposals of shared management and governance taking place on Indian 
lands managed in trust by the United States, such as options for managing 
the South Unit of Badlands National Park. Instead, the Report focuses on 
federal public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. 
Forest Service, National Park Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.   
Several cases of tribal co-management are reviewed to varying 
degrees in this Report. We use them for illustration, but our objective was 
to stay mostly focused on the more technical legal and policy dimensions 
in order to provide a common foundation and framework. Graduate and 
law students enrolled in the Bolle Center and Indian Law Clinics are 
scheduled to provide deeper investigations into these and other cases over 
academic year 2020–21. We hope that more detailed case histories, shared 
lessons, and strategic playbooks can be presented by tribal representatives 
and their conservation partners in subsequent phases of the project and 
made available on a website. The website would ideally become a rich 
online repository of technical information to facilitate learning across 
cases and places. In addition to the stories of particular places and 
collaborative successes, this resource would offer important assistance, 
with anything from statutes and consultation regulations and policies to 
638 contracts, assistance agreements, template MOUs, best practices in 
public lands planning, and frequently asked questions pertaining to tribal 
co-management and the tools used in the approach.   
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I. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
Understanding the import, scope, and dimensions of tribal co-
management on federal public lands demands an understanding of the 
history of Indian tribes, their connections to the lands that have become 
federal public lands, and the ways in which that history contributed to the 
long-standing legal principles underpinning tribal rights to engage in co-
management. The history of federal Indian law and policy is intimately 
intertwined with the founding and establishment of America but, for 
reasons explained below, public land law has largely marginalized or 
erased tribes,7 leaving the current discussion of tribal co-management of 
federal public lands bereft of the full legal and historical context. This 
section aims to remedy that divergence by developing a fuller context for 
considering tribal claims to co-management, including the historical 
expropriation of tribal lands, the relationship between those lands and 
today’s federal public lands, and the critical foundations of federal Indian 
law developed during that process, which remain relevant when 
considering modern assertions of tribal authority. Beyond simply a 
recitation of history, however, this section offers a different legal 
perspective and framework from which to consider tribal co-management. 
And, in view of the deep connections between tribes and the many federal 
public lands on which their ancestors existed for millennia, this history 
also provides important substantive benefits to applying that framework to 
support tribal involvement in managing those resources. 
A. Sovereign Since Time Immemorial 
While population estimates vary (and have been much debated),8 
North America has most certainly been populated by millions of 
indigenous people for millennia.9 These groups developed and maintain 
complex cultural and trade structures,10 including widespread land use and 
 
7. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the 
Possibility of Justice, 53 HARV C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 213 (2018). 
8. See Charles Mann, 1491, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2002), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/03/1491/302445/. 
9. See, e.g., Alexander Koch, et al., Earth System Impacts of the 
European Arrival and Great Dying in the Americas after 1492, 207 QUATERNARY SCI. 
REVS. 13, 17–18 (Mar. 2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2018.12.004 
(estimating a total of 60.5 million people living in the Americas as of 1492, including 
between 2.8–5.7 million in North America) [hereinafter Koch, et al., Earth System 
Impacts].  
10. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC 




resource management regimes.11 Although impossible to generalize about 
such a diverse range of cultures, languages, societies, and civilizations, 
many of these tribal groups, bands, clans, or families were intimately 
connected with the places on which they lived and across which they 
roamed. These long-standing, generational connections dating back to 
time immemorial remain core aspects of many modern tribal cultures and 
support the interests and commitments of many tribes to engage in the 
ongoing management and protection of the lands to which they trace their 
own histories and traditions. 
Recent efforts to map or delineate these traditional areas help 
illustrate the ubiquity and diversity of indigenous presence in what is now 
the United States. For example, Native Land Digital, a Canadian non-
profit organization, has produced an interactive internet resource showing 
approximate traditional territories of indigenous cultural and linguistic 
groups across the continent.12  
These efforts show the breadth and scope of traditional indigenous 
presence on the continent, with a range of cultures, governments, and 
societies inhabiting, traversing across, and relying upon nearly every part 
of what would become the United States.13 Importantly, that presence did 
not merely ground indigenous spirituality, cultural values, and lifeways; it 
also rooted tribal assertions of governmental power—sovereignty—in the 
lands upon which that power was exercised.14 Recognizing the depth and 
meaning of this presence is therefore critical to a complete understanding 
of modern tribal co-management. 
 
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2012). 
11. See, e.g., Koch, et al., supra note 9, at 19–20.  
12. Native Land, NATIVE LAND DIGITAL, https://www.Native-Land.ca, 
(last visited June 12, 2020); see also Tribal Connections, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, 
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=fe311f69cb1d43558227
d73bc34f3a32 (last visited June 12, 2020) (documenting tribal lands and land 
cessions).  
13. These boundaries are necessarily approximate, imprecise, and 
historically fluid but the presence of a variety of indigenous peoples across the 
continent is undeniable.  
14. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict between the ‘Public Trust’ 
and ‘Indian Trust’ Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Indian Nations, 39 
TULSA L. REV. 271 (2013) (“Native people have legal, moral, political, and cultural 
interests in their ancestral homelands, and these multiple and complex interests should 
not be described as purely ‘religious’ in nature.”). 
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B. Sovereignty and Treaties: European Legal Foundations  
and Federal Indian Law 
Understanding the fundamental principles of federal Indian law 
relevant to tribal co-management also demands historical context, 
although those principles often ignore the indigenous presence on the land 
since time immemorial and begin with the arrival of European colonists to 
the so-called “New World.”15 
The evolution of principles within the American context revolved 
around the legal standing of indigenous people and, due to the arrival of 
Europeans interested in claiming new territories, their rights to land.16 The 
natural rights of native people, most conclusively elaborated by Francisco 
de Vitoria in 1532, supported their fair treatment as co-equal sovereigns 
and the acquisition of their lands only with their consent.17 But those 
principles were disputed by competing theories of indigenous inferiority, 
on which European settlers could rely to freely confiscate land and 
overrun, if not exterminate, its original inhabitants.18  
Although those philosophical debates would continue (and come 
to parallel uncertainty and debate over the rights of the federal government 
to reserve public lands),19 the realpolitik of the colonial era demanded that 
European nations seek durable alliances with the powerful and numerous 
tribes of the continent. Therefore, in animating Vitoria’s principles of the 
natural rights of indigenous people, European countries negotiated 
agreements with tribes; an approach that necessarily “implied recognition 
of tribes as self-governing peoples.”20 Through these tools of international 
law, Europe’s sovereigns could ensure their colonizing interests and 
citizens would be protected and, more practically, secure actual claims to 
lands that had been claimed only in theory by colonial charters.21 More 
importantly, however, the use of treaties became a central part of relations 
with tribes that would persist well after America’s founding and, though 
 
15. See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER & KRISTEN A. CARPENTER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47, 47–71 (7th ed. 2017).  
16. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[1] (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed. 2012) [hereinafter Cohen’s Handbook].  
17. Id.  
18. See id. (summarizing conflicts between Vitoria’s theories and 
“[a]rguments that Indians possessed neither rights to property nor governmental 
status”). 
19. See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. 
REV. 631 (2018) (summarizing debates over federal property rights and claims). 
20. Getches et al., supra note 15, at 85. 
21. Id.  




not always adhering to the principles of respect in which those 
government-to-government bonds implied, the reliance by non-Indian 
governments on treaties ensured important tribal status and rights.22  
The international and European legal traditions that supported 
treaty-making mandated the sovereign-to-sovereign nature of those bonds; 
however, with colonial sovereigns well removed from their colonizing 
subjects, conflicts over sovereign promises were numerous. Land hungry 
British settlers pouring into tribal territories ultimately prompted King 
George III to restrict such migration via the Royal Proclamation of 1763.23 
Among other provocations, that action largely motivated the colonial 
resistance to ongoing British authority and sparked the Revolutionary 
War.24  
The founding of America brought a host of new challenges and 
legal traditions imposed upon Indian people; however, the recognition of 
tribes as sovereign governments, rooted in the treaty practices begun by 
European nations, endured. American law would soon embrace treaties 
and the inherent and pre-extant nature of tribal sovereignty, both of which 
would inform the establishment of the defining relationship between the 
federal government and Indian tribes.  
C. The Trust Relationship: America’s Founding, Tribes, and States 
Having played a central role in catalyzing the American 
Revolution, the status of and relationship to Indian tribes would continue 
to animate the development of the young nation’s legal traditions. The 
very presence of tribes—sovereign powers outside of the American 
system—within the boundaries of the original colonies posed challenging 
questions to the nature and extent of both federal and state power. The 
federal-state conflict over authority to manage tribal relations was a 
remnant of the “divided legacy” from colonial times and echoed the 
founders’ complaints about the distant edicts of King George.25 The 
Articles of Confederation plainly illustrated the conflict; reserving to 
Congress the “sole and exclusive right and power” over Indian affairs but 
only so long as such power did not infringe or violate “the legislative right 
of any State within its own limits.”26 The continuing use of treaties, 
negotiated by representatives of the Continental Congress, further 
 
22. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.02. 
23. Royal Proclamation, Oct. 7, 1763, reprinted in 3 THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
AND THE UNITED STATES 2135–39 (Wilcomb Washburn, ed., Greenwood Press 1973). 
24. Getches et al., supra note 15, at 67–69. 
25. Gregory Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1011 (2014). 
26. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
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exacerbated the divide. In Georgia, for example, the 1785 Treaty of 
Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation guaranteed peace to the Cherokee and 
protection by the United States.27 But the State of Georgia refused to 
acknowledge this undue nationalist interference in matters that Georgia 
viewed as integral to state sovereignty.28  
In addition to treaty-making with the Cherokee and other tribes,29 
the early American government also sought to assume primary 
responsibility for protecting tribes and their properties from incursion by 
states through other means. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, for 
example, provided for both protection and respect for tribal lands as well 
as limits on state authority to interfere with federal power to sell or secure 
title in acquired lands.30 That pre-constitutional enactment highlighted 
federal efforts to assert preeminence in both Indian affairs and the control 
of property, both of which would become central to the eventual 
establishment of federal public lands.31  
These conflicts informed, if not motivated, the framing of the U.S. 
Constitution, which, according to Professor Gregory Ablavsky, 
represented a federal guarantee to reticent states to remove Indians from 
state boundaries.32 The Constitution cemented the prominence of federal 
authority and resolved the uncertainty and confusion created by the 
Articles of Confederation by expressly reserving to the Congress the 
exclusive authority to regulate “commerce . . .  with the Indians” while 
also confirming the supremacy of treaties made by and between the United 
States and the tribes to state laws.33 But the details of that prominence 
remained to be fleshed out. 
In exercise of its constitutional authority to regulate commerce 
with tribes, many of the early actions taken by Congress sought to provide 
a framework for dealing with the trade of tribal lands. These trade and 
intercourse laws echoed the formerly reviled Proclamation of 1763 by 
limiting the validity of purchases of tribal lands to transactions 
 
27. Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.02[3]; Treaty with the 
Cherokees, 1785, pmbl., 7 Stat. 18. 
28. See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra note 25, at 1029–30 (describing Georgia’s 
reaction to the treaty negotiations at Hopewell). 
29. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.02[3]. 
30. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334, 340–41 (1787). 
31. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Federal Public Lands 
Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 505 (2019) (describing the Northwest 
Ordinance’s role in “the beginning of the nation’s public lands”). 
32. Ablavsky, supra note 25, at 1072 (explaining federal promises to 
provide military support and “eradicate the Indian threat”). 
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 




consummated or ratified by the federal government.34 Conceivably, in 
conjunction with treaty-making committed to respecting tribes as co-equal 
sovereigns, these provisions would ensure federal protection for tribes and 
their territories, to be forfeited only upon negotiation of an acceptable 
treaty. But, with the changing political dynamics, the implicit guarantees 
of federal deference to state interests, and the growing pressure on tribes 
and their territories, this arrangement quickly became significantly 
unilateral, with the United States acquiring vast swaths of tribal territory 
for little or nothing in return.35 
These practical acts of conquest were soon legitimized by the 
United States Supreme Court, which, in its 1823 decision in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh,36 established an overriding and supreme federal authority over 
tribal lands. Relying on his view of history, Chief Justice John Marshall, 
who would go on to write two more foundational federal Indian law 
decisions,37 determined that, in acceding to Britain’s colonial claims, the 
United States acquired the “absolute ultimate title . . . , subject only to the 
Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the 
exclusive right of acquiring.”38 This splitting of title between the United 
States and tribes put the federal government in charge of acquiring, 
managing, and overseeing tribal territories, a relationship that would 
inform the establishment of the government’s trust duties to tribes and 
remains in place across present-day Indian reservations, which include 
“trust lands” held by the United States for the benefit of resident tribes.39  
Ongoing conflicts between the State of Georgia and the Cherokee 
Nation would offer additional opportunities for Chief Justice Marshall and 
the Supreme Court to further define the nature of that trust relationship. 
Georgia, like other states seeking to establish their sovereignty and claims 
to greater territory, ignored federal treaty promises to the Cherokee and, 
instead, simply sought to extend its powers over Cherokee territory.40 In 
 
34. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Cohen’s 
Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.03[2] (reviewing similar acts).  
35. See, e.g., Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, §1.03[3] (describing 
treaty strategies of the Jefferson administration following the Louisiana Purchase of 
1803).  
36. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
37. See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  
38. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592. 
39. See Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From 
Conquest & Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763, 767 
(2011) (noting the continuation of “conquest” represented by the “co-ownership” 
created by the Johnson decision).  
40. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 11; see also CLAUDIO SAUNT, 
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considering the Cherokee’s claims to protection, Chief Justice Marshall 
described the tribe as a “domestic, dependent nation,”41 which remains a 
descriptor of tribal status.42 With regard to the federal-tribal relationship, 
Marshall analyzed the United States’ role in agreeing to treaties like the 
Treaty of Hopewell to determine that the Cherokee were to be protected 
by the United States; like a “ward to [the United States as] guardian.”43  
The next year, in Worcester v. Georgia,44 Marshall again relied on 
treaties in upholding the exclusive federal nature of this role.45 In doing 
so, the Supreme Court excluded Georgia law from applying within the 
Cherokee’s territory as it would interfere with the treaties, which were 
recognized by the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.46 Worcester 
ultimately insulated the Cherokee Nation from Georgia’s laws and 
explicitly protected the tribe’s “distinct community,”47 thereby reinforcing 
and protecting the tribe’s sovereignty in addition to emphasizing the 
importance of treaties and securing the federal-tribal trust relationship. 
Notwithstanding these important precedents, the Cherokee and 
other tribes of the southeast were forcibly removed from their homelands 
pursuant to a federal law authorizing exchange of tribal lands in the 
southeast for lands farther west.48 The political divide over the legislation 
highlighted the conflict between honoring the legal principles announced 
by Chief Justice Marshall, including the importance of the United States’ 
treaty guarantees, and the land hungry desires of largely slave-owning 
capitalists interested in expanding their commerce.49 In a foreshadowing 
of the remaining decades of the nineteenth century, the political power of 
the latter won the day and tribal concerns were ignored in service of 
broader national (non-Indian) interests.  
Nonetheless, the three foundational legal concepts forged during 
this pivotal era: tribal sovereignty, the trust relationship, and treaties, 
became the basis for understanding federal Indian law. Their evolution and 
 
UNWORTHY REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO 
INDIAN TERRITORY, 27–49 (2020) (discussing Georgia’s incalcitrance toward federal 
authority and tribal presence in the lead up to the 1830 Removal Act). 
41. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
42. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 587 U.S. 782, 
788 (2014) (“Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations.’”). 
43. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
44. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
45. Id. at 561 (“whole intercourse between the United States and this 
nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States”). 
46. Id. at 559–60. 
47. Id. at 561. 
48. Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. 
49. See Saunt, supra note 40, at 53–83. 




treatment by Congress, the courts, and policymakers have defined the 
rights and obligations of Indian tribes ever since. In addition, like the 
connection between federal, tribal, and state interests in lands covered by 
the Northwest Ordinance or seized by Georgia citizens as the Cherokee 
were removed from their lands, treaties, the trust relationship, and tribal 
sovereignty have been central to the acquisition and establishment of the 
nation’s public lands and, therefore, provide an important framework for 
analyzing tribal co-management of those resources.  
D. Indian Tribes and Public Lands 
Each year, the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
publishes a report documenting public land statistics.50 In these reports, 
the BLM aims to document the current state of public lands that it manages 
but also provides a brief history of the acquisition of that estate and its 
evolution over time. In each of its reports issued in the new millennium, 
however, the agency neglects to mention Indian tribes, their historical 
presence, or any role that federal Indian law and the federal government’s 
continuing subjugation of those tribes played in acquiring the nearly 250 
million surface acres now managed by the BLM.51 Instead, the most recent 
Public Land Statistics publication, like its predecessors, explains the 
federal government’s acquisition of lands ceded by states (like those 
covered by the Northwest Ordinance), purchases of territory from foreign 
countries, like the Louisiana Purchase, and other means, like the 
annexation of Texas.52 In doing so, the report provides an orderly historical 
explanation of the growth of federal ownership, amounting to a total of 1.8 
billion acres in lands acquired as public domain lands, and, following the 
disposition of 1.3 billion of those acres by the federal government, the 
continuing management of those public lands by the BLM (and other 
agencies) “so that they are used in a manner that will best meet the present 
and future needs of the nation.”53 
This report’s erasure of any tribal interest or role in the creation of 
America’s public lands mirrors the manner in which the federal government 
wielded its plenary authority over Indian affairs to largely erase tribes and 
 
50. See Public Land Statistics, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND 
MANAGEMENT, https://www.blm.gov/about/data/public-land-statistics (last visited 
June 12, 2020). 
51. See, e.g., Public Land Statistics 2018, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND 
MANAGEMENT 1, 4 (Aug. 2019), https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/PublicLand 
Statistics2018.pdf.  
52. Id.   
53. Id. at 1. 
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tribal people from the landscapes that they had occupied since time 
immemorial. Although the trust relationship originally articulated by Chief 
Justice Marshall in the Cherokee cases envisioned a strong federal 
government stepping in to protect tribes, honor treaty promises, and 
insulate their sovereignty from state or other interference, that 
interpretation evolved to enable the federal government to pursue other 
priorities like extinguishing Indian title to enable settlement and 
development regardless of tribal interests. In doing so, the federal 
government relied on its time-honored practice of treaty-making, at least 
until 1871, when, in a fit of political discord over the role of the U.S. 
Senate in ratifying treaties, Congress passed an act prohibiting further 
treaties.54 Thereafter, the federal government still negotiated agreements 
with tribes and further relied on Presidential orders to establish Indian 
reservations, thereby limiting tribes to smaller and smaller territories while 
unifying the United States’ title to lands those tribes were induced, 
coerced, or forced to cede.  
By the late 1800s, even those much smaller reservations were not 
immune from disintegration, as federal policy swung toward further 
breaking up tribal land bases and opening up those lands to settlement, 
acquisition, and ownership by non-Indians as well as the state and federal 
governments. Spurred on by decisions of the Supreme Court authorizing 
boundless plenary power to largely do as it pleased with regard to Indian 
affairs,55 Congress passed the Allotment Act of 1887, a law designed to 
destroy the integrity of many remaining tribal lands, which it did to great 
effect.56 Ultimately, the Supreme Court even went so far as to bless 
Congressional abrogation of treaty promises, ruling that, where Congress 
decides it appropriate, the promises of the United States to tribes may be 
rendered meaningless.57 
 
54. Act of March 3, 1871, § 1, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566. 
55. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) 
(upholding Congress’ extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country 
because Congress’ “power . . . over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak 
and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of 
those among whom they dwell [and such power] must exist in th[e federal] 
Government, because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its 
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States; because it has never 
been denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes”). 
56. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.04 (noting the loss of over 
90 million acres—one-third of the tribal land base—during the Allotment Era, from 
1887 to 1934). 
57. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (“[I]t was never 
doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that, in a contingency, 
such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy, 




By twisting or setting aside the foundational principles of federal 
Indian law and wielding its growing military, economic, and population 
advantages, the United States removed Indian tribes from lands it had 
acquired through other means and unified its title by extinguishing tribal 
occupancy and possession. Those lands would become 30 of the nation’s 
50 states and, particularly in the western United States and Alaska, would 
remain in federal ownership to be managed as public lands.58  
The examples of these interconnections are numerous. In what 
would become southern Oregon and northern California, for example, the 
Klamath people existed for generation upon generation. In 1864, the 
Klamath ceded claims to nearly 12 million acres and reserved a much 
smaller reservation in what would soon be the State of Oregon.59 The Tribe 
also reserved continuing rights to hunt and fish through that treaty. Less 
than a century later, after the allotment of the reservation in the late 1800s, 
which resulted in a significant loss of land, the federal government came 
calling again when, in 1954, Congress passed the Klamath Termination 
Act, dissolving the tribe’s status and effectively ending the federal 
government’s trust obligations to the tribe.60 As part of that Act, the federal 
government offered to pay tribal members for their interests in the tribes 
lands and ultimately condemned other former reservation lands.61 The 
result was that 70% of the former reservation ended up in federal 
ownership to be managed as a refuge under the authority of the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) or national forest lands 
administered and managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS).62 
Although the Tribe retains important rights across its former reservation 
lands,63 the ownership and management of those lands lies within federal 
auspices and is governed by federal laws, regulations, practices, and 
policies in which the Tribe has little say or influence. 
While important, the foundations of federal Indian law are not 
solely relevant for illustrating this dark history of tribal dispossession and 
the creation of federal public lands. Although often manipulated to serve 
other interests, those legal principles have endured and, in the modern era 
of federal policies focused on promoting tribal self-determination, treaties, 
 
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians.”). 
58. See Public Land Statistics, supra note 50, at 1. 
59. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 1983).  
60. Act of Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-587, § 1, 68 Stat. 718; Adair, 
723 F.2d at 1398. 
61. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1398.  
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 1412–13 (holding that reserved water rights associated with 
the Tribe’s treaty survived the termination act). 
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the trust responsibility, and tribal sovereignty all ground important tribal 
rights to their traditional territories and require accommodation by the 
federal agencies managing public lands. 
E. Legacies of History, Law, and Context 
Throughout this report, we rely on case studies and particular 
examples to help illustrate the myriad means of tribal co-management and 
its varied successes, failures, and complexities. A few examples also help 
demonstrate the modern implications of treaties, tribal sovereignty, and 
the federal government’s trust responsibilities to Indian tribes. 
F. The Canons of Construction and Tribal Rights on Public Lands 
For at least the last ten centuries, the bands of the Ute Tribes have 
occupied the lands of Colorado, Utah, and the Four Corners region.64 
While different bands traditionally occupied certain parts of this vast 
region, collectively, the Utes’ traditional territory included most of 
present-day Colorado and Utah as well as parts of New Mexico, Arizona, 
and Wyoming.65 As with all tribes across the western United States, 
however, the rush of non-Indian migration soon brought federal officials 
seeking to negotiate treaties that would ultimately define and reduce this 
vast Ute territory. But the first treaty entered by the Ute Tribes and the 
United States, in 1849, paralleled other treaties of the time by establishing 
an exclusive federal-tribal relationship, rooted in friendship and peace 
while guaranteeing free passage across and seeking to define the 
boundaries of the then-current Ute territory.66  
Within two decades, however, the United States’ desire to close 
the frontier and secure limited territories reserved to tribes brought a new 
round of negotiators, this time as part of what would be the last round of 
official treaty-making done by President Grant’s Great Peace Commission 
of 1867 and 1868.67 The Ute Treaty of 1868 reduced the Tribes’ traditional 
 
64. PETER R. DECKER, THE UTES MUST GO! AMERICAN EXPANSION AND 
THE REMOVAL OF A PEOPLE 8 (2004). 
65. Id. at 14–15. 
66. Treaty with the Utahs, Dec. 30, 1849, 9 Stat. 984, reprinted in 2 
CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 585–88 (1904). The 
treaty was entered only with the Muache Band of Utes though the United States 
believed it to be binding on the entire Ute Tribe. Decker, supra note 65, at 26–27.  
67. An Act to Establish Peace with Certain Hostile Indian Tribes, § 1, ch. 
32, 15 Stat. 17 (1867) (establishing and charging the Commission with making treaties 
with tribes in order to “remove all just causes of complaint on their part” while also 
“establish[ing] security for person and property along the lines of railroad . . . [which] 




territory dramatically while reserving nearly the western third of what 
would become Colorado as a reservation.68 Within five years, the 
discovery of gold and silver in the San Juan Mountains of the southern part 
of the Ute Reservation brought a stampede of non-Indian prospectors. 
Federal negotiators again reached an agreement with the Ute requiring the 
Tribes to cede a large block of territory encompassing those lands.69 In 
doing so, however, the Tribes reserved the “right to hunt upon said [ceded] 
lands so long as the game lasts and the Indians are at peace with the white 
people.”70 Though political, military, social, and legal conflicts over the 
next generation would drive some Ute bands out of Colorado and onto 
reservations in Utah, reducing the Tribes’ lands in Colorado to a narrow 
strip of two reservations in the southwestern corner of the state, that 
language and the rights reserved by it would come to ensure important 
future opportunities for the Ute Tribes who remained in Colorado.71  
The United States Supreme Court has long sought to ensure that 
treaty promises made by the United States, like those in the so-called 
Brunot Agreement with the Ute Tribes, are not rendered meaningless 
simply by the passage of time. To do so, the Court has developed and relied 
upon rules for interpreting treaty language that protect the bonds of the 
federal-tribal relationship and help ensure balance between the nation’s 
 
will most likely insure civilization for Indians and peace and security for the whites”). 
68. Treaty with the Ute, May 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619.  
69. An Act to Ratify an Agreement with Certain Ute Indians in Colorado 
and Make an Appropriation for Carrying out the Same, ch. 13618 Stat. 36 (1874) 
(known as the “Brunot Agreement”) (Although technically not a treaty—the 
agreement was made after 1871—it was ratified by Congress and has the same legal 
effect.). 
70. Id. at art. II, 18 Stat. at 37. 
71. On the removal of the Utes from Colorado, see generally Decker, 
supra note 65. As a result of subsequent Congressional actions and conflicting 
interpretations of the tribal signatories to the Brunot Agreement, the Ute bands now 
in Utah have not yet been able to exercise reserved rights in the area ceded by the 
Brunot Agreement. Associated Press, Ute Tribe Wants Colorado Hunting Rights, 
DESERET NEWS (May 25, 2000), https://www.deseret.com/2000/5/25/19508715/ute 
-tribe-wants-colorado-hunting-rights. In addition, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe’s 
reservation was eventually opened for allotment, resulting in a checkerboard pattern 
of ownership, including United States Forest Service lands, within the reservation’s 
boundaries. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Southern Ute Indian Tribe and Ute Mountain 
Ute Tribe in Support of Petitioner, Herrera v. Wyoming, No. 17-532, filed Sept. 11, 
2018, 11–13. On September 21, 2012, President Barack Obama proclaimed a portion 
of these lands as Chimney Rock National Monument, which is managed in 
consultation with the Southern Ute Indian Tribe. USFS, Chimney Rock National 
Monument Final Management Plan, 1, 11 (Aug. 2015), http://www.fs.usda.gov/ 
project/?project=42952.  
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constitutional structure of federalism and tribal sovereigns who exist 
entirely outside of that framework.72 These Indian canons of construction 
demand that courts work to understand treaty language as the Indians 
would have understood it at the time it was negotiated and that the rights 
reserved by tribes through treaties remain intact unless Congress clearly 
and unambiguously abrogates those rights.73 The canons also help 
emphasize that a “treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant 
of right from them[—]a reservation of those not granted.”74  
Most recently, the Court relied on the canons of construction to 
uphold the rights reserved by the Crow Tribe in their 1868 Treaty with the 
United States (a treaty also negotiated as part of the Great Peace 
Commission’s work) to hunt in the Bighorn National Forest of 
Wyoming.75 In doing so, the Court considered Wyoming’s reliance on a 
Supreme Court decision from the late 1800s finding that similar treaty 
rights ended upon Wyoming’s statehood.76 But, because the language of 
the treaty did not mention any such termination date, nor would the Crow 
have so understood the treaty, the Court rejected Wyoming’s arguments 
and confirmed that the Crow’s rights to hunt in “unoccupied” areas of the 
National Forest remain valid, some 150 years after they were reserved.77 
Like the Court’s recent confirmation of the Crow’s treaty reserved 
rights, the rights reserved by the Ute Tribes in the Brunot Agreement could 
be fortified against diminution by the canons of construction; however, the 
Tribes faced challenges in using those rights across the broad swath of area 
they ceded in the Brunot Agreement, much of which is federal public land 
managed by the USFS.78 Importantly, however, because the Tribes’ rights 
were centered on hunting, the difficulties they faced arose from attempts 
by the State of Colorado to prosecute tribal members for exercising those 
 
72. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 2.02[2]. 
73. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 
U.S. 172, 196 (1999) (hereinafter Mille Lacs) (“[W]e interpret Indian treaties to give 
effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them.”); id. at 
202 (“Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, but it must clearly express its intent 
to do so.”). The Supreme Court has extended these canons of interpretations beyond 
treaties as well, applying them to agreements, statutes, and other federal enactments 
in order to ensure that the federal government’s unique obligations to tribes are 
fulfilled. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 2.02[1]. 
74. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
75. Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).  
76. Id. at 1694–97. 
77. Id. at 1699–1700. 
78. See Tribal Connections, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, https://www.arcgis. 
com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=fe311f69cb1d43558227d73bc34f3a32 (last 
visited June 12, 2020) (the Brunot cession is shown as cession 566). 




rights. In fact, as the result of one such prosecution in 1972, the Southern 
Ute Indian Tribe agreed not to pursue further exercise of its reserved rights 
so as to avoid the continuing threat of state prosecutions of its members.79 
That fact illustrates one further complexity confronting the potential for 
tribal co-management of federal lands, namely that the federal government 
has traditionally deferred to state authority over wildlife management 
across the public lands, rendering co-management in these situations a 
potentially tripartite affair.80 So, in order to effectuate the rights that the 
Tribe reserved with the federal government in the 1872 Brunot Agreement, 
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe approached the State of Colorado to develop 
an agreement and process through which the Tribe’s members might again 
hunt in the Brunot area. 
The intergovernmental agreement ultimately reached between 
Colorado and the Southern Ute Indian Tribe is rooted in and based on the 
unique status of the Tribe’s Brunot Agreement rights but also recognizes 
and upholds the Tribe’s sovereign rights to manage wildlife and enforce 
its own laws regarding that management.81 In negotiating that agreement, 
the Tribe relied on the Indian canons of construction, tribal traditional 
practices, and historical records, all of which supported the Tribe’s 
understanding that the rights it reserved in the Brunot Agreement included 
“trapping, fishing, and gathering” rights, even though the Agreement itself 
only used the word “hunt.”82 Thus, the legal standing of the Tribe’s 
reserved rights and the long-standing rules for interpreting treaties and 
agreements between the United States and Indian tribes secured the actual 
implementation of important sovereign, cultural, and traditional rights for 
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.83 
In addition to the co-management of wildlife resources with the 
State of Colorado, those historical understandings, the progression of 
 
79. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Southern Ute Indian 
Tribe and the State of Colorado Concerning Wildlife Management and Enforcement 
in the Brunot Area, 1 (Sept. 15, 2008) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Brunot 
MOU]. 
80. See, e.g., Martin Nie et al., Fish and Wildlife Management on Federal 
Lands: Debunking State Supremacy, 47 ENVTL. L. 797 (2017). 
81. See Brunot MOU, supra note 80, at 3–5 (recognizing shared 
principles of management, tribal authorities, and the traditional practices of the Tribe, 
which included hunting species that the State may consider “non-game” as well as 
gathering and fishing). 
82. Id. at 1.  
83. The neighboring Ute Mountain Ute Tribe soon secured a similar 
agreement with the State of Colorado. See Joe Hanel, Ute Tribe Hunting Agreement 
gets Approval, DURANGO HERALD (Jan. 11, 2013), https://durangoherald.com/ 
articles/49901.  
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treaties, and the implementation of important traditional tribal reserved 
rights all supported and were included in the USFS’s analysis of Areas of 
Tribal Importance within the area’s national forests.84 That assessment will 
help guide future forest planning and resource management, thereby 
improving the USFS management and protection of tribal interests in the 
area over prior forest plans which largely limited or excluded those rights 
from consideration.85  
G. Understanding Sovereignty and the Trust Responsibility  
through Alaska 
Like the rest of the United States, the federal government acquired 
the territory that now comprises Alaska while it was already possessed and 
occupied by indigenous peoples. As with the Louisiana or Gadsden 
purchases, the United States’ 1867 deal with Russia gave it the right to 
exclude other international sovereigns but, by the terms of that agreement, 
the United States expressly recognized the presence of the region’s 
original residents.86 The framework of federal Indian law had already been 
sketched out and, therefore, that treaty indicated the federal government’s 
intent to apply that structure to Alaska’s “uncivilized native tribes.”87 
Although that language implies that members of “civilized” Tribes would 
be considered American citizens, the distinction was largely ignored for 
purposes of the legal status of Native Tribes in Alaska, who—with some 
exceptions—were considered under the same principles of federal Indian 
law throughout the final decades of the 1800s.88  
This treatment vacillated through the early 1900s, particularly as 
it related to the United States’ recognition of tribal lands and property 
interests, a challenge that Congress eventually sought to remedy by 
amending the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to include Alaska 
Natives.89 The IRA marked a distinct shift in federal Indian policy by 
ending the failed allotment era and providing an avenue for tribes to 
acquire trust lands, adopt tribal constitutions, and unequivocally 
 
84. See, e.g., Grand Mesa, Uncompahgre, and Gunnison National 
Forests, Revised Draft Forest Assessments: Areas of Tribal Importance, U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE (Mar. 2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/ 
fseprd573530.pdf.  
85. Id. at 10. 
86. Treaty of March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, 542. 
87. Id. 
88. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND 
AMERICAN LAWS, 55–56 (3d ed. 2012). 
89. Act of May 1, 1936, 49 Stat. 1250 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 5119 
(2018)). 




recognizing tribal sovereign authority.90 But, when it came to applying 
those principles to acquire and protect tribal lands in Alaska, the United 
States’ ability to do so was ultimately “relatively limited and 
fragmented.”91 Thus, while treaty relationships, the reservation system, 
and trust lands remain mostly foreign to the federal government’s 
treatment of Alaska Native Tribes, the core of that sovereign relationship 
still resolves around the inherent sovereignty of those Tribes. Therefore, 
while the unique history, laws, and property status of Alaska Native Tribes 
might suggest that they should be considered outside of the scope of 
general principles of federal Indian law, their continuing exercise of tribal 
sovereignty provides a clearer window through which to understand the 
nature of tribal sovereignty, the federal government’s trust relationship, 
and their relevance for comprehending the potential for tribal co-
management of public lands.  
What is now Alaska was historically inhabited by a wide variety 
of indigenous cultures, languages, and societies. While these tribal groups 
remain in present-day Alaska and continue their cultural and governmental 
traditions, their claims to the lands on which they reside have evolved quite 
differently than the history of treaty-making in the American expansion 
described above. For example, unlike the western continental United 
States, what is now Alaska was not acquired from the various groups of 
Alaska Native peoples through treaties and, in many instances, remain 
unceded lands. 
Instead, questions and uncertainty around the status of Alaska 
Native claims to aboriginal title—the title recognized by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh and to which the United States acquired 
the exclusive right to extinguish through treaties—dogged the first century 
of the federal-tribal relationship in the state.92 While the inclusion of 
Alaska Natives in the IRA signaled federal recognition of their sovereign 
authority, their relative isolation in villages and legal challenges to tribal 
authority over the few reservations that were recognized posed serious 
questions to the “legitimacy” of such claims.93 In 1955, the United States 
Supreme Court dealt a further blow to those claims, holding that, despite 
the language of the 1867 treaty with Russia and various congressional 
actions recognizing tribal rights, the federal government was not obligated 
 
90. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–
5144). 
91. See, e.g., Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 60–62 (noting the 
subsequent practical limitations on the federal government’s ability to create and 
protect reservation and trust lands in Alaska). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 62.  
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to compensate Alaska Natives for any taking of their aboriginal lands 
because the United States had not “recognized” such ownership.94 Further, 
relying on the notions of discovery and conquest from Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, the Court excused the United States from any compensation 
even when terminating aboriginal title.95  
Notwithstanding that much criticized and reviled decision, 
however, subsequent efforts by the Tlingit and Haida Indians to pursue 
compensation from the Indian Claims Commission, which Congress 
established in 1946 to allow tribes to seek compensation for the taking of 
their lands in unfair treaty deals, seemed to support the rights of Alaska 
Native Tribes to compensation for the taking of their lands.96 In addition, 
Alaska’s Statehood Act, like those of other western states, disclaimed any 
rights to Native lands or property, like continued fishing rights, and a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision suggested that, perhaps, the Act’s 
preservation of the “status quo” with regard to those aboriginal claims 
neither “extinguish[ed] them nor recognize[d] them as compensable.”97 
The uncertainty swirling around the scope and extent of the land and 
property rights of Alaska Natives ran headlong into Congress’ 
authorization for the state of Alaska to acquire a portion of public lands, 
prompting further conflict and an eventual freezing of that process by the 
Department of the Interior.98  
That conflict prompted Congress to seek a comprehensive 
solution that would allow the state to acquire lands and, perhaps more 
importantly, enable access to the region’s oil reserves. Thus, where the 
United States had for much of the prior century relied on the treaty-making 
process and its own plenary power to extinguish tribal claims to the 
continental states and the public lands that would be created therein, the 
events and conflicting legal treatment of the claims of Alaska Natives over 
the bulk of the twentieth century prompted a different approach to 
resolving those claims.99 As a result, the treaty relationships that 
undergirded the recognition of tribal sovereignty elsewhere were 
irrelevant to Alaska; however, like their continental tribal counterparts, 
 
94. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278–79 (1955). 
95. Id. at 284–85. 
96. See Case & Voluck,  supra note 89, at 132–33. 
97. Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 65 (1962). 
98. Case & Voluck,  supra note 89, at 134–35, 276–77. 
99. Cases arising after Congress adopted that new solution served to 
confirm that the aboriginal title claims of Alaska Natives should not be distinguished 
from those of other tribes and, therefore, according to the leading treatise on Alaska 
Native law and policy, “the most tenable legal conclusion is that . . . Alaska Native 
title had the same legal status as original Indian title elsewhere in the United States.” 
Id. at 79. 




Alaska Native Tribes continued to uphold and exercise their inherent 
sovereign rights. 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)100 was 
Congress’ solution to the seemingly intractable quagmire that ensconced 
the early years of Alaska’s statehood. As described by one treatise, 
ANCSA aimed to balance four competing interests: 
 
First were the Alaska Natives, represented by over two 
hundred villages or tribes, which held the aboriginal claim 
to some 365 million acres of land. Under ANCSA, Native 
corporations would own about 45.7 million of these acres. 
Second was the state of Alaska, with its claim to about 
103 million acres under the Statehood Act. Third was the 
federal government itself, which held the remaining 
approximately 216 million acres. Finally, there were the 
environmental interests that became increasingly 
concerned about the effect of these land settlements on 
wildlife, habitat, and other ecological values.101 
 
While immensely complicated and subject to many subsequent legislative 
efforts to improve its implementation,102 the core of ANCSA—like so 
many historical tribal treaty cessions before it—extinguished aboriginal 
title claims, including any claims to “aboriginal hunting or fishing rights,” 
upon the lands in the state of Alaska.103 The law then authorized the 
claiming of lands and interests therein by newly created Native villages, 
regional and urban corporations, as well as the state and federal 
government but, with regard to the Native lands, they would not be held 
in trust or otherwise treated like tribal lands in the rest of the country.104  
Importantly, ANCSA said nothing about its impact on the inherent 
sovereign authority of Alaska Native Tribes.105 Nonetheless, despite the 
 
100. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as 
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601—1629h (2018)). 
101. Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 278 (citations omitted); see also 
Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished Business, 43 
TULSA L. REV. 17, 28 (2007) (describing the events leading up to “the inevitable 
collision” of Alaska’s statehood and the claims of its Native peoples). 
102. See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 
Act of Dec. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 95-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101—
3233 (2018)) (addressing the federal conservation lands intended for reservation by § 
17(d)(2) of ANCSA); see also Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 278. 
103. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2018). 
104. Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 280–83. 
105. See Anderson, supra note 101, at 35–37. 
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usually applicable Indian canon of construction dictating that tribal rights 
remain unless expressly abrogated by Congress, the United States 
Supreme Court soon severed any claim of Alaska Native sovereignty from 
those properties, holding in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government, 106 that Congress did not intend for lands conveyed to 
corporations under ANCSA to be considered Indian Country over which 
the Tribes would exercise territorial authority. Thus, the continuing 
existence of tribal sovereignty in Alaska was called into significant doubt 
and the separation of that sovereignty from a tribal land base presented a 
significant distinction between Alaska Native Tribes and those to which 
the general principles of federal Indian law would otherwise apply.  
But, as the result of subsequent litigation,107 various congressional 
acts recognizing Alaska Native Tribes on the same bases as other tribes,108 
and the inclusion of 229 Alaska Native groups in the congressionally-
mandated list of federally recognized Indian tribes,109 it is clear that there 
remains a unique form of tribal sovereignty across Alaska. Further, while 
a number of other laws ensure the rights of individual Alaska Natives to 
federal services as Indians and protect their rights to continue their 
traditional subsistence lifeways,110 there are growing avenues through 
which this sovereignty is being exercised, particularly as the federal 
government continues to recognize Alaska Native Tribes on the same basis 
as other tribal sovereigns. Unlike those other sovereigns, however, given 
the unique separation of Alaska Native property and sovereignty, the 
exercise of that authority by Alaska Native Tribes is largely exclusive of 
 
106. 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998). Outside of one existing reservation, some 
limited parcels of trust land remain in Alaska; see Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 111.  
107. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999). 
108. Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 426–32. 
109. List of Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from 
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 85 Fed. Reg. 5462, 5466–67 (Jan. 30, 
2020); see Cabazon Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians of the Cabazon Reservation, 
Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364 (Oct. 21, 1993) (explaining the initial 
inclusion of these entities on the list as “expressly and unequivocally acknowledging 
that the Department [of the Interior on behalf of the United States] has determined that 
the villages and regional tribes [on the list] are distinctly Native communities and have 
the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states”). 
110. See, e.g., Case & Voluck, supra note 89, at 242–45 (describing the 
federal trust relationship and services to individual Alaska Natives), 297–300 
(explaining the legal issues surrounding ANILCA’s protection for Native subsistence 
practices and its compromises). 




their interests in land, although efforts have been made to allow for trust 
land acquisitions in Alaska.111  
Therefore, the federal government’s obligations to these Tribes 
run exclusively along that sovereign-to-sovereign basis and represent a 
trust obligation to fulfill and protect purely sovereign interests, largely 
without regard to federal trust obligations to property. As such, like the 
tribal exercise of rights guaranteed through the government-to-
government bonds established by treaties, the United States has sacred 
obligations to honor and abide by the sovereignty of Alaska Native Tribes. 
These foundational principles of federal Indian law and their 
historical context help situate the claims and interests of tribes in pursuing 
broader co-management authorities and responsibilities on federal public 
lands. Rather than isolating tribal sovereignty, cultural values, and legal 
standing from questions of public land management, this history and the 
development of the United States’ treaty relationships and trust 
responsibilities to Indian tribes demonstrate the centrality of tribes to those 
questions. In addition to this important legal context, the millennia of 
connection between Indigenous Americans and the landscape now largely 
managed by federal land agencies provide an additional base of ecological 
expertise that could be incorporated into and improve management 
decisions. Unfortunately, however, public land law has ignored and often 
severed the legal, historical, and cultural connections between the 
management of public lands and the original inhabitants of those areas. 
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT  
BY FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 
This section reviews various traditional approaches to tribal 
engagement in the management and oversight of federal public lands, 
including tribal consultation and cooperation in the evaluation of certain 
federal actions pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), the role of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and 
authority of Indian tribes to contract or compact with the federal 
government to assume certain management responsibilities. While none 
 
111. See, e.g., Akiachak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 827 F.3d 
100 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (dismissing appeal regarding lawfulness of Interior’s decision to 
take land into trust in Alaska); Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888 (Dec. 23, 2014) (publishing final rule authorizing 
land trust land acquisitions in Alaska; but see Department of Interior Solicitor 
Memorandum M-37053 (June 29, 2018) (withdrawing prior opinion recognizing 
authority to take land into trust in Alaska), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/ 
uploads/m-37053.pdf.  
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of these approaches in isolation amount to tribal co-management, they 
provide important context for understanding the complexity of those 
approaches and the challenges that implementing it will present. 
Subsections include examples and recommendations for how these 
traditional approaches can possibly be used as a bridge to more substantive 
co-management models in the future.   
A. The Framework of Federal Public Lands Management 
The historical exclusion of Indigenous people and Native nations 
from lands that they traditionally occupied enabled the acquisition, 
disposition, and management of those areas by the federal government. 
The supremacy of federal authority in this regard, rooted in the 
Constitution, was bolstered by the Supreme Court’s determination that the 
United States retained the exclusive right to extinguish aboriginal title 
across the lands purchased or seized from other non-tribal sovereigns.112 
Consistent with the expansionism of the era, the federal government’s first 
phase of public lands policy promoted development and economic return 
through the sale of significant acreage to railroads, settlers, and other 
interests.113 Soon, however, a second era of public lands policy dawned 
and, contrary to the exploitative manner of the prior approach, focused on 
the conservation, federal retention, and management of those lands.114 As 
described by Professor Jedediah Britton-Purdy, the laws supporting the 
conservation approach both “promoted utilitarian management of 
resources that were thought to be vulnerable to wasteful private 
extraction” and protected “certain unique and irreplaceable locations” 
from any economic development activities.115 The statutory bases for 
management of all federal public lands generally align with one of these 
two categories and either provide that federal agencies balance the 
demands of multiple uses across those lands or ensure the protection of 
particular values recognized in particular areas.  
 
112. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 592 (1823); see Leshy, supra note 
32, at 517. 
113. See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Public-Lands: Whose Lands? 
Which Public? The Shape of Public Lands Law and Trump’s National Monument 
Proclamations, 45 ECOLOGY L. Q. 921, 940 (2018). 
114. Id.  
115. Id. at 941; see also Sarah Krakoff, Not Yet America’s Best Idea: Law, 
Inequality, and Grand Canyon National Park, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 559, 568–69 
(2020) (“For the Native peoples of the greater Grand Canyon region, the reservation 
and allotment periods coincided with two phases of public land law [disposition and 
conservation], both of which depended on eliminating indigenous rights to land.”). 




The federal agencies charged with managing public lands include 
the USFS, which is housed in the Department of Agriculture, and a number 
of agencies residing within the Department of the Interior, including the 
National Park Service (NPS), BLM, and USFWS. Generally, the USFS 
and the BLM are tasked with managing the bulk of their lands under 
multiple use mandates essentially requiring “landscape-scale zoning, with 
very substantial agency discretion.”116  
These laws—the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA),117 which provides guidance to the BLM, and the Multiple Use 
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) and National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA) for the USFS118—emphasize the role of agency discretion and 
provide a general statutory framework with the practical details to be filled 
in by agency regulations, land use plans, manuals, and handbooks.119 
Though FLPMA at least recognizes values that might be used by tribes to 
protect their rights and interests on public lands, those values are 
characterized as “historical” and “archeological values” with little or no 
regard for modern tribal cultural or sovereign interests.120 No such 
recognition of these values or “cultural resources” whatsoever are included 
in the USFS’s multiple use mandate or NFMA.121 
The specially-designated areas managed by the NPS or the 
USFWS have much more focused interests and purposes that those 
agencies are mandated to protect.122 The designation of these areas, either 
 
116. Britton-Purdy, supra note 113, at 942; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) 
(2020) (setting forth interests of public lands managed by the BLM); 16 U.S.C. § 528 
(2020) (same for national forest management). 
117. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (Oct. 21, 1976) (codified as 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701–1787,  (2018)) [FLPMA]. 
118. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (Oct. 22, 1976) (codified as 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1600–1687 (2018)) [NFMA]. 
119. See, e.g., Pub. L. 94-579, Title II (Land Use Planning; Land 
Acquisition and Disposition) and III (Administration) of FLPMA; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 
1604(g) (2018) (NFMA planning provisions); 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601, et seq. (Westlaw 
through March 18, 2021); 36 C.F.R. § 219 (Westlaw through Jan. 11, 2021). 
120. 43 U.S.C. §1701(a)(8). 
121. Contra FLPMA at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8) and 1702(c) to MUSYA 
at 16 U.S.C. § 528.   
122. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2018) (National Wildlife Refuge 
System Improvement Act mandating USFWS to “administer a national network of 
lands and waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, 
restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United 
States for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.”); Act of May 
11, 1910, Pub. L. No. 171, 36 Stat. 354 (codified as 16 U.S.C.A. § 161) (establishing 
Glacier National Park). 
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by Congress or—as authorized by laws like the Antiquities Act123—the 
President, can include specific guidance to those agencies about the 
manner in which the area will be managed, which could account for tribes 
and tribal interests.124 Generally, however, these designations focus on 
protecting the natural or scientific values inherent in the area,125 and rely 
on the management agencies to develop more specific management plans 
to fulfill those objectives.126  
As we discuss in Part V, there are an array of additional 
conservation and protected land use designations used by Congress. Most 
notable is the Wilderness Act of 1964, which is the most restrictive and 
ends-oriented statute governing public lands management.127 But this law, 
like others before it, marginalized indigenous peoples, with early versions 
of the bill treating tribal reservation lands as public lands.128 Though the 
Wilderness Act is silent on tribal rights and interests, more recent 
wilderness legislation at least makes reference to treaty rights and sacred 
lands.129 The point here is not to diminish the value of this law, as some 
tribes use it to protect treaty rights and cultural resources. Rather it is to 
show how tribes are relegated in federal public lands law, cast as either 
outsiders or historical artifacts, and must resort to procedural methods of 
engagement that are often no match for the substantive mandates provided 
in these laws.  
Thus, while the statutory bases for public land management vary 
depending upon the interests that the federal government seeks to serve or 
protect through that management, the agencies responsible for carrying out 
those mandates are tasked with balancing federal priorities arising after 
and premised on the erasure of a continuing indigenous presence on those 
lands.130 In fact, but for a requirement to consider existing tribal land use 
 
123. 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2018).  
124. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 7394, 115 Stat. 2569, 2571 (Jan. 17, 
2001) (establishing Kasha-Katuwe National Monument); Proclamation 9558, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016) (establishing Bears Ears National Monument).  
125. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 221, et seq. (establishing Grand Canyon 
National Park “for the benefit and enjoyment of the people” and providing various 
enhancements and enlargements to the Park originally established in 1919).  
126. U.S. Forest Serv., Chimney Rock National Monument Final 
Management Plan, 1 (Aug. 2015), http://www.fs.usda.gov/project/?project=42952. 
127. Pub. L. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (Sept. 3, 1964) (codified as 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1131, et seq.). 
128. See Martin Nie, The Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use 
Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on 
Federal Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 624–27 (2008). 
129. Id.   
130.  See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 115, at 562 n.7 (noting that the history 




plans on the same basis as other state and local land use plans in the course 
of developing public land use plans,131 FLPMA was silent as to tribal 
interests in the public lands themselves.132 NFMA and the Wilderness Act 
do not mention Indian tribes or their interests in and historical connections 
to public lands at all.133 Rarely have these interests been included, much 
less considered, in the designation of national parks or monuments 
either.134 In fact, the silence of national park designations as to tribal rights 
have instead been interpreted as limitations on those interests, even where 
prior treaties or legislation expressly recognized their continuation.135  
 
and “dark side” of public land law demands recognition of the exclusion of tribal 
presence and interests in what would become public lands). 
131.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(b) (“In the development and revision of land 
use plans, the Secretary of Agriculture shall coordinate land use plans for lands in the 
National Forest System with the land use planning and management programs of and 
for Indian tribes by, among other things, considering the policies of approved tribal 
land resource management programs.”); see also id. § 1712(c) (requiring coordination 
in planning efforts with non-federal agencies, including Indian tribes and 
consideration of “the policies of approved State and tribal land resource management 
programs” and requiring the Secretary of Interior “to the extent he finds practical, keep 
apprised of State, local, and tribal land use plans; assure that consideration is given to 
those State, local, and tribal plans that are germane in the development of land use 
plans for public lands; assist in resolving, to the extent practical, inconsistencies 
between Federal and non-Federal Government plans, and shall provide for meaningful 
public involvement of State and local government officials, both elected and 
appointed, in the development of land use programs, land use regulations, and land 
use decisions for public lands, including early public notice of proposed decisions 
which may have a significant impact on non-Federal lands” (emphasis added)). 
132. See Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1701–1787). 
133. See Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (Oct. 22, 1976); Pub. L. 88-577, 78 
Stat. 890 (Sept. 3, 1964). 
134. See HILLARY HOFFMANN & MONTE MILLS, A THIRD WAY: 
DECOLONIZING THE LAWS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL PROTECTION, 73–81 (2020) 
(reviewing designations pursuant to the Antiquities Act).  
135. See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 510 (1896) (“And this 
view of the temporary and precarious nature of the [treaty] right reserved in the 
hunting districts is manifest by the act of congress creating the Yellowstone Park 
reservation, for it was subsequently carved out of what constituted the hunting districts 
at the time of the adoption of the treaty, and is a clear indication of the sense of 
congress on the subject.”), repudiated by Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019); 
United States v. Peterson, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1320 (D. Mont. 2000) (interpreting 
Congressional designation of Glacier National Park as “intended to create a game 
preserve in Glacier Park where the Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to 
allow any hunting,” even that authorized by prior agreements between the United 
States and the Blackfeet Tribe). 
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The lack of any explicit statutory, public land law basis promoting 
federal agency engagement with Native nations has contributed to the 
continuing exclusion of tribes from public lands; albeit a formal, legal 
exclusion from exercising meaningful and independent authority to 
access, protect, or manage those lands rather than their historic actual, 
physical exclusion. Rooted as they are in the removal of the original 
inhabitants of what would become federal public lands, these traditional 
approaches to public lands management continue to marginalize or 
minimize tribal interests in those lands. While the assertion of tribal treaty 
rights and the modern tribal sovereignty movement have begun to reshape 
those approaches,136 they remain mostly centered on federal policies borne 
of an era in which Native nations were erased or overlooked.137  
The bottom line is that tribal engagement with the management of 
federal public lands must proceed through avenues outside of traditional 
public land law, many of which are necessarily reactive to the 
prioritization of other federal interests already imbedded in these laws. The 
remainder of this section details those approaches. 
B. Tribal Consultation: Meaningfully Implementing  
the Trust Responsibility . . . Maybe 
Like definitions and applications of tribal co-management, “tribal 
consultation” is an “unwieldy term . . . often subject to inconsistent 
interpretations and applications, and of course, politics.”138 Despite the 
long-standing recognition of the fiduciary nature of federal government’s 
trust responsibilities to Native nations and the need to meaningfully 
engage those duties,139 a series of presidential actions mandating and 
seeking to implement more effective consultation procedures for federal 
agencies,140 the adoption and endorsement by the United States of an 
 
136. See, e.g., Legal Roots portion of Co-management section, infra; on 
the modern sovereignty movement, see generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD 
STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2005). 
137. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 115, at 567–70 (describing the “myth 
of the ‘blank space’ on the map” that supported the creation of Grand Canyon National 
Park). 
138. See Co-management section infra. 
139. See, e.g., First Principles of Federal Indian Law section supra; 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295–98 (1942) (recognizing the 
fiduciary nature of the trust responsibility). 
140. Exec. Order 12875, ENHANCING THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PARTNERSHIP, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (Oct. 26, 1993); Exec. Order 13084, 
CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Exec. Order 13175, CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION 




influential United Nations declaration discussing consultation 
principles,141 and the development of numerous executive agency policies 
seeking to effectively define and operationalize consultation,142 there 
remain as many variations and understandings of tribal consultation as 
there are meetings convened to engage in that relationship.143 Therefore, 
while tribal consultation plays a central role in the engagement of Native 
nations and their interests in the management of public lands, the 
numerous and often inconsistent ways in which such consultation is 
proposed, used, engaged in, and relied upon regularly result in confusion, 
disappointment, and contempt for its effectiveness on the part of both 
tribal and federal participants. 
C. Background: A Product of the Self-Determination Era 
Although the federal government’s historical interactions with 
Native nations, like treaty-making, could be considered early forms of 
tribal consultation, the term itself gained formal status only in the most 
recent era of federal Indian policy. This era, though originating in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations,144 was formally ushered in by 
President Nixon’s 1970 special message to Congress, in which he called 
on the federal government to promote tribal self-determination and 
 
WITH INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); President 
George W. Bush, Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with 
Tribal Governments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Bush 
Memorandum]; President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Obama 
Memorandum].  
141. Art. 19, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, G.A. Res. 295, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (2007) 
(“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.”) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. After initially 
voting against the UNDRIP, the United States announced its support on January 12, 
2011. See U.S. State Dep’t, Announcement of U.S. Support for United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 12, 2011), https://2009-2017. 
state.gov/s/srgia/154553.htm. 
142. See, e.g. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-22, Tribal 
Consultation: Additional Federal Actions Needed for Federal Infrastructure Projects, 
82–86 (Mar. 2019), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-22 [hereinafter GAO 
Report]. 
143. See, e.g., id. at 87–92 (documenting the wide variety of definitions 
and coverage of tribal consultation across a multitude of federal agency policies). 
144. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 1.07. 
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sovereignty without the threat of termination.145 The Secretary of the 
Interior at the time, Walter J. Hickel, emphasized the need for the federal 
government to seek tribal input, saying “[i]t is a time we listen to what the 
Indians have been telling us.”146  
The first statutory consultation requirements appeared in the 
landmark Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, which 
Congress passed in 1975.147 That law, the Self-Determination Act, sought 
to invigorate Nixon’s policy goals by encouraging federal agencies to 
contract with Indian tribes—through so-called 638 contracts—to assume 
responsibility for carrying out federal programs, services, functions, and 
activities on their own.148 The Self-Determination Act included a 
requirement that, “to the extent practicable,” responsible federal agencies 
must consult with tribal organizations on the development of regulations 
to implement the law.149 This requirement, combined with further 
legislative actions related to education, focused the early statutory 
consultation obligations of the federal government on services provided to 
tribes but, eventually, the federal government’s duty to consult expanded 
to include decisions related to certain actions that might affect tribal lands, 
natural or cultural resources.150  
Of these laws, and discussed in more detail below, the 1992 
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) provided 
the most relevant and potentially powerful consultation requirements, 
which, through NHPA’s Section 106 process, require federal consultation 
 
145. See President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 8, 1970), https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president 
-nixon-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-1970. 
146. Statement by Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel on President 
Nixon’s Special Message to Congress on Indians, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, July 8, 
1970, https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/opa/online-press-release/statement-secretary 
-interior-walter-j-hickel-president-nixons-special.  
147. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2018)). For a detailed review of the history of tribal 
consultation, see Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation 
in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417 (2013).  
148. See, e.g., id. § 102, 88 Stat. at 2206; 25 U.S.C. § 5321; see 
Contracting Section infra for a detailed review of the role of 638 contracts in tribal 
engagement with public land management.  
149. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. at 2212. 
150. See Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 439–41 (describing the 
consultation requirements of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) in 
1979, Pub. L. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (1979); the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Pub. L. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990); and the 1992 
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), Pub. L. 102-575, 106 
Stat. 4600 (1992)). 




with tribes to identify the potential effects of any federal undertaking on 
culturally significant properties and mitigation of those effects where 
feasible.151 The Section 106 consultation process remains the most broadly 
applicable consultation requirement across all federal land management 
agencies and, outside of other laws more narrowly focused on particular 
archaeological artifacts or Native American human remains and associated 
objects, is the only statutorily-mandated consultation process specific to 
Indian tribes.152 
Notwithstanding the narrow statutory footing for tribal 
consultation, its reach has been expanded through a series of executive 
actions and corresponding agency policies, the push for which was 
initiated by President William Clinton.153 Following a 1994 presidential 
memorandum requiring agencies to consult with tribal governments before 
taking actions that would affect them,154 President Clinton issued the most 
sweeping endorsement of tribal consultation in two Executive Orders, 
issued in 1998 and 2000, each of which sought to implement the 
requirements announced in the earlier memorandum.155 To do so, 
 
151. 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2018); see NHPA Section infra. 
152. As described in more detail infra, the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4321–4347 (2018)), requires public participation in the assessment and analysis of 
certain potential federal actions but does not mention tribes at all, much less the federal 
government’s unique relationship with them. The regulations implementing NEPA 
require that federal agencies consult early in the NEPA process “with appropriate state 
and local agencies and Indian tribes and with interested private persons and 
organizations,” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(d)(2) (2019), and that tribes be involved, along 
with other interested parties, in the NEPA scoping process, 40 C.F.R. § 1507(a)(1), 
but those requirements also do not take into account the unique status of the federal-
tribal relationship and, instead, put tribes on par with any other group interested in the 
proposed federal action. As noted in a 2017 report issued by three federal departments, 
“[t]his coordination should not be confused with a Federal agency’s responsibility to 
engage in government-to-government consultation with Tribes.” U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, U.S. Dep’t Of the Army, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Improving Tribal 
Consultation and Tribal Involvement in Federal Infrastructure Decisions (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc2-060030.pdf [hereinafter 
Infrastructure Report].   
153. See Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 442. 
154. Id.; Government-to-Government Relations with Native American 
Tribal Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994). 
155. Consultation And Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 
Exec. Order 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Consultation And 
Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 
67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). The latter order (13175) expressly revoked the prior (13084) 
upon its issuance. Sec. 9(c), Exec. Order 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,251. 
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Executive Order 13175 set forth certain fundamental principles to guide 
the formulation of policies with tribal implications,156 including the federal 
government’s trust responsibilities, the importance of tribal sovereignty, 
the ongoing federal policy of promoting tribal self-determination.157 
Beyond applying those principles, agencies were also instructed to support 
tribal administration of federal laws by granting “tribal governments the 
maximum administrative discretion possible” and, when developing 
policies with tribal implications, agencies were encouraged to support the 
development of tribal policies in those arenas, defer to those tribal 
standards, and refrain from establishing federal standards until after 
consulting with tribes about how and where such standards may interfere 
with tribal priorities.158 The Order went on to require broader agency 
consultation on any regulatory initiatives by prohibiting the promulgation 
of any such rules that might have tribal implications, impose compliance 
costs on tribes, or preempt tribal law unless the agency had engaged in 
tribal consultation “early in the process of developing the proposed 
regulation” and provided additional information about those efforts when 
publishing the rule.159 Executive Order 13175 prompted agencies to 
develop their own policies and procedures to implement its guidance,160 
but, by its own terms, the Order did not create any enforceable legal 
rights.161 
Following President Clinton’s lead, presidents George W. Bush 
and Barack Obama each issued their own memoranda further encouraging 
and reinforcing the federal government’s obligation to strengthen its 
relationship with Indian tribes.162 In fact, President Obama’s 2009 
Memorandum relied on the directives of President Clinton’s earlier Order 
and sought to further integrate them into the Executive Branch by 
requiring each agency to develop a plan for implementing those directives 
and annual progress reports on those plans thereafter.163 Like its 
predecessors, the Obama Memorandum expressly disclaimed any legal 
 
156. Policies with tribal implications include “regulations, legislative 
comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have 
substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the 
Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and 
responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.” Exec. Order 
13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,249. 
157. Id.  
158. Id. at 67,249–50. 
159. Id. at 67,250–51. 
160. Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 443–44. 
161. Exec. Order 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,252. 
162. See Bush Memorandum and Obama Memorandum.  
163. Obama Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. at 57,881. 




enforceability164 and, as shown by subsequent reviews of agency 
consultation policies, has had mixed results in prompting the development 
and implementation of new approaches to consultation.165  
Notwithstanding that criticism, the presidential prompts of the last 
few decades have resulted in renewed or entirely new focus by public land 
management agencies on tribal consultation. The United States 
Department of Agriculture, which houses the USFS, for example, updated 
its policies on consultation in 2013 through the adoption of a Departmental 
Regulation,166 which the USFS supplemented with its own policy in 
2016.167 Similarly, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar issued a 
Secretarial Order setting forth a new consultation policy for the 
Department of the Interior in 2011, and the Department integrated new 
policies and procedures on consultation into the Departmental Manual in 
2015.168 Both the BLM and USFWS then updated their consultation 
policies in 2016.169 Only the National Park Service, whose policies date to 
 
164. Id. at 57,882. 
165. See, e.g., Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, Consultation with Tribal 
Nations: An Update on Implementation of Executive Order 13175 (Jan. 2012), http:// 
www.ncai.org/resources/consultations/consultation-report-2012-update (reviewing the 
status of consultation plans and policies); GAO Report 19–22, supra note 142, at 82–86 
(reviewing same as of July 2018); see also Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 447–
48 (noting issues with implementing and enforcing the Obama Memorandum and 
concluding that “while well intentioned, the Obama Memorandum f[ell] short of 
creating any real change to the federal-tribal relationship”). 
166. U.S Dep’t of Agric., Regulation 1350-002: Tribal Consultation, 
Coordination, and Collaboration (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.fs.fed.us/spf/ 
tribalrelations/documents/policy/consultation/Final_DR.pdf.  
167. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., U.S. Forest Serv., Final Directives on American 
Indian and Alaska Native Relations Forest Service Manual 1500, Chapter 1560, and 
Forest Service Handbook 1509.13, Chapter 10, 81 Fed. Reg. 12,447 (Mar. 9, 2016). 
168. Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3317, Department of the Interior 
Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.doi.gov/ 
sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/upload/FINAL-Departmental-tribal-consultation 
-policy.pdf; Dep’t of the Interior, Departmental Manual, 512 DM 4, Department of 
the Interior Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes and Alaska Native 
Corporations (effective Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/ 
documents/chapter_4_department_of_the_interior_policy_on_consultation_with_ind
ian_tribes_and_alaska_native_corporations.docx; Dep’t of the Interior, Departmental 
Manual, 512 DM 5, Procedures for Consultation with Indian Tribes (effective Nov. 
9, 2015), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/chapter_5_ 
procedures_for_consultation_with_indian_tribes.docx. 
169. See Dep’t of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Manual 
Transmittal Sheet: BLM Manual 1780 Tribal Relations (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/MS%201780.pdf; Dep’t of the 
Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Manual Transmittal Sheet: BLM Handbook 
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2006, has not updated its consultation guidance since the Obama 
Memorandum.170  
Although each of these agencies have followed presidential 
directives to develop and refine their approaches to tribal consultation, 
those approaches and their standards and procedures—even the definition 
of consultation itself—vary from agency to agency.171 These varying 
commands are layered on top of the public land management 
responsibilities of each agency, which, particularly in light of the statutory 
basis for those missions and the more recent but less structured 
development of tribal consultation measures, can present practical 
limitations for tribal consultation as an effective means to engage with 
tribes in the management of federal public lands. 
D. Consultation in Practice: Limitations and Promises of Potential 
In September 2016, three federal executive departments—
Interior, Army, and Justice—came together to consult with tribal leaders 
on how to improve the federal-tribal relationship regarding the federal 
government’s permitting of infrastructure projects.172 The effort came at 
an intense time in the battle over the Dakota Access Pipeline, to which 
Native nations from across the country had responded in opposition,173 
and, although the report that resulted from those consultations focused 
primarily on decisions related to infrastructure projects, the input that 
tribes provided during the report’s development highlighted the range of 
challenges posed by the current state of tribal consultation as a tool for 
engaging tribes in public land management.174 Of particular relevance 
 
1780-1 Improving and Sustaining BLM-Tribal Relations (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/H-1780-1__0.pdf; U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service, Native American Policy (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.fws.gov/ 
nativeamerican/pdf/native-american-policy.pdf.  
170. See, e.g., The National Park Service and American Indians, Alaska 
Natives, and Native Hawaiians: Excerpts and Identified Sections from Management 
Policies 2006, The Guide to Managing the National Park System, National Park 
Service American Indian Liaison Office (Oct. 2008), https://www.nps.gov/history/ 
tribes/Documents/NPSManagementPolicy.pdf.  
171. See, e.g. GAO Report 19–22, supra note 142, at 87–90 (providing 
various departmental and agency definitions of “consultation” and “meaningful 
consultation”). 
172. Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 26.  
173. See, e.g., Jack Healy, North Dakota Pipeline Battle: Who’s Fighting 
and Why, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/north-
dakota-oil-pipeline-battle-whos-fighting-and-why.html.  
174. That input was collected through seven consultation sessions, a 
listening session, and the submission of written comments and included comments 




were tribal concerns over the inconsistent approaches to the practice of 
consultation employed by various federal agencies;175 the concern that 
federal agencies only sought to consult when tribal lands might be 
affected, which ignores tribal relationships with larger traditional 
territories;176 the timing of consultation, which many tribes viewed as 
taking place only after the agency had made its decision;177 and the manner 
in which tribal input provided during consultations was treated.178 In 
addition, tribes provided specific input on the consultation required by the 
NHPA’s Section 106 process and the ways in which their comments are 
solicited and considered in the review of federal actions under the 
NEPA.179 In summarizing all of these comments, the report highlighted 
the deeper issues undercutting the recent efforts of various executive 
branch officials to improve consultation:  
 
Tribes further remarked that even the best-written agency 
Tribal consultation policies are often poorly 
implemented. Tribes noted that often agencies neither 
treat Tribes as sovereigns nor afford Tribes the respect 
they would any other governmental entity—let alone treat 
Tribes as those to whom the United States maintains a 
trust responsibility or as those who hold reserved rights 
through treaties that granted the United States vast 
amounts of territory. Tribes emphasized that the spirit 
with which consultation is conducted is essential, Tribes 
need to be consulted sooner, Federal staff need better 
training prior to working with Tribes, and that 
consultation should be more consistent across agencies.180 
 
These concerns and the broadly shared tribal perspective on federal 
consultation efforts highlight the fundamental challenge faced by federal 
agencies seeking to engage Native nations through the existing legal 
framework for consultation related to public lands management. The 
management directives and structures of public land law establish agency 
 
from 59 tribes and eight tribal organizations. See Infrastructure Report, supra note 
152, at 43. 
175. Id.  
176. Id. at 44–45. 
177. Id. at 45–46. 
178. Id. at 47 (describing tribal concerns that “[f]ederal agencies often 
treat consultation as a procedural ‘check-the-box’ exercise, in which Federal agencies 
come to the consultation with their minds already made up and ignore tribal input”). 
179.  Id. at 52–61. 
180. Id. at 3. 
96               PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol.  44 
 
 
priorities and, depending on those priorities, provide varying amounts of 
discretion to each agency to carry them out.181 But those laws ignored and 
continue to implicitly exclude a meaningful tribal voice in the setting of 
those priorities, and their balancing and protection. Therefore, while the 
self-determination era of the recent generations and its corresponding 
focus on improving tribal involvement in federal decision-making have 
certainly opened new avenues for those efforts, they remain cabined within 
the overriding scheme of public land law and the longer standing and more 
rigid institutional measures designed to fulfill that scheme. 
Notwithstanding the NHPA’s consultation command, which presents its 
own challenges,182 there remains no competing statutory directive that 
secures the appropriate “spirit with which consultation is conducted,”183 
demands accountability for agency leadership in carrying out that 
directive, ensures the appropriate historical context for federal 
management decision affecting traditional tribal territories,184 and 
appropriately elevates tribal sovereign decisions within the balance of 
competing federal and public interests.185 Those underlying conflicts often 
leave tribal consultation in a reactive posture, with tribal officials 
responding to federal projects or plans that have already been initiated and 
for which tribal input will be considered along with and on the same basis 
as that of other interested parties.186 
Beyond the tribal input on infrastructure projects reported in 2017, 
recent case studies further illustrate these shortcomings and conflicts. In 
January 2018, officials from the State of Alaska petitioned the Secretary 
of Agriculture to develop a new rule that would change the roadless status 
 
181. Britton-Purdy, supra note 113, at 943. 
182. See NHPA section, infra. 
183. Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 3. 
184. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 115, at 647 (“If we continue to think 
about protecting the places we love without simultaneously redressing the inequities 
sewn into how we have protected those places in the past, we will see increasingly 
extreme versions of environmental inequality amidst overall environmental 
devastation.”). 
185. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 12 (citing United 
Nations, General Assembly, United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13 2007), https://www.un.org/development/desa/ 
indigenouspeoples/wpcontent/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf., which 
Tribes conistently cited for  “authority for requiring Tribes’ free, prior, and informed 
consent . . .” [hereinafter UNDRIP]). 
186. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 13 (“Tribes 
frequently commented that Federal agency leaders and staff often treat Tribes merely as 
stakeholders. Tribes repeatedly emphasized that they should be regarded as sovereign 
governmental entities who are trust beneficiaries and holders of treaty rights.”). 




of the Tongass National Forest in the southeast part of the state.187 
Following on a long and litigious history,188 the State sought to have the 
USFS repeal the roadless rule’s application to the Tongass in “the interests 
of the socioeconomic wellbeing of [Alaska’s] residents.”189 The USFS 
soon initiated a rulemaking to officially move that petition forward and, 
consistent with the agencies responsibilities under NEPA prepare an 
environmental impact statement.190 The agency named the State of Alaska 
as a cooperating agency and indicated that it had also invited interested 
tribes to participate on the same basis.191 Although those invitations were 
dated two months after the USFS was directed to start a rulemaking and 
only a month before the agency announced the initiation of its 
rulemaking,192 a number of Tribes accepted the invitation to participate as 
cooperating agencies and partook in meetings leading up to the issuance 
of a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS).193 Following the 
issuance of the DEIS, however, the cooperating agency Tribes sent a letter 
expressing extensive concerns about the USFS actions proposed in the 
DEIS and their treatment as cooperating agencies.194  
 
187. Letter from Andrew T. Mack, Commissioner, Alaska Department of 
Natural Resources, to Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. 
(Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3 
_5214387.pdf. 
188. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 
956 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an exemption of the Tongass National Forest from the 
2001 roadless rule). 
189. State of Alaska Petition for USDA Rulemaking, 7 (Jan 18, 2018), 
available as an attachment to Letter from Andrew T. Mack, supra note 187, 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5214387.pdf.  
190. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., U.S. Forest Serv., Roadless Area 
Conservation; National Forest System Lands in Alaska, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,252 (Aug. 
30, 2018); 40 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018). 
191. Notice of Intent, 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,253; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 
(authorizing cooperating agencies). 
192. See Letter from David E. Schmid, Acting Regional Forester, U.S. 
Forest Serv., to Albert Howard, President, Angoon Community Association (July 30, 
2018), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5136541.pdf. 
193. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between Hoonah Indian 
Association and United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (U.S. Forest 
Serv. 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3 
_5136119.pdf; Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Rulemaking for Alaska’s 
Roadless Areas, 5–3 (U.S. Forest Serv. 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/ 
www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5207661.pdf (listing the six tribes serving as 
cooperating agencies). 
194. Letter from tribal leaders to Sonny Perdue, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t. of 
Agric. (Oct. 22, 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834 
_FSPLT3_5136565.pdf; Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; National Forest 
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Despite that status, the Tribes uniformly felt their input and 
expertise were being ignored in favor of other competing interests, and 
that because they favored maintaining the roadless protections that the 
State of Alaska sought to repeal, their position made them a “‘nuisance 
factor’ to be ignored” in the consultation process.195 Beyond their 
substantive disagreements, the participating Tribes also expressed concern 
about a compressed timeframe and inability to provide meaningful input 
despite their elevated status as cooperating agencies.196  
Thereafter, the USFS provided a draft of the final environmental 
impact statement for review and comment by tribal entities, but did so in 
the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, providing only two weeks for that 
process.197 In addition, despite the additional burdens on their 
governments created by the national emergency, the USFS asked the 
Tribes to participate in virtual consultations so that the agency’s 
rulemaking could continue to move forward.198  
The rulemaking process for the Tongass National Forest has 
proceeded according to NEPA and although the Tribes involved secured 
participation in that process as cooperating agencies, a status that 
confirmed certain protections for their input and role,199 the Tribes still 
believed their interests—and their knowledge of and values in the Tongass 
landscape in which they’d existed for generations—were being ignored in 
favor of other, competing interests.  
Critically, given the amount of agency discretion enjoyed by 
USFS, the procedural nature of NEPA’s requirements and the USFS’ 
consultation policies, as well as the nature of the consultation and the 
record of tribal involvement (albeit in frustrated opposition to the process), 
the Tribes are left with few legal avenues to force a different course of 
government-to-government relations in this matter. As described above, 
none of the presidential actions focused on consultation provide any legal 
standing or claim for an aggrieved tribe to pursue,200 leaving the claim-
creating provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as the 
 
System Lands in Alaska, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,522 (Oct. 17, 2019), http://www.fs.usda. 
gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834_FSPLT3_5136119.pdf. 
195. Letter from tribal leaders to Secretary Perdue, supra note 194, at 2. 
196. Id. at 1–2. 
197. See Ben Hohenstatt, Tribes ask feds to stop work on roadless rule 
plan, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/tribes 
-ask-feds-to-stop-work-on-roadless-rule-plan/.  
198. Id. 
199. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6. 
200. See Consultation in Practice: Limitations and Promises of Potential 
Section infra. 




only options for such a tribe.201 Under the APA, a tribe would have to 
demonstrate that the agency’s consultation actions were unlawfully 
withheld,202 “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law,”203 or fail to comply with required legal 
procedures.204 In rare instances,205 tribes have successfully shown that 
agency failures in consultation meet these requirements; however, 
provided an agency reasonably fulfills its duties to engage in the process 
of consultation (i.e., “checks-the-box”), there is little, if any, legal basis 
for a tribe to challenge the agency’s resulting substantive determination 
due to a lack of “meaningful” consultation.206 
E. Consultation as a Bridge to Tribal Co-Management 
Despite the challenges for consultation to serve as an effective 
method for incorporating tribal perspectives and values into federal 
decision-making, it remains an essential aspect of the federal-tribal 
relationship when considering the possibility of tribal co-management of 
federal public lands. To serve that role, however, consultation must evolve 
from the unenforceable, discretionary, and variable practice widely 
criticized by tribes207 into a meaningful, compatible, and continuing 
conversation between appropriate tribal and federal officials. Few 
 
201. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
202. Id. at § 706(1). 
203. Id. at § 706(2)(A). 
204. Id. at § 706(2)(D). 
205. See, e.g., Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Wyoming v. Dep’t of the 
Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1317 (D. Wyo. 2015), vacated and remanded by Wyoming 
v. Sierra Club, 2016 WL 3853806 (10th Cir. 2016); but see Vanessa L. Ray-Hodge & 
Sarah M. Stevenson, Examining The Legal Implications Of Government-To-
Government Tribal Consultation And Off-Reservation Development, 4 ROCKY MTN. 
MIN. L. INST. 11, 6–7 (2017) (reviewing cases and suggesting, “Tribal consultation is 
also more than a process that must be followed, federal agencies must provide a real 
opportunity for tribal views to be heard and considered. Agencies must substantively 
address and respond to tribal views in their decision-making process, even where those 
views are not followed or are rejected.”). 
206. See, e.g., San Juan Citizens All. v. Norton, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 
1292–94 (D.N.M. 2008) (rejecting claims that the BLM failed to adequately consult 
under NHPA in the development of a resource management plan); Routel & Holth, 
supra note 147, at 464–66 (reviewing enforceability issues and concluding that 
“failure to enforce the substantive components of the trust responsibility means that 
even when tribal suggestions and requests are properly solicited, they can be 
disregarded without the potential for any recourse”). 
207. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152.  
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examples exist of such approaches, primarily arising when federal 
agencies are mandated to develop and maintain effective relationships, or 
where through a long-standing course of practice, those relationships have 
developed into mutually beneficial partnerships. 
The necessity of effective tribal consultation can be created 
through executive or legislative mandates requiring federal land 
management agencies to incorporate tribal input into substantive 
management decisions. President Clinton’s 2001 designation of the 
Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, for example, commanded 
that the Monument be managed in “close cooperation” with the Pueblo.208 
Although the Pueblo and the BLM had worked together prior to the 
Monument’s establishment, the designation of the Monument created new 
and additional demands on both of those parties, as well as the 
landscape.209 Through the development of federal-tribal agreements and 
an evolving relationship, the parties successfully complied with the 
proclamation’s directive all while keeping consultation at the heart of that 
process.210 The required and continuing role for the Pueblo of Cochiti in 
the BLM’s management of the monument necessitates a workable 
consultation framework to ensure that mandate can be met.211  
Sustained and long-term federal-tribal relationships also help 
bridge effective consultation practices into more meaningful and practical 
roles for tribal partners in management. As described in more detail 
below,212 the judicial recognition and protection of treaty-reserved rights 
to fish and hunt across traditional territories and in particular, the 
allocation of fishery resources between tribes and other interests,213 
 
208. Establishment of the Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, 
Proclamation No. 7394, 115 Stat. 2569, 2571 (Jan. 17, 2001). 
209. See Sandra Lee Pinel & Jacob Pecos, Generating Co-Management at 
Kasha Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, New Mexico, 49 ENVTL. MGMT. 593, 
596–97 (2012). 
210. Id. at 600 (relating the view of a BLM official, whose “staff were 
engaging in extensive consultation and respecting the Pueblo’s wishes wherever 
possible” but retained “their federal responsibility for management of the 
monument”). 
211. President Obama’s proclamation of the Bears Ears National 
Monument contemplated a similar mandate for the federal agencies responsible for 
managing those lands and would have required the development of an effective 
consultation protocol to ensure that those agencies would “carefully and fully 
consider” tribal input in their management decisions. Establishment of the Bears Ears 
National Monument, Proclamation 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016). 
212. See Co-management section infra. 
213. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 
1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 




demanded that states, tribes, and federal agencies develop ways to 
collaboratively address and resolve those issues.214 The decades of work 
to fulfill that mandate in both the Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes 
regions have resulted in the establishment of meaningful, effective 
relationships that rely on consultation.215 In the implementation of those 
relationships, the tribes and their federal partners have agreed on the scope, 
process, and terms of consultation as a means to serve the broader 
management objectives defined by the nature of tribal treaty rights.216 
These agreements help avoid the more general failings of consultation as 
a bridge to effective co-management described above and may be 
instructive when considering ways to reform those general practices to 
make them more effective. 
Another potential bridge between existing tribal consultation 
practices and requirements and broader co-management relationships is 
being proposed to the USFS by tribes across Southeast Alaska. As 
described above, those tribes have been frustrated by the lack of 
meaningful consultation with the USFS in the context of the State of 
Alaska’s proposal to modify the Roadless Rule for the Tongass National 
Forest.217 While the tribes retain the ability and may still seek to litigate 
their concerns over that rulemaking process, they also have sought to 
pursue a new path that could reset their relationship with the USFS and 
that presents the opportunity for a new and improved foundation of 
federal-tribal relations and consultation.  
Relying on the APA,218 nine tribal governments across the region 
recently submitted a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture requesting that 
the Department commence new rulemaking “to create a traditional 
homelands conservation rule for the long-term management and protection 
of traditional and customary use areas in the Tongass National Forest.”219 
 
214. See, e.g., Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Or. 1969); 
Monte Mills, Beyond the Belloni Decision: Sohappy v. Smith and the Modern Era of 
Tribal Treaty Rights, 50 ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 402–03 (2020) (discussing the 
collaborative mandate of Judge Belloni’s decision in Sohappy).  
215. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 214, at 394 n.41. 
216. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, Regarding Tribal-USDA-
Forest Service Relations on National Forest Lands Within the Territories Ceded in 
Treaties of 1836, 1837, and 1842, 10–11 (amendeded March 2012), https://www. 
glifwc.org/Regulations/mouamd2012withappendixes.pdf.  
217. See Letter from tribal leaders to Sonny Perdue, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t. 
of Agric., (Oct. 22, 2019), http://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/109834 
_FSPLT3_5136565.pdf.  
218. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2018) (“Each agency shall give an interested 
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”). 
219. See Elizabeth Jenkins, With a Roadless Rule Decision Pending, 
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Importantly, the tribes are calling upon the USFS to collaboratively 
develop the rulemaking process and to “engage in a new and more robust 
and legitimate government-to-government consultation process with the 
Tribes on the Tongass National Forest under the principle of ‘mutual 
concurrence’ to identify traditional and customary use areas and design 
forest-wide conservation measures to protect them.”220 According to the 
tribes, that process must “ensure culturally competent and meaningful 
consultation with accessible meetings that take place in local communities 
on a regular schedule, and mutually-agreed upon measurable processes for 
engaging in” such consultation.221 Through that process, the tribes would 
propose developing and implementing “appropriate, forest-wide 
conservation measures and management direction that is based off the 
principles of subsistence priority, local control, and ‘all lands, all hands’ 
collaborative stewardship and management in order to protect the unique 
traditional and subsistence values of the Tongass, its people, and its fish 
and wildlife populations,” which would be carried out in a collaborative 
partnership between the USFS and the tribes.222 Although the outcome of 
the tribes’ petition remains to be seen, their demands offer a new avenue 
to consider how expanded and deeper consultation requirements could 
enhance tribal co-management across public lands beyond the Tongass 
National Forest. 
F. Recommendations for Consultation Reform 
Reforming the general standards for tribal consultation presents 
its own challenges, particularly in light of the diversity of federal agencies, 
their mandates, interests, and capacities and the range of issues, tribes, and 
tribal interests with which those agencies must consult. As described 
 
Tribal Governments Petition for New Process, ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA (July 21, 
2020), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/07/21/with-a-roadless-rule-decision 
-pending-tribal-governments-petition-for-new-process/; Organized Village of 
Kasaan, Organized Village of Kake, Klawock Cooperative Association, Hoonah 
Indian Association, Ketchikan Indian Community, Skagway Traditional Council, 
Organized Village Of Saxman, Yakutat Tlingit Tribe, Central Council Tlingit And 
Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska, Petition For USDA Rulemaking to Create a 
Traditional Homelands Conservation Rule for the Long-Term Management and 
Protection of Traditional and Customary Use Areas in the Tongass National Forest, 
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/ktoo/2020/07/FINAL-Southeast-Tribes-APA 
-Petition-7-17-2020-Nine-Tribe-Signatures.pdf (last visited July 31, 2020) 
[hereinafter SE AK Tribal Petition]. 
220. SE AK Tribal Petition, supra note 219, at 1. 
221. Id. at 6. 
222. Id. at 11. 




above, a “one-size-fits-all” approach rarely does so, and even well-written 
and intentioned agency-specific consultation policies are a challenge to 
effectively implement. Nonetheless, like the principles of co-management 
discussed below, efforts to reform tribal consultation procedures and 
requirements could be measured and guided by the lessons offered from 
prior shortcomings and successes. 
First, as recognized by each of the executive orders, actions, and 
a number of existing agency policies that resulted from those directives, 
consultation must be firmly rooted in the legal principles and 
responsibilities of the government-to-government relationship and the 
federal government’s trust responsibilities. Importantly, however, as 
demonstrated by the instances of effective collaboration described above, 
those responsibilities must also be incorporated into the guiding mandates 
of federal land management agencies on the same basis as their other 
responsibilities. Unlike the general exclusion of tribes and tribal interests 
from the framework of public land law, for example, effective tribal 
engagement through consultation could be incorporated on an equal basis 
with the competing management objectives described by that 
framework.223 
Consistent with that principle, effective consultation is also 
largely dependent upon the development and maintenance of a long-term 
relationship, rather than a project-specific discussion. Therefore, federal 
agencies interested in enhancing the effectiveness of their consultation 
practices could be encouraged—through specific directives and 
accountability measures, including evaluation metrics that track success—
to regularly engage in consultation about matters of general tribal concern 
without regard to a pending or proposed federal action. While such 
practices demand additional time and resources, both of which are in short 
supply for federal and tribal officials,224 the investment of effort in 
relationship-building would likely avoid additional expenditures resulting 
from conflict over failed consultations on specific projects.225  
 
223.  One example of such a reform proposal suggests adopting procedural 
mandate and standard for tribal consultation that could be incorporated into federal 
decision-making on the same basis as environmental reviews required by NEPA. 
Routel & Holth, supra note 147, at 466–74. 
224. See, e.g., Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 23–24. 
225.  An example of broad-based consultation efforts can be found in the 
BLM’s development of the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP), 
which involved lengthy consultation with several tribes over a months-long process 
and served to build relationships beyond a specific project. See Record of Decision for 
the Land Use Plan Amendment to the California Desert Conservation Plan, Bishop 
resource Management Plan, and Bakersfield Resource Management Plan, BUREAU 
OF LAND MANAGEMENT, 89–93 (Sept. 2016), https://eplanning.blm.gov/public 
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Finally, the consultation process must provide some guarantee of 
accountability. As noted above, even where tribes may be afforded 
cooperating agency status under NEPA, the broad discretion allowed to 
federal agencies can excuse a disjointed or disagreeable consultation 
process and result in the marginalization or exclusion of tribal input. While 
the spirit of recent executive actions and the agency policies they spawned 
are important, so too is the lack of any legal basis on which that spirit and 
the process of consultation it envisions can be enforced. In addition to 
building accountability through personnel measures like evaluations, there 
are other procedural avenues for enhancing accountability around 
consultation. The “mutual concurrence” model suggested by tribes in 
Alaska’s Tongass National Forest would help ensure that the process of 
tribal engagement adequately accounts for tribal perspectives while also 
guaranteeing some substantive control for tribes.226 Short of that model, 
the decision-making process set forth for the management of the original 
Bears Ears National Monument required that federal land managers 
provide a written explanation to interested Tribes when their management 
decisions did not align with tribal comments or input gathered through 
consultation.227 While leaving ultimate decision-making in the hands of 
federal agencies, this model would require additional accountability for 
those decisions and provide a stronger basis on which consultation and 
cooperative relationships could be maintained and strengthened. 
Reform to accommodate these principles could be accomplished 
through further executive actions or legislative efforts. The work done by 
various federal agencies in the context of infrastructure projects provide 
some important first steps for executive agencies to consider;228 however, 
regulatory reform efforts could also be undertaken to deepen and 
strengthen the support for effective tribal consultation. The regulations 
developed by the Advisory Council on Historic Properties (ACHP) in the 
context of the NHPA’s statutorily mandated consultation process for 
historic or cultural properties could provide a basis for implementing a 
more general regulatory consultation mandate.229 Like those regulations, 
the involvement of an additional entity, like the ACHP in NHPA 
proceedings, could also provide an important check on or review of a 
consultation process. Importantly, however, these efforts should aim to 
incorporate tribal consultation as an objective on an equal basis with 
 
_projects/lup/66459/133460/163124/DRECP_BLM_LUPA_ROD.pdf.  
226. See SE AK Tribal Petition, supra note 219, at 5. 
227. Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, Proclamation 
No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016); see  infra Part III. 
228.  Infrastructure Report, supra note 152, at 16–25. 
229.  See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(f) (2007). 




existing federal land management priorities in order to integrate the 
process of consultation with the balancing of a multiple-use, wilderness, 
refuge, or other management framework. Doing so would help overcome 
the historical exclusion and separation of tribes from the legal structure of 
public land management. 
With regard to possible legislative initiatives, the National 
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) has called upon Congress to enact 
laws that would provide “uniform, effective and meaningful 
consultation,”230 At least one such bill has been introduced in Congress.231 
That legislation would have established more particular requirements for 
agency consultation policies and practices and provided a cause of action 
under the APA for tribes to seek judicial review of an agency’s failure to 
comply with its terms.232 Those concepts would remain important for any 
future legislative efforts to improve tribal consultation, as would 
consideration of the need to integrate consultation with other federal land 
management priorities. 
Ultimately, reforming tribal consultation will demand additional 
work beyond the formal executive or legislative actions taken to encourage 
a more meaningful, effective, and enforceable federal-tribal relationship. 
That process must originate from and be rooted in the foundational legal 
principles described above and effectively involve tribal voices and 
priorities in federal administrative and legal processes that were built 
without such involvement. 
G. Contracting and Compacting for the Assumption by Tribes of  
Federal Programs, Services, Functions, and Activities 
The modern era of federal law and policy regarding relations with 
Native nations is rooted in a commitment to tribal self-determination.233 
That policy represented a marked shift from the prior era of termination 
and, for fifty years, has undergirded various federal legislative and 
executive actions, including the series of executive actions supporting and 
enhancing tribal consultation described above. Central to the development 
and implementation of the self-determination policies has been the 
 
230. Resolution #MOH-17-001 (2017), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/ 
Resolution_tNWJMIbVBsWNXwnaUYCgwjpsJImEmxzkuQZYPcJxjDIxJpMrqJR_
MOH-17-001.pdf. 
231.  See Requirements, Expectations, and Standard Procedures for 
Executive Consultation with Tribes Act, H.R. 2689, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).  
232.  Id. at § 401.  
233.  See President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 8, 1970) https://www.epa.gov/tribal/president 
-nixon-special-message-indian-affairs-july-8-1970. 
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enactment and evolution of the Indian Self Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (ISDEAA),234 which was first enacted in 1975 and 
subsequently amended multiple times.235 The ISDEAA serves as the 
backbone of federal self-determination policy through its promotion of 
tribal authority and the transfer of programs and services intended to 
benefit tribes from overarching federal domination and control to tribal 
supervision and management.236 This policy approach has been wildly 
successful, with tribes across the country taking on the responsibility for 
previously federal programs, receiving funding to implement them, and 
carrying them out according to tribal—not federal—priorities.237 
To do so, the ISDEAA encourages federal agencies to negotiate 
agreements with tribes pursuant to which the tribes can then assume those 
responsibilities.238 While the process for doing so and agency recalcitrance 
toward the transfer of federal programs to tribes has required further 
congressional attention to fulfill the goals of the program,239 that attention 
has resulted in broader avenues for tribes to pursue such agreements. The 
1994 enactment of the Tribal Self-Governance Act (TSGA),240 for 
example, authorized self-governance compacts in addition to self-
determination contracts and provided federal agencies and tribes greater 
flexibility to negotiate and address funding, ongoing agreements, and the 
potential for tribes to redesign their delivery of services and reallocate 
federal funding.241 Thus, whether through a more focused self-
 
234.  Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975).  
235.  Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, repealed by Tribal Self-
Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711; Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250; see generally Geoffrey 
D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Self-
Governance under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 
AM. IND. L. REV. 1 (2015).  
236. See 25 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (2018). 
237.  See, e.g., Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 48–49 
(documenting the rapid growth in tribal self-governance programs from 1991 to 2013). 
238.  See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 5321.  
239.  Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 30 (describing 
congressional “outrage” over the implementation of the ISDEAA and the 1988 
amendments). 
240. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250. 
241.  See 25 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5368; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, 
at 37; Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements between Native 
American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal Self-
Governance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2007); Brian Upton, 
Returning to a Tribal Self-Governance Partnership at the National Bison Range 
Complex: Historical, Legal, and Global Perspectives, 35 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. 




determination contract or a broader self-governance compact, tribes can 
pursue the authority to oversee and manage aspects of the federal 
bureaucracy and, in doing so, expand the scope and capacity of their own 
governance. 
While the bulk of the focus and activity under the ISDEAA has 
been on programs and services administered by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) and Indian Health Service (IHS) directly for the benefit of 
tribes and their members, the TSGA broadened the potential for tribal 
assumption of federal responsibilities beyond those tribally-specific 
areas.242 Rather than only assuming responsibility for on-reservation social 
or health services, the TSGA authorized compacts pursuant to which tribes 
could take on non-BIA “programs, services, functions, and activities, or 
portions thereof, administered by the Secretary of the Interior which are of 
special geographic, historical, or cultural significance to the participating 
Indian tribe requesting a compact.”243 The TSGA also required that the 
Secretary of the Interior review which non-BIA programs may be 
available for such assumption and report on them annually.244 Additional 
legislation in 2018 enabled tribes to enter similar agreements with the 
Department of Agriculture to carry out “demonstration projects” involving 
the administration or management of certain national forest lands pursuant 
to the Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA),245 although this latter authority 
is limited to protecting tribal lands or forest lands “bordering or adjacent 
to” lands under tribal jurisdiction.246  
Thus, while the ISDEAA began with the goal of transferring 
federal programs within the BIA and IHS to tribal control, the evolution 
of the self-determination policy has expanded the reach of that objective 
to open avenues for tribes to assume the responsibility for certain programs 
across the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture. These agreements 
may therefore provide an important bridge to expanded tribal co-
management of public lands administered by agencies within those 
departments. As demonstrated by the few such agreements shown on the 
 
REV. 52, 85–91 (2014). 
242.  Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, §§ 204, 403(c); 25 U.S.C. § 
5363(b)(2). 
243.  25 U.S.C. § 5363(b)(2) and (c).  
244.  Id. § 5365(c); see List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding 
Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2020 Programmatic Targets, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 12,326 (March 2, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 List]. 
245.  Enacted as part of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-334, Title VIII, § 8703, 132 Stat. 4877 (Dec. 20, 2018) (codified as 25 U.S.C. 
§ 3115b). 
246.  25 U.S.C. § 3115a(b)(1)–(3). 
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most recent annual report of the Secretary of the Interior under the TSGA, 
however, the utility of compacting as a means to tribal co-management 
may be limited.247 
H. Limitations of Self-Governance Compacting 
As noted above, the continuing barriers to promoting tribal self-
determination under the ISDEAA prompted repeated congressional efforts 
to better implement those objectives. Agency reluctance or opposition to 
tribal requests for self-determination contracts and self-governance 
compacts were the primary motivator for many of these amendments, 
although disputes over funding and other matters also required judicial 
resolution.248 In addition to these more general conflicts over the 
implementation and promotion of the self-determination policy, the use of 
self-governance compacting in the context of tribal lands management 
presents additional issues that further hinder its utility. 
First, the TSGA distinguishes between the authority and 
obligations of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to compact 
for non-BIA programs that are “otherwise available to Indian tribes or 
Indians” and non-BIA programs that are not Indian focused.249  As one 
commentator explains the import of this distinction: 
 
Programs are “otherwise available,” in the Department’s 
interpretation, if they would be eligible to contract under 
Title I [of the ISDEAA]. This means that they must be 
programs ‘for the benefit of Indians because of their status 
as Indians’ under [that law]. Such programs must be 
included in [TSGA] agreements upon tribal request. 
Non-BIA programs that are not specifically targeted to 
Indians may still be included in [TSGA] agreements under 
the discretionary authority [authorized by the TSGA], 
which allows inclusion of PFSAs ‘administered by the 
Secretary of the Interior which are of special geographic, 
historical, or cultural significance to the participating 
 
247.  2020 List, at 12,326–27 (including two agreements with the BLM, 
three with the NPS, and only one with USFWS). 
248.  See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
Furthermore, with respect to the contracting authorities available to tribes under the 
TFPA, there is “no specific authorization of funding or right to funding.” Strommer & 
Osborne, supra note 235, at 71. 
249. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(b)(1)(c).  




Indian tribe requesting a compact.’ These programs, while 
benefiting a wider constituency than Indians alone, may 
still be awarded on a non-competitive basis in a [TSGA] 
agreement at the bureau’s discretion.250 
This interpretation of the difference between mandatory and discretionary 
compacting authority was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, which rejected a tribal effort to force the Bureau of 
Reclamation to compact for the tribal assumption of non-BIA programs.251 
The TSGA’s provisions therefore allow “non-BIA bureaus unchecked 
discretion to deny tribal proposals,”252 which as one commentator has 
noted in the context of public land management, allows for a myopic focus 
on the objectives of public lands management without consideration of the 
continuing evolution of the federal government’s policy to support tribal 
self-determination.253 
Similarly, the TSGA makes clear that although it expands the 
window for tribes to assume previously federal authorities, it does not 
authorize the Secretary to allow tribes to carry out “functions that are 
inherently federal.”254 What constitutes an “inherently federal function” is, 
however, a topic of uncertainty and one over which tribes and federal 
agencies have and continue to debate.255 When considering the TSGA on 
the floor of the Senate, the late Senator John McCain suggested a narrow 
definition of such functions, particularly in light of prior agency 
recalcitrance toward contracting with tribes.256 In a comprehensive 
 
250. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 39 (citations omitted). 
251.  Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 
2005).  
252. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 40.  
253. King, supra note 241, at 481. 
254.  25 U.S.C. § 5363(k).  
255.  See, e.g., Tribal Self-Governance; Proposed Rule with Request for 
Comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 7202, 7205 (Feb. 12, 1998) (explaining differing tribal and 
federal views on inherently federal functions in the context of promulgating TSGA 
regulations and concluding that decisions about what constitutes such a function “are 
best made on a case-by-case basis during the government-to-government negotiation 
process”); Monte Mills, Beyond a Zero-Sum Federal Trust Responsibility: Lessons 
from Federal Indian Energy Policy, 6 AM. IND. L. J. 35, 68–69 (2017) (discussing 
inherently federal functions in the context of the 2005 Energy Policy Act).  
256.  Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, 140 CONG. REC. 
S28833, S28835 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (Inherently federal functions not subject to 
compacting under the TSGA are “Federal responsibilities vested by the Congress in 
the Secretary which are determined by the Federal courts not to be delegable under 
the constitution.”); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2021(12) (defining “inherently Federal 
functions” for purposes of BIA education programs largely along administrative lines 
110               PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol.  44 
 
 
opinion issued in 1996, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior 
reviewed the TSGA with respect to its limitations on the delegation of 
certain functions to tribes and concluded that while the principles of 
federal Indian law, including tribal sovereign authority and the unique 
nature of the federal-tribal relationship, provide some general and helpful 
guidance, the TSGA’s “inherently federal restriction can only be applied 
on a case-by-case basis.”257 Nonetheless, the Solicitor noted that such 
application must consider the extent of tribal sovereignty and 
jurisdiction,258 the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that 
delegation of federal authority to Indian tribes is not limited by the general 
principles of the non-delegation doctrine,259 and that “close calls should 
go in favor of inclusion [of programs for tribal control] rather than 
exclusion.”260  
Notwithstanding that guidance, the uncertainty and case-specific 
nature of the “inherently federal function” limitation on TSGA 
compacting combined with the broad discretion for non-BIA agencies to 
deny tribal requests to compact can present significant barriers to the 
TSGA (and its Department of Agriculture counterparts) as an effective 
avenue for tribal co-management. In the context of the NPS, for example, 
one commentator suggested that the agency has “narrowly construed the 
TSGA [and] framed it within the NPS’s conventional tools for sharing 
money and authority with non-tribal entities.”261 This reluctance to 
delegate important responsibilities to a non-federal actor can best be 
 
but also including the somewhat ambiguous “nondelegable statutory duties of the 
Secretary relating to trust resources”).  
257.  Memorandum from John Leshy, Solicitor, DOI, to Assistant Secs. & 
Bureau Heads, DOI, Inherently Federal Functions under the Tribal Self-Governance 
Act, 14 (May 17, 1996) [hereinafter Leshy Memo]. 
258.  Id. at 12. 
259. Id. at 7–10, 12 (citing U.S. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)).  
260. Id. at 13; see also Upton, supra note 241, at 94–99 (reviewing 
background and development of the Leshy Memo). Recently, the Secretary of the 
Interior ordered the development of more specific guidance regarding the 
contractibility of programs (i.e., what functions are available and, therefore, not 
inherently federal) for oil and gas development on Indian lands. Secretarial Order 
3377, Contractibility of Federal Functions for Oil and Gas Development on Indian 
Lands (Dec. 16, 2019). More recently, the Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Land 
Management and the Offices of Self-Governance and Natural Resource Revenue 
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, which includes a list of contractible and 
inherently federal functions related to oil and gas development, in order to implement 
and operationalize the Secretary’s order. Memorandum of Agreement Between Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, Office of Self-Governance, Office of Natural Resources Revenue, 
and Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 24, 2020) (on file with authors).  
261.  King, supra note 241, at 481.  




understood in light of the statutory mandates with which these agencies 
are charged, all of which focus on the management and protection of 
public lands as a national resource.262 However, a range of authorities 
allow these agencies to privilege private and state interests with 
management and control of the public lands estate and, from the very 
beginning of that estate, the federal government has relied on its ability to 
divest and capitalize on it.263 
Even where federal agencies may be interested in considering 
tribal proposals to assume management or other administrative functions 
for lands with which they have a “special geographic, historical, or 
cultural” connection, the federal agency’s failure to competently honor its 
other legal obligations may frustrate that partnership.264 In the case of the 
National Bison Range, for example, which was taken from the 
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) and subsequently 
managed by the USFWS as a National Wildlife Refuge,265 the agency’s 
failure to conduct an adequate analysis of an agreement to delegate to the 
Tribes the management of the Range resulted in the judicial invalidation 
of that agreement.266 Similarly, NEPA likely requires any agency 
considering such an action to obtain public input and consider alternatives 
before making a final decision, procedural steps that may be viewed as 
inconsistent with the federal government’s trust obligations to tribes, the 
spirit of the TSGA, and may also subject the agency to further litigation.267 
Finally, although the TSGA makes important strides toward tribal 
self-determination, it remains a vehicle for the federal government to 
delegate only limited authority to tribes, particularly in the context of 
activities taking place on public lands. In other words, despite decades of 
recalcitrance toward such delegations and the continuing attempts by 
Congress to overcome these barriers, federal agencies remain largely in 
the driver’s seat when it comes to authorizing broader tribal control over 
federal activities on federal lands. This mostly unilateral framework can 
severely limit the viability of self-determination contracting or self-
governance compacting as a workable means of expanding tribal 
authority. 
 
262.  See Public Lands section infra. 
263.  See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra note 19, at 680–82. 
264. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(c) (2018).  
265. See generally Upton, supra note 241.  
266.  Reed v. Salazar, 744 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2010).  
267.  See, e.g., Notice: Fish and Wildlife Service and Council of 
Athabascan Tribal Governments Sign Annual Funding Agreement, 69 Fed. Reg. 
41,838, 41,839–44 (July 12, 2004) (addressing public comments in response to a 
proposed TSGA compact).  
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I. Contracting and Compacting as a Bridge to Tribal Co-Management 
The ability of Indian tribes to seek, negotiate, and enter 
agreements with the federal government to assume previously federal 
programs, functions, services, and activities is a core component of the 
current era of tribal self-determination. Through the assumption of a 
variety of service programs, for example, tribes across the country have 
begun serving and protecting their own communities, on their own terms, 
without the disconnection and interference of federal oversight. These 
contracting and compacting authorities are, therefore, critically important 
avenues for building and enhancing tribal sovereignty and sovereign 
capacity. 
Relying on the success of self-determination contracting and self-
governance compacting, the expansion of these concepts to federal 
agencies managing public lands present important opportunities for 
reshaping tribal co-management opportunities in the future. The TSGA, 
TFPA, and 2018 amendments all represent steps toward these reforms and 
if utilized as other self-determination and self-governance agreement 
authorities have been used, could usher in broader tribal roles with a range 
of federal land management agencies. Though contracting or compacting 
may be more limited in scope with regard to the assumption by tribes of 
off-reservation management responsibilities, the successful completion of 
those tasks can help alleviate concerns over greater tribal authority over 
public resources. Similarly, like their historical treaty antecedents, 
contracts and compacts mark important bonds of government-to-
government agreement that secure and respect co-existing sovereign 
authorities. And as with the history of self-determination contracting and 
self-governance compacting, the federal government can ensure 
appropriate tribal capacity, legitimacy, and oversight through those 
agreements so as to avoid concerns over improper delegations of federal 
authorities or the mismanagement of public resources.  
The continuing evolution of contracting and compacting show the 
promise of these avenues as bridges to a new era of expanded tribal co-
management; however, as demonstrated by the limited number of 
agreements developed pursuant to the TSGA and TFPA, more time, 
attention, and potential revisions are needed to enhance their effectiveness.   
J. Recommendations for Reform & TSGA Compacting as  
Implementation Mechanism for Tribal Co-Management 
As with other existing approaches to tribal engagement, self-
governance compacting could be improved through both executive and 




legislative actions aimed at encouraging greater balance between tribes 
and federal public land management agencies. For example, with regard 
to executive actions, broader incorporation and application of the 
principles surrounding delegation of federal authorities to tribes analyzed 
in the 1996 Solicitor’s Memorandum could help diminish agency concerns 
over and reluctance to treat tribes as partners rather than contractors.  
As described in detail below, the delegation of authority over 
federal public lands from the federal government to states and even private 
development interests is a well-established and long-accepted practice that 
pervades nearly all aspects of public land and resources management. 
While the legal basis for considering similar broad delegations to tribes is 
rooted in the foundational principles of federal Indian law described earlier 
and therefore entirely separate from the conflict over states’ rights and 
privatization of these federal and public interests, that basis should 
empower a greater recognition of the use of TSGA compacting as a means 
to fulfill the federal policy to promote tribal self-determination. A 
comprehensive executive branch review of these authorities, including 
further clarification of what may constitute an inherently federal function 
in the context of the trust relationship with Indian tribes would be an 
important first step in that direction.  
With regard to legislation, various recent efforts have sought 
further amendments to the TSGA in order to expand tribal options for 
compacting and decrease federal discretion over that process.268 An 
important provision for further consideration would be the elimination of 
the discretionary nature of compacting for non-BIA programs where there 
exists a “special geographic, historical, or cultural” tribal connection and, 
potentially, the development of additional options for tribes to pursue pilot 
or demonstration projects in the management of federal public lands and 
resources.269 
K. The National Historic Preservation Act and Native American 
Traditional Cultural Properties, Districts and Landscapes 
A more purposeful and structured form of tribal consultation is 
provided by the NHPA, which serves as the basic charter and method of 
 
268. See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 235, at 61–63 (reviewing prior 
proposals); Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act, S. 286, 114th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/286/ 
text. 
269. 25 U.S.C. § 5363(c); see, e.g., Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, Pub. 
L. 114-78, 130 Stat. 432 (June 22, 2016). 
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historic preservation in the United States.270 Section 106 of the NHPA 
requires federal agencies with direct or indirect control over a “proposed 
[f]ederal or federally assisted undertaking”271 to consider the effects of the 
undertaking on historic and cultural properties and to consult with 
interested parties as a way to “accommodate historic preservation concerns 
with the needs of Federal undertakings.”272  
A series of complicated procedural steps are required by the law 
and its regulations, including a consultation process whereby agencies 
consult “with any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that 
attaches religious and cultural significance” to a historic property that 
would be affected by a proposed federal undertaking.273 “The goal of 
consultation is to identify historic properties potentially affected by the 
undertaking, assess its effects and seek ways to avoid, minimize or 
mitigate any adverse effects on historic properties.”274  
A unique aspect of tribal consultation per Section 106 is the role 
played by the ACHP, an independent federal agency with statutorily 
designated representation. The ACHP oversees the Section 106 process, 
and participants within it “may seek advice, guidance and assistance from 
the Council” regarding specific undertakings, including the resolution of 
disagreements.275 As we return to in Part V of this article, the NHPA’s 
creation of the ACHP is in itself an important development because it 
divides decision-making responsibilities among more than one agency, 
thus, providing a potential check or brake on those “action agencies” 
proposing federal undertakings.276 As discussed below, although advisory 
 
270. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (Oct. 15, 1966) (codified as 54 
U.S.C. §§ 300301–307108 (2018)).  
271. Id. § 306108. 
272.  36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a) (2020). 
273.  54 U.S.C. §§ 302706(b), 306108; see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (Under 
NHPA regulations, “[c]onsultation means the process of seeking, discussing, and 
considering the views of other participants, and where feasible, seeking agreement 
with them.”). 
274.  36 C.F.R. § 800.1; see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(1) (“An adverse 
effect is found when an undertaking may alter, directly or indirectly, any of the 
characteristics of a historic property that qualify the property for inclusion in the 
National Register in a manner that would diminish the integrity of the property’s 
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or association. 
Consideration shall be given to all qualifying characteristics of a historic property, 
including those that may have been identified subsequent to the original evaluation of 
the property’s eligibility for the National Register.”).  
275.  36 C.F.R. § 800.2. 
276.  See Michael C. Blumm & Andrea Lang, Shared Sovereignty: The 
Role of Expert Agencies in Environmental Law, 42 ECOLOGY L. Q. 608 (2015) 
(assessing those environmental laws that divide decision-making authority among 




in nature, the ACHP’s potential to influence agency decision making, both 
substantively and procedurally, is a significant one.   
The 1992 Amendments to the NHPA clarified that “traditional 
cultural properties” (TCP) could be eligible for listing in the National 
Register of Historic Places,277 which is an official list administered by the 
NPS and intended to serve as a planning tool “to be used by [f]ederal, 
[s]tate, and local governments, private groups and citizens to identify the 
Nation’s cultural resources and to indicate what properties should be 
considered for protection from destruction or impairment.”278 There is a 
designated “Keeper” of the National Register of Historic Places—a NPS 
official with the authority to officially designate properties as eligible for 
inclusion in the National Register.279 
A TCP is defined as a property “eligible for inclusion in the 
National Register because of its association with cultural practices or 
beliefs of a living community that (a) are rooted in that community’s 
history, and (b) are important in maintaining the continuing cultural 
identity of the community.”280 Another type of TCP covered by the NHPA 
is a traditional cultural district (TCD), which constitutes a “concentration, 
linkage or continuity” of properties.281 Outside of the regulatory and legal 
context, these terms are often used interchangeably, but they are 
essentially viewed as a way to move beyond the protection of discrete 
sites, such as a National Historic Landmark,282 and towards the protection 
 
more than one agency, such as the NEPA, NHPA, ESA, CWA and the Federal Power 
Act).  
277. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-575, 106 Stat. 4753, 4757 (codified as 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b)). 
278. 36 C.F.R. § 60.2 (2020). 
279.  30 C.F.R. § 60.3(f) (2020).   
280.  National Park Service, Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting 
Traditional Cultural Properties 1 (1990, rev. 1992, 1998) https://www.nps.gov/ 
subjects/nationalregister/upload/NRB38-Completeweb.pdf (An example is “a 
location where Native American religious practitioners have historically gone, and are 
known or thought to go today, to perform ceremonial activities in accordance with 
traditional cultural rules of practice.”) [hereinafter National Register Bulletin 38]. 
281. Id. at 11.   
282. Section 110 of the NHPA provides more protection to National 
Historic Landmarks than is provided in Section 106: “Prior to the approval of any 
Federal undertaking that may directly and adversely affect any National Historic 
Landmark, the head of the responsible Federal agency shall to the maximum extent 
possible undertake such planning and actions as may be necessary to minimize harm 
to the landmark. The head of the Federal agency shall afford the Council a reasonable 
opportunity to comment with regard to the undertaking.” 54 U.S.C. § 306107; see e.g., 
Wyoming Sawmills v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001), aff’d, 
383 F. 3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004) (focused on protection of the Bighorn Medicine 
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of “Native American Traditional Cultural Landscapes” which are “large 
scale properties . . . often comprised of multiple, linked features that form 
a cohesive landscape.”283 
Another 1992 Amendment to the NHPA authorized tribes, upon 
meeting specified standards, to assume the responsibilities of the State 
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO), who plays an important role in 
administering the NHPA.284 The Amendment established the position of a 
Tribal Historic Preservation Officer (THPO) that has different duties and 
authorities on and off tribal lands. If a proposed undertaking’s “area of 
potential effect” (APE) is on federal public land the THPO “may serve as 
the official representative designated by his/her tribe to represent its 
interests as a consulting party in Section 106 consultation.”285 
Of particular relevance to tribal co-management is the NHPA’s 
multi-layered dispute resolution framework, which is applied at multiple 
decision points, including the identification of traditional properties and 
the assessment of adverse effects to those properties. In resolving the 
latter, the THPO (or SHPO) can disagree with a finding of no adverse 
effects and formally consult with the parties to resolve the disagreement 
or to request the engagement of the ACHP.286 A more substantive form of 
consultation is called for at this stage, with the requirement being that 
agency officials “should seek the concurrence of any Indian tribe or Native 
Hawaiian organization that has made known to the agency official that it 
attaches religious and cultural significance to a historic property subject to 
the finding.”287 Here, again, the ACHP may be requested to review the 
finding of no adverse effects, and the resolution of the disagreement may 
happen through continuing consultation or the preparation of a 
“programmatic agreement[,]” which documents “the terms and conditions 
agreed upon to resolve the potential adverse effects of a Federal agency 
program, complex undertaking or other situations.”288 Finally, there is a 
 
Wheel in Wyoming’s Bighorn National Forest).   
283.  Native American Traditional Cultural Landscapes Action Plan, 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.achp. 
gov/sites/default/files/guidance/2018-06/NativeAmericanTCLActionPlanNovember 
232011.pdf (internal quotations omitted) (The Action Plan was part of a “Native 
American traditional cultural landscapes initiative” began by the ACHP in 2011.). 
284.  54 U.S.C. § 302702. 
285.  Role of the Tribal Historic Preservation Officer in the Section 106 
Process, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION (Nov. 2, 2013), https:// 
www.achp.gov/digital-library-section-106-landing/role-tribal-historic-preservation 
-officer-section-106-process.  
286.  36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (2020).  
287.  Id. § 800.5(C). 
288.  Id. § 800.6; § 800.16(t). 




process regarding a failure to resolve adverse effects, leading to a 
termination of consultation and engagement of the ACHP.289 
L. Section 106 in Practice 
What does all of this mean in practice? The NHPA is a procedural 
statute affording federal agencies considerable discretion in how 
rigorously it is applied to the protection of sacred places and cultural 
resources on public lands. Section 106 encourages but does not mandate 
preservation.290 As shown below, the consultation process required by 
section 106 provides an important opportunity for tribal participation in 
federal agency decision making.291 After all, forcing agencies to consider 
whether their undertakings will adversely affect cultural properties and 
whether the actions can be avoided, minimized and mitigated is better than 
no consideration at all. For the same reasons that NEPA is so crucial to 
environmental protection, the precautionary “stop, look, and listen”292 
nature of the NHPA can provide important time, space and leverage to find 
possible alternative courses of actions. Furthermore, in comparison to the 
executive orders on tribal consultation, Section 106 provides a statutorily 
based right to consultation, though circuit courts are mixed as to whether 
it also provides a stand-alone and enforceable right of action against the 
federal government.293 
As we discuss below, there are elements of the Section 106 
framework that could be used to inform, and possibly bridge, variations of 
tribal co-management in the future. Several features of Section 106—the 
structured and statutorily based version of tribal consultation, the principle 
 
289. Id. § 800.7. 
290.  Protecting Historic Properties: A Citizen’s Guide to Section 106 
Review, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, pg. 4 (2017) 
https://www.achp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017-01/CitizenGuide.pdf. 
291. See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, Historic Storytelling and the Growth of 
Tribal Historic Preservation Programs, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T (2002–2003) at 86, 
88 (reviewing NHPA’s consultation framework as “the right to have a seat at the table, 
a chance to persuade the responsible federal official to do the right thing”).  
292.  Apache Survival Coalition v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 906 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).  
293. Compare San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091 
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that NHPA claims must be pursued under the APA), with 
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1017 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing a cause 
of action under the NHPA); see also Melinda Harm Benson, Enforcing Traditional 
Cultural Property Protections, 7 HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 60, 66–67 (2014); Amanda M. 
Marincic, The National Historic Preservation Act: An Inadequate Attempt to Protect 
the Cultural and Religious Sites of Native Nation, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1777, 1792–94 
(2018). 
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of concurrence in resolving disputes, the important role of THPOs in the 
administration of the NHPA, and the exogenous roles played by the ACHP 
and the “Keeper” of the National Register that serve as a check on action 
agency discretion—could be replicated or modified in future place-based 
or system-wide legislation focused on tribal co-management. 
Notwithstanding the benefits and potential of section 106 process, 
all too often federal agencies view those steps as a procedural obstacle to 
overcome, or as a bureaucratic check-mark on the way to making decisions 
that will move forward regardless of the findings and analysis required by 
Section 106 consultation. Part of the problem stems from how much public 
land has yet to even be inventoried for cultural resources.294 Cultural 
resource and heritage programs within the BLM and USFS are also 
chronically underfunded and deprioritized within the agencies, especially 
when competing with revenue-generating activities like oil and gas 
leasing.295  
Some of the most well-known disputes regarding tribal sacred 
lands and cultural resources have an associated Section 106 NHPA claim. 
And with few exceptions,296 tribes were unsuccessful in using the law and 
its consultation procedures as a stand-alone way to protect sacred sites and 
traditional cultural properties.297 The prominent cases—Standing Rock 
Sioux v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Dakota Access 
Pipeline),298 Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service (use of 
wastewater for snowmaking at Arizona Snowbowl),299 Hoonah Indian 
Association v. Morrison (timber sales on the Tongass National Forest),300 
 
294.  See T. Destry Jarvis, National Trust For Historic Preservation, 
Cultural Resources On The Bureau Of Land Management Public Lands: An 
Assessment And Needs Analysis, May 2006, at 6 (finding roughly six percent of BLM 
lands surveyed for cultural resources); see also T. Destry Jarvis, National Trust For 
Historic Preservation, The National Forest System: Cultural Resources At Risk: An 
Assessment And Needs Analysis, May 2008 (finding 80 percent of USFS lands not 
surveyed for cultural resources).  
295.  See T. Destry Jarvis, National Trust For Historic Preservation, 
Cultural Resources On The Bureau Of Land Management Public Lands: An 
Assessment And Needs Analysis, May 2006, at 6. 
296.  See e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 
1994); Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 755 
F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010).  
297.  See generally Jess Phelps, The National Historic Preservation Act at 
Fifty: Surveying the Forest Service Experience, 47 ENVTL. L. 471 (2017) (reviewing 
NHPA litigation trends on NFS lands).  
298.  205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2016). 
299.  479 F. 3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007); on reh’g en banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th 
Cir. 2008).   
300.  170 F. 3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1999). 




and Apache Survival Coalition v. United States (construction of Mount 
Graham International Observatory on the Coronado National Forest)301—
make clear the discretionary and procedural nature of the law. And more 
contemporary cases—such as the lack of any meaningful consultation 
pertaining to oil and gas development adjacent to the Chaco Canyon region 
of the Southwest,302 and the acknowledged destruction of a TCP in the Oak 
Flat area on the Tonto National Forest that was exchanged with a foreign-
owned mining corporation303—show a continuation of this trend. 
M. Case Study: The Badger-Two Medicine 
The Badger-Two Medicine story demonstrates the evolution, 
variability and limitations of the NHPA, but also the law’s potential to 
serve as a possible bridge to co-management in the future.304 This section 
 
301.  Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 118 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 1997) 
[hereinafter Apache Survival II]. 
302.  See, e.g., Uncited Preliminary Brief (Deferred Appendix Appeal) of 
Amici Curiae All Pueblo Council of Governors and National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, in Support of Appellants, Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. 
Zinke, Civ. No. 18-2089 (10th Cir. filed Sept. 7, 2018) (describing BLM NHPA 
violations in failing to consult with Pueblo tribal governments when considering 
applications for permits to drill and how they would potentially affect traditional 
cultural properties in the area).   
303.  The Oak Flat area was listed on the National Register of Historic 
Places as an Apache TCP in 2016. Within its boundaries include 38 archeological sites 
and several additional sacred places, springs and other significant locations. Section 
3003 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck” McKeon National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a mandatory land exchange and 
transfer of the Oak Flat area to Resolution Copper. Though the Act limits the USFS’s 
discretion over the transfer, and its ability to address Tribal concerns, an 
environmental impact statement still had to be prepared. The Draft EIS makes clear 
that “[c]onstruction and operation of the mine would profoundly and permanently 
alter” the Oak Flat TCP, potentially including human burials. It also includes a section 
on mitigation of adverse effects, including “data recovery” and curation strategies. 
Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Resolution Copper Project and Land 
Exchange, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. (Aug. 2019) https://www.resolutionmineeis.us/ 
documents/draft-eis.    
304.  See generally Kathryn Sears Ore, Form and Substance: The National 
Historic Preservation Act, Badger-Two Medicine, and Meaningful Consultation, 38 
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 205, 240 (2017) (telling the story of how it “took 
the Forest Service and the Blackfeet more than three decades to organically achieve a 
common understanding of meaningful consultation”); Martin Nie, The Use of Co-
Management and Protected Land-Use Designations to Protect Tribal Cultural 
Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal Lands 48 NAT. RESOURCES J., 585 
(2008) (providing an overview of the Badger-Two Medicine and how tribal co-
management and a protected land use designation could be applied in the future).  
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provides a very broad and incomplete snapshot of the story with a more 
technical focus on how a TCD designation for the Badger-Two Medicine 
is being leveraged to find more cooperative management and substantive 
protections for the area.   
The Badger-Two Medicine area of western Montana is bounded 
by Glacier National Park to its north, the Bob Marshall and Great Bear 
Wilderness areas to its south and west, and the Blackfeet Indian 
Reservation to its east. Most of the Badger-Two Medicine area is 
designated roadless and it is a stronghold for several species of fish and 
wildlife that are no longer found or diminished elsewhere.305 It is part of 
an international landscape referenced as the “Crown of the Continent,” 
with the Badger-Two Medicine found at the northern edge of the Rocky 
Mountain Front, where the Great Plains meet the Rocky Mountains.  
This larger geographic area was historically governed through a 
succession of agreements between the Blackfeet Nation (Blackfeet) and 
the federal government. Most important, for purposes here, is the 
Blackfeet Agreement of 1895 (ratified in 1896), in which the Blackfeet 
reserved use rights on roughly 400,000 acres of ceded lands for 
$1,500,000.306 Most of this ceded land is now part of Glacier National 
Park, with the remaining roughly 130,000 acres in the Helena-Lewis and 
Clark National Forest. The Blackfeet have used and inhabited the Badger-
Two Medicine since time immemorial, and the area is critical to the “oral 
history, creation stories, and ceremonies of the Blackfeet people, as well 
as an important plant gathering, hunting, fishing and timbering site which 
continues to be vital to the religious, cultural and subsistence survival of 
the Blackfoot people.”307 
The most significant set of threats facing the Badger-Two Medicine 
stem from fifty-one oil and gas leases issued in the area and adjacent lands 
 
305.  See John Weaver, Vital Lands, Sacred Lands: Innovative 
Conservation of Wildlife and Cultural Values, Badger-Two Medicine Area, Montana 
(Wildlife Conservation Society, Working Paper No. 44, 2015). 
306. Agreement with the Indians of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in 
Montana, 29 Stat. 353, 354 (1896) (“Provided, that said Indians shall have, and do 
hereby reserve to themselves, the right to go upon any portion of the lands hereby 
conveyed so long as the same shall remain public lands of the United States, and to 
cut and remove therefrom wood and timber for agency and school purposes, and for 
their personal uses for houses, fences, and all other domestic purposes: And provided 
further, That the said Indians hereby reserve and retain the right to hunt upon said 
lands and to fish in the streams thereof so long as the same shall remain public lands 
of the United States under and in accordance with the provisions of the game and fish 
laws of the State of Montana.” (emphasis in original)). 
307. Proclamation of the Blackfoot Confederacy, Badger-Two Medicine 
(2004) (on file with author).   




in 1982.308 These parcels were not inventoried for cultural resources by the 
USFS, and the “USFS and BLM failed to fully consider the effects of 
leasing, including all phases of oil and gas activities on cultural resources, 
including religious values and activities, within the Badger-Two Medicine 
area.”309 No environmental analysis was conducted prior to lease issuance, 
let alone consideration of how these leases would impact the Blackfeet’s 
reserved rights. Nor did the USFS comply with NHPA (or the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act) tribal consultation procedures before issuing 
the leases, mistakenly asserting that compliance would take place after lease 
issuance and “at the time soil disturbing activities are proposed.”310  
Multiple objections and protests to these controversial leases were 
immediate and applications for permits to drill in the area were temporarily 
suspended by the Department of the Interior.311 While this was playing 
out, the USFS’s Land and Resources Management Plan (Forest Plan) in 
effect at the time provided no direction or restrictions specific to the 
Badger-Two Medicine. Several provisions used in the 1986 Forest Plan 
are indicative of the type of post-hoc “consultation” used by federal 
agencies at the time of the Forest Plan’s preparation. For example, one 
provision requires the Blackfeet to be “notified” of all exploration drilling 
and development proposals with its Treaty lands and that this was 
sufficient to comply with the AIRFA.312 Another requires that “any 
decision respecting 1895 Agreement lands will be made only after 
informing the Blackfeet Tribe.”313 
The USFS failed to protect the Badger-Two Medicine in the 
1980s, and using its forest planning process opened the door to yet another 
threat, this one posed by a lack of travel management and increasing 
motorized use of the area. The Blackfeet saw “the proliferation of 
motorized use . . . as an increasing trend with commensurate cumulative 
effects to the cultural landscape and a threat to the continuance of 
traditional practices and associated cultural lifeways.”314  
 
308. See generally U.S. Forest Service, Environmental Assessment: Oil 
and Gas Leasing, Nonwilderness Lands, 61 (1981). 
309. Letter from Aden L. Seidlitz, Acting State Dir. BLM Mont. Dakotas 
Office, to Solenex LLC, Letter re Cancellation of Federal Oil and Gas Lease 
MTM53323 7 (Mar. 17, 2016), available as attachment in Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 156 
F. Supp. 3d 83 (D.D.C. 2016) [hereinafter Interior Cancellation Letter]. 
310.  Id.  
311. Id. 
312. Lewis and Clark National Forest Plan, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., 2–57 
(1986) https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5409083.pdf 
[hereinafter Forest Plan]. 
313. Id. at 2–60.   
314. Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Rocky Mountain Ranger 
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The threats posed to the Badger-Two Medicine, and the processes 
used to address them, invariably placed the Blackfeet in a reactive and 
defensive position, forcing the Blackfeet and their conservation allies to 
expend time and resources fighting proposals that they had no role in 
developing. Yet, the 1992 Amendments to the NHPA provided the 
Blackfeet an important tool that could be used in a more pro-active and 
synergistic fashion. As discussed above, the Amendments broadened the 
type of properties possibly covered by the NHPA (to include TCP and 
TCD designations), and secondly, they authorized tribes to assume 
functions of state historic preservation officers. 
Ethnographic, archeological, and other studies of the cultural 
significance of the Badger-Two Medicine resulted in the designation of 
89,376 acres as a TCD in 2002. Shortly thereafter, the Blackfeet THPO 
initiated several collaborative projects to complete the ethnographic 
studies of the area.315 This collective work led to the boundaries of the 
Badger-Two Medicine TCD being expanded to 165,588 acres in 2014. The 
“Keeper” of the National Register’s Determination again recognized “the 
remote wilderness” of the Badger-Two Medicine but provided “a more 
holistic and inclusive view” of the region than what was provided in 2002, 
recognizing how it is seen “as an interconnected traditional landscape,” “a 
place of extreme power,” and “a significant region of refuge” for many 
tribal members.316 
Designation of the Badger-Two Medicine TCD has proven 
advantageous in several ways. First, the historic and cultural studies done 
pursuant to the NHPA provided the BLM one important rationale to 
 
District Travel Management Plan, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 98 (June 2005).   
315. See Blackfeet Tribal Historic Preservation Office, Blackfeet Tribal 
Business Council, Badger-Two Medicine Traditional Cultural District, Helena-Lewis 
And Clark National Forest, Montana: Proposal To Establish Permanent Protections 
(Dec. 5, 2017), at 26–28 (providing a detailed assessment of these studies and how 
they were funded and organized to recognize tribal sovereignty) [hereinafter Proposal 
To Establish Permanent Protections]. These studies include the influential 
collaborations between the Blackfeet THPO John Murray, Blackfeet Community 
College and research anthropologist Maria Nieves Zedeño at the University of 
Arizona. See e.g., Maria Nieves Zedeño, Principal Investigator, Badger-Two Medicine 
Traditional Cultural District, Montana: Boundary Adjustment Study, Final Report 89 
(Mar. 10, 2006); see also Maria Nieves Zedeño, Blackfeet Landscape Knowledge and 
the Badger-Two Medicine Traditional Cultural District, The SAA Archeological 
Record (Mar. 2007).  
316. National Park Service, Determination of Eligibility Notification: 
Badger-Two Medicine Traditional Cultural District (Boundary Increase) (2014) (on 
file with authors). 




reauthorize temporary suspensions of oil and gas leases in the area.317 
Second, it allowed the USFS to recommend to Interior a federal mining 
withdrawal that happened administratively in 2001,318 and then by 
Congress in 2006.319 These moves, and others, provided the Blackfeet and 
conservationists important time to find more durable solutions to the costly 
leasing mistake of 1982.  
These studies had an educative function as well, clearly 
articulating to federal agencies and political decision makers the deep 
history and webs connecting the Blackfeet to the Badger-Two Medicine. 
In some respects, the law, regulations and policies governing TCD 
eligibility made the federal agency’s recognition of such values more 
official and legitimate; or, at least safer for bureaucrats to reference. In 
combination with Blackfeet Treaty rights, these studies and the TCD 
designation provided an important basis to find legislative solutions for 
the area. An important moment came in 2006, with passage of a law 
providing tax incentives for existing leaseholders to transfer their oil and 
gas leases to the federal government or qualifying non-profit conservation 
organizations.320 As a result of this legislation, twenty-nine leaseholders 
relinquished their leases in the Badger-Two Medicine. The TCD, and the 
ethnographic studies and NHPA Section 106 consultation process done as 
part thereof, factored into the USFS’s decision in 2009 to restrict 
motorized use and prohibit snowmobiles in the Badger-Two Medicine,321 
a decision that withstood a legal challenge asserting that protection of the 
TCD was an unconstitutional advancement of “Native American 
religion.”322 
The last oil and gas lease to remain in the Badger-Two Medicine 
was acquired by the company Solenex in 2004, in the midst of this 
administrative and legal turmoil, and two years after the initial Badger-
Two Medicine TCD designation. The NHPA Section 106 process played 
a prominent role in Interior’s decision to ultimately cancel the lease in 
2016, recognizing that it was improperly issued and did not comport with 
“Congress’ express intent to protect this culturally significant area” and 
the “Executive Branch’s long standing commitment to protect Indian 
 
317. Interior Cancellation Letter, supra note 309, at 4. 
318. Public Land Order No. 7480.  
319. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 403, 120 
Stat. 3050 (2006). 
320. Id. at 3050–53. 
321. Lewis and Clark National Forest, Rocky Mountain Ranger District 
Travel Management Plan: Record of Decision for Badger-Two Medicine, U.S. Forest 
Service, 11 (2009).   
322. Fortune v. Thompson, No. CV-09-98, 2011 WL 206164 (D. Mont. 
2011).   
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sacred sites and ensure that adequate and meaningful consultation occurs 
when federal land management decisions have significant impacts on 
tribal religious and cultural practices.”323  
In making this decision, Interior relied upon the ACHP’s 
recommendation that the Departments of Agriculture and Interior revoke 
Solenex’s suspended permit to drill, cancel the lease, and ensure that future 
mineral development does not occur in the area.324 The ACHP stated, “the 
Solenex exploratory well along with the reasonably foreseeable full field 
development would be so damaging to the [TCD] that the Blackfeet 
Tribe’s ability to practice their religious and cultural traditions in this area 
as part of their community life and development would be lost.”325 The 
ACHP concluded the Badger-Two Medicine is “of premier importance to 
the Blackfeet Tribe in sustaining its religious and cultural traditions,” “the 
TCD retains integrity and is a landscape virtually unmarred by modern 
development and intrusions,” and “the public at large is overwhelmingly 
in support of the preservation of the TCD.”326 For these and other reasons, 
the ACHP found that “no mitigation measures would achieve an 
acceptable balance between historic preservation concerns and the 
undertaking.”327  
The ACHP’s involvement in this case was itself a turning point, 
providing a panel of council members the opportunity to visit the region 
and hear the most compelling testimony of what the Badger-Two 
Medicine means to Indians and non-Indians alike. The meeting began with 
an unexpected powerful ceremony, a set of songs and blessing by the 
Crazy Dog Society, a Blackfeet traditional group whose presence made 
clear to the panel the power of this place and how far the Blackfeet will go 
to defend it. The meeting was bookended by Earthjustice Attorney Tim 
Preso, who has worked for years with the Tribe, telling members of the 
Council: 
You’ve come here to an amazing place. I know your 
hearings are rare, but this one must be especially rare 
 
323. Letter from Aden L. Seidlitz, Acting State Dir. BLM Mont. Dakotas 
Office, to Solenex LLC, Letter re Cancellation of Federal Oil and Gas Lease 
MTM53323 7 (Mar. 17, 2016), available as attachment in Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 156 
F. Supp. 3d 83 (D.D.C. 2016).   
324. Comments of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
Regarding the Release from Suspension of the Permit to Drill by Solenex LLC In Lewis 
And Clark National Forest, Montana, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 7 
(Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter ACHP Comments on Solenex]. 
325. Id.  
326. Id. at 4–5.  
327. Id. at 7.  




because you sit on the edge of one our country’s last great 
undeveloped spaces; a tract of largely undeveloped public 
land stretching from the Canadian border to McDonald 
Pass, that contains almost all of its native fauna intact. 
And, as the events we’ve already seen today demonstrate, 
is the home not only to historical, but a living cultural 
overlay that is extremely rare in our world today. And this 
whole undeveloped space is an increasingly rare 
commodity in our crowded and developed world.328 
The Section 106 process provided an official and structured platform to 
share these powerful stories.   
The decision to cancel the lease was challenged by Solenex, and 
the D.C. District Court ruled in its favor holding that the amount of time 
that had elapsed between the lease’s issuance and its cancellation in 2016 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).329 That decision was 
vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court in 2020, with much of the opinion 
centered on the TCD and the lack of sufficient NHPA analysis.330 Drawing 
on the values and attributes so clearly described in the TCD 
determinations, the D.C. Circuit Court began its opinion with a vivid 
description of the Badger-Two Medicine and the meaning it holds in 
Blackfeet creation before moving into the intricacies of administrative and 
oil and gas law.  
There is no neat and tidy way to measure the impact of the Badger-
Two Medicine TCD. The designation was most often used and leveraged 
in concert with other laws and processes, and assessing the effects of 
procedural-based laws, like NHPA’s Section 106 and NEPA, is 
particularly difficult. Based on previous Section 106 case law, it is easy to 
imagine how differently things could have gone along the way. A common 
NHPA mitigation measure proposed, for example, is “data recovery,”331 
curation, or to simply document the property being destroyed by the 
federal agency, such as a proposal to map and photograph culturally 
significant land that was being exchanged between the USFS and 
Weyerhaeuser timber corporation.332 Previous mitigation measures 
 
328. Speakers at Choteau Meeting Overwhelmingly Oppose Badger-Two 
Medicine Drilling (Montana Public Radio broadcast Sept. 3, 2015).   
329. Solenex LLC v. Jewell, 334 F. Supp. 3d 174, 177 (D.D.C. 2018).   
330. Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, 962 F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2020).   
331. For a recent example, see USDA Forest Service, Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement: Resolution Copper Project and Land Exchange (2019), 638 
(reviewing mitigation strategies for the Oak Flat TCP on the Tonto National Forest).  
332. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 177 F. 3d 800 (9th 
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offered for the Badger-Two Medicine in 1991 and 1993 included the 
requirement that Fina (Solenex’s predecessor), prior to any construction 
activity, provide the Blackfeet and USFS a schedule of when oil and gas 
leasing work was to be performed; another provided the option of using a 
gravel pad to protect a discovered archeological site.333 These, and other 
mitigation scenarios, could have easily placed the Badger-Two Medicine 
on a different trajectory.   
But in this case, the TCD has been unmistakably impactful. With 
vision and leadership by the Blackfeet THPO, the TCD—and the 
ethnographic work that went into it—changed the narrative and created a 
new way of thinking and talking about the Badger-Two Medicine and the 
Blackfeet’s role in safeguarding it. Based on the work of the THPO, the 
TCD was then successfully leveraged by the conservation allies working 
with the Blackfeet to painstakingly undo the fifty-one leases, one-by-one, 
over the course of nearly forty years.  
The problem remaining is that the TCD and the Section 106 
processes are still procedural, and thus did not provide the Badger-Two 
Medicine substantive and enforceable protections, nor did it provide the 
Blackfeet a more pro-active and pre-decisional role in its management. 
The next section describes how public lands planning could potentially 
serve as a bridge in that regard, fully integrating the TCD and tribal 
consultation into the development and implementation of a national forest 
plan. The focus will remain on the Badger-Two Medicine, and therefore 
national forest planning, but the principles and strategy could be modified 
and replicated in plans prepared by the BLM, NPS and USFWS.   
N. Public Lands Planning as Bridge to Tribal Co-Management 
For better or worse, planning is a core principle in federal public 
land law, and most decisions and activities taking place on a piece of 
public land must be consistent with the governing land use plans. Plans are 
the vehicle for taking broad statutory mandates and more detailed 
regulations and applying them to particular places. Planning is particularly 
important on lands managed by the USFS and BLM because it is at the 
plan level where their broad multiple use missions are operationalized and 
given meaning on the ground.  
The NFMA of 1976 requires the preparation of land and resource 
management plans for every national forest and grassland in the National 
Forest System (NFS). In 2012, new planning regulations (2012 Planning 
 
Cir. 1999).  
333. ACHP Comments on Solenex, supra note 324, at 2–3.  




Rule) written pursuant to NFMA were promulgated by the Obama 
Administration and dozens of national forests across the country are now 
in the process of revising plans using this planning rule.334 These 
regulations include tribal provisions that are premised on the USFS’s trust 
responsibility, its consultation duties, the unique government-to-
government relationship between the federal government and tribes, and 
the agency’s obligation to protect treaty and reserved rights.335 New to the 
2012 Planning Rule are provisions related to the management of “areas of 
tribal importance,”336 and the use of “native knowledge.”337 The 2012 
Planning Rule also requires consultation with federally recognized tribes 
and encourages them to seek “cooperating agency status.”338 
The Blackfeet THPO engaged in the Forest Plan revision for the 
Helena-Lewis and Clark National Forest understanding the implications 
for the Badger-Two Medicine. John Murray and Kendall Edmo of the 
THPO and the Bolle Center for People and Forests collaborated in drafting 
and submitting to the USFS a set of recommended plan components that 
would provide substantive protections for the Badger-Two Medicine 
TCD, secure Blackfeet treaty rights, and advance the objective of co-
management. The revision process also provided an important opportunity 
to incorporate into the new Forest Plan the significant changes and policy 
developments happening since the original plan was prepared in 1986,339 
including the TCD designations and executive orders pertaining to sacred 
sites E.O. 13007, 1996 and consultation and coordination with tribal 
governments E.O. 13175.   
The focus on plan components is because of the 2012 Rule’s 
consistency provision: “Every project and activity must be consistent with 
the applicable plan components.”340 They are at the heart of forest 
planning, and if there were to be any meaningful changes to the Badger-
Two Medicine they would be found in the plan components applied to the 
area. Each revised Forest Plan must include a set of plan components 
consisting of: (1) desired conditions; (2) objectives; (3) standards; (4) 
 
334. See generally Susan Jane M. Brown & Martin Nie, Making Forest 
Planning Great Again? Early Implementation of the Forest Service’s 2012 National 
Forest Planning Rule, 33 NAT. RESOURCES. & ENV’T 1 (2019) (providing an overview 
of the Rule and its early implementation).     
335. 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(2) (2020). 
336. Id. § 219.10(b)(1). 
337. Id. § 219.19. 
338. Id. § 219.4. 
339. Id. § 219.7 (as per the 2012 Planning Rule, these developments 
should have informed the “Plan Assessment” and the “need to change” the existing 
plan and the subsequent development of plan components.).  
340. Id. § 219.15. 
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guidelines; and (5) suitability of lands (required for timber production, 
optional for other multiple uses or activities). When properly integrated, 
these components establish the vision of a plan, set forth the strategy to 
achieve it, and provide the constraints of subsequent management. 
Components can be applied across a national forest or to specific 
management or geographic areas designated in a plan, such as prohibiting 
types of activities that are incompatible in areas of tribal importance, 
protecting cultural resources and treaty-based habitat, and provisions 
related to traditional access, among others.  
The “desired conditions” stated in a forest plan are particularly 
important to tribal co-management because they hold the potential of 
federal agencies working with tribes in a more pro-active and pre-
decisional manner—a way to break the pattern of consulting with tribes 
after the die is cast. There is a problematic tendency to write desired 
condition statements in a vague and discretionary fashion, though the 2012 
Planning Rule and its planning directives make clear that they “must be 
described in terms that are specific enough to allow progress toward their 
achievement to be determined.”341 
The 2020 Land Management Plan for the Helena-Lewis and Clark 
National Forest provides a set of plan components for the Badger-Two 
Medicine “emphasis area.” They are built on the explicit recognition of 
the TCD and Blackfeet treaty rights reserved in the area. As provided in 
the 2012 Planning Rule and Directives, desired conditions are to “drive 
the development of the other plan components”342 and can include 
“[s]ocial relationships, traditions, culture, and activities that connect 
people to the plan area.”343 One of the desired conditions in the 2020 Land 
Management Plan copies the language and endorses the vision provided 
by the Blackfeet THPO: 
[The] Badger Two Medicine is a sacred land, a cultural 
touchstone, a repository of heritage, a living cultural 
landscape, a refuge, a hunting ground, a critical 
ecosystem, a habitat linkage between protected lands, a 
wildlife sanctuary, a place of solitude, a refuge for wild 
nature, and an important part of both tribal and non-tribal 
community values. It is important to the people who rely 
 
341. Id. § 219.7(e)(1)(i). 
342 Forest Service Handbook 1902.12, 22.11(2015) [hereinafter FSH].  
343. Id. at 1909.12, 12.20.  




upon it, critical to the wild nature that depends upon it, 
and has an inherent value and power of its own.344 
This powerful desired conditions statement is a positive development even 
though the USFS could go further to integrate the values and attributes of 
the TCD (as documented in the National Register Determinations and the 
ethnographic studies that informed them) into specific desired conditions.   
Standards in forest planning are particularly important because 
they serve as “a mandatory constraint on project and activity decision-
making”345 and are generally viewed by the courts as non-discretionary 
and enforceable.346 Two standards are currently included in the Helena-
Lewis and Clark Plan for the Badger-Two Medicine:  
(1) Management activities in the Badger Two Medicine 
shall be conducted in close consultation with the 
Blackfeet Nation to fulfill treaty obligations, and the 
federal Indian trust responsibility. Project and activity 
authorizations shall be protected and honor Blackfeet 
reserved rights and sacred land. The uses of this area must 
be compatible with desired conditions and compatibility 
shall be determined through government to government 
consultation.347  
(2) Management activities shall accommodate Blackfeet 
tribal member access to the Badger Two Medicine for the 
exercise of reserved treaty rights, and enhance 
opportunities for tribal members to practice spiritual, 
ceremonial, and cultural activities.348  
The second standard is not unusual and is essentially a restatement of 
existing rights and access or accommodation policy. However, the first 
standard is far more substantive, and will provide the Blackfeet a more 
powerful role in ensuring that uses of the area are compatible with desired 
conditions, and that these compatibility determinations will happen 
 
344. U.S. Forest Service, 2020 Land Management Plan: Helena-Lewis and 
Clark National Forest, 183 (May 2020) [hereinafter HLC 2020 Forest Plan].   
345. Id. § 219.7(e)(1)(iii). 
346. See Martin Nie & Emily Schembra, The Important Role of Standards 
in National Forest Planning, Law, and Management, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 281 
(2014).  
347. HLC 2020 Forest Plan, supra note 344, at 183.  
348. Id. at 184.   
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through government-to-government consultation. Our view of this 
standard is that it ties the procedural nature of tribal consultation to a more 
substantive result and discrete decision point, which is determining 
compatibility with the desired conditions.  
One of the standards removed by the USFS between draft and final 
plan was focused specifically on the TCD:  
Management activities within the Badger Two Medicine 
area shall not pose adverse effects to the Badger Two 
Medicine Traditional Cultural District. Management 
activities shall consider scientific research and 
ethnographic research as they relate to Blackfeet cultural 
land-use identities when analyzing project effects.349  
This standard, which will hopefully be reinstated by the USFS in the near 
future, similarly illustrates how innovation in forest planning could be 
used to translate a procedural protection (the TCD and Section 106 
process) into a substantive one (no adverse effects to the TCD).  
Furthermore, as discussed in Part II(C), there is existing authority 
for the USFS to contract with the Blackfeet to work in the Badger-Two 
Medicine and on other NFS lands. When viewed collectively, all of these 
existing mechanisms, processes and authorities—the TCD, the new 
desired conditions reflecting pre-decisional tribal input and participation, 
the new compatibility and consultation procedures stated as enforceable 
standards, and existing contracting authorities—can be constructed into an 
approach that reflects the core principles of tribal co-management.  
Yet, there is so much more that could have been done in the Forest 
Plan for the Badger-Two Medicine, using all of the available tools and 
provisions provided in the 2012 Planning Rule. Most problematic is the 
USFS’s decision to not restrict mechanized (including mountain bikes and 
e-bikes) travel in the area, which the Tribal Business Council and Pikuni 
Traditionalists Association specifically requested and views as an 
incompatible use and an adverse effect on the TCD.350 This, once again, 
illustrates the reactive and defensive position in which the Blackfeet has 
found itself since ancestral lands were ceded. The Forest Plan could also 
 
349. Draft Revised Forest Plan, Helena-Lewis and Clark National Forest, 
U.S. FOREST SERV., 172 (June 2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_ 
DOCUMENTS/fseprd575231.pdf.  
350. Letter From Timothy Davis, Chairman, Blackfeet Nation, to  Bill 
Avey, Deputy Forest Supervisor,  U.S. Forest Serv. (Feb. 20, 2020) and Letter from 
Pikuni Traditionalists Association to Bill Avey, Deputy Forest Supervisor,  U.S. 
Forest Serv. (Feb 23, 2020) (on file with authors).   




have done more to facilitate the Blackfeet’s vision (and Tribal Business 
Council’s proclamation) regarding the return of “Original Buffalo” to 
“Original Homelands.” The agency could do so by taking part of the 
Blackfeet’s Proclamation and turning it into a desired condition statement, 
or making a “suitability” of use determination regarding bison in the 
Badger-Two Medicine.351 
Most importantly, the USFS could have used its authority, and 
embraced its federal trust responsibilities, to formalize a more cooperative 
management framework for the Badger-Two Medicine. The Proposal to 
Establish Permanent Protections for the Badger-Two Medicine (Blackfeet 
Proposal), submitted to the USFS by the Blackfeet THPO and Tribal 
Business Council, recommends making the Badger-Two Medicine area “a 
model of tribally co-managed federal public lands.”352 The proposed 
management strategy shares some commonalities with the proposal 
submitted to President Obama by the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition and 
is based on the core principles of tribal co-management reviewed in Table 
1. The Blackfeet Proposal includes the establishment of a commission, 
dispute resolution mechanisms, provisions related to funding and capacity 
building, a tribal consent provision related to new uses of the area, and 
encouraging the use of existing contract, agreement, or memorandum-of-
understanding (MOU) authorities, among other core principles of tribal 
co-management. The management strategy also requests the integration of 
traditional and historical knowledge and the special expertise of the 
Blackfeet into the development and implementation of a management 
plan. This too could be formalized using the 2012 Planning Rule’s new 
provision related to “Native knowledge.”353 
 
351. The 2012 Planning Rule states that “[s]pecific lands within a plan 
area will be identified as suitable for various multiple uses or activities based on the 
desired conditions applicable to those lands.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(e)(1)(v) (2020). Other 
than timber suitability, the USFS has discretion in making suitability determinations 
for other resources and uses. 
352. Proposal to Establish Permanent Protections, supra note 315, at 2.   
353. 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(a)(3) (2021) (Native knowledge defined as: “A 
way of knowing or understanding the world, including traditional ecological and 
social knowledge of the environment derived from multiple generations of indigenous 
peoples’ interactions, observations, and experiences with their ecological systems. 
Native knowledge is place-based and culture-based knowledge in which people learn 
to live in and adapt to their own environment through interactions, observations, and 
experiences with their ecological system. This knowledge is generally not solely 
gained, developed by, or retained by individuals, but is rather accumulated over 
successive generations and is expressed through oral traditions, ceremonies, stories, 
dances, songs, art, and other means within a cultural context.”).    
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As discussed in Part II(D)(3), the USFS’s response to this 
carefully crafted proposal was to first muddle the meaning of co-
management and to then dismiss it altogether: “The Tribe has also 
expressed an interest in co-management of the area. However, only 
Congress has the authority to change Federal land management agency 
jurisdiction.”354 Of course, the Blackfeet did not ask for a change of 
jurisdiction and the USFS has existing authority to work in a more 
structured and cooperative framework with the Blackfeet, an authority that 
was more explicitly recognized in the 1986 Forest Plan.355  
O. Recommendations 
In the absence of tribal co-management legislation, the executive 
actions could facilitate this type of bridge-building or cross-walking 
between the NHPA and federal land planning. NHPA’s Section 106 
regulations already call for consultation to be “coordinated with other 
requirements of other statutes, as applicable, such as NEPA, NAGPRA,  
AIRFA, ARPA, and agency specific legislation.”356 The Council on 
Environmental Quality and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
provide detailed guidance on how best to integrate and coordinate Section 
106 and NEPA planning, including the use of “NEPA documents to 
facilitate Section 106 consultation,” and using “Section 106 to inform the 
development and selection of alternatives in NEPA documents.”357 
Federal public land laws require plans to be prepared in accordance with 
NEPA,358 so there exists an opportunity to use land use plans in a more 
pro-active and strategic fashion in the future.359  
 
354. U.S. Forest Service, Draft Record of Decision: Helena-Lewis and 
Clark National Forest 2020 Land Management Plan (2020), at 7.   
355. See Lewis And Clark National Forest Plan, supra note 312, 2–60 
(The 1986 Forest Plan include the following standard: “Establish a working group 
with representatives of the Blackfeet Tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs in order 
to negotiate agreements which will enable both the Forest Service and the Blackfeet 
Tribe to share in the management of those resources reserved by the Blackfeet Tribe. 
An Agreement under this guideline need not affect the legal status of those reserved 
rights.”).   
356. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2 (a)(4) (2021). 
357. Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of The 
President and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, NEPA and NHPA: A 
Handbook for Integrating NEPA And Section 106, 5 (Mar. 2013); see also 36 C.F.R. 
§ 800.8(c) (NEPA process for section 106 purposes). 
358. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §1 604(g)(1) (2020); 36 C.F.R. §1502.25 (2021). 
359. See, e.g., USDA Office of Tribal Relations and U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 
U.S. Forest Serv., Report to the Secretary of Agriculture: USDA Policy and 
Procedures Review and Recommendations: Indian Sacred Sites (2012), at 41 




What is needed, however, is executive leadership to ensure that 
public land agencies are using their available authorities to protect cultural 
resources, sacred places, and treaty rights on public lands—and to do so 
in a more cooperative and sovereignty-affirming way with tribes. The 
President should also ensure that federal land planning regulations, 
agency-specific manuals, handbooks, and policies related to cultural 
resources and tribal relations, and programmatic agreements done 
pursuant to the NHPA, comport with the first principles of federal Indian 
law reviewed in Part I and the core principles of tribal co-management 
outlined in Part III(F).  
Most “first generation” plans prepared by the USFS and BLM are 
now decades old and fail to provide any meaningful or enforceable 
provisions at all related to tribal cultural resources, sacred lands, and 
reserved treaty rights. Nor do they reflect or incorporate any of the 
significant policy developments related to tribal relations, such as 
Secretary Jewell’s Order 3342 on identifying opportunities for cooperative 
and collaborative partnerships with tribes in the management of federal 
lands and resources.360 The President can help ensure that every plan 
revision prepared by federal public land agencies effectuate these orders 
and the principles on which they are based.361 
III. TRIBAL CO-MANAGEMENT: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLITICS 
There are legal, symbolic and normative dimensions of the term 
co-management. Is the term just short-hand for “cooperative 
 
(recommending the forest planning process as a “proactive process for evaluating 
methods of protecting sacred sites”); see also Jonathan W. Long and Frank K. Lake, 
Escaping Social-Ecological Traps Through Tribal Stewardship on National Forest 
Lands in the Pacific Northwest, United States of America, 23(2) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 
10 (2018) (reviewing stewardship strategies and the more than 70 federally recognized 
tribes having lands and ancestral territory within the boundaries of the Northwest 
Forest Plan, which is at early stages of plan revision).   
360. Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships with Federally 
Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal Lands and Resources, 
Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3342 (2016). 
361. We hope to provide more agency-specific planning modules in 
subsequent phases of this project. These modules will showcase how the USFS, BLM, 
NPS and USFWS could use their planning processes to provide substantive 
protections for Native American traditional cultural landscapes, sacred sites and 
reserved treaty rights. To be included at this stage is more strategic use of NHPA-
based Programmatic Agreements. This is an important window of opportunity, with 
several high-profile planning endeavors now underway, such as the revision of the 
Northwest Forest Plan. It is crucial for tribes to be engaged in these processes at the 
earliest possible stages of plan development. 
134               PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol.  44 
 
 
management” or does the use of the prefix co- (meaning: with, together, 
joint, jointly) make it something different, especially when preceded by 
the word tribal? This unwieldy term is often subject to inconsistent 
interpretations and applications, and of course, politics.  
This section provides background on tribal co-management in the 
U.S. with an emphasis on law and policy. It reviews the origins, variations, 
multiple definitions, and legal parameters of co-management. Reviewed 
are substantive cases of shared authority and responsibility among 
sovereigns that are officially labeled “cooperative management” or 
something similar, and cases referred to as “co-management” that are 
anything but cooperative. We therefore focus more on how co-
management is operationalized and recommend that it be built on a set of 
core principles. We also review recent tensions between members of 
Congress and the executive branch regarding the authority to enable tribal 
co-management on public lands, including the issue of delegation-of-
authority. Though legislation, either system-wide or place-based, provides 
the clearest and most durable pathway for tribal co-management, the 
President has considerable powers and precedent to affirm tribal 
sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust 
obligations through innovations in shared governance. The section 
concludes by responding to some of the more frequent questions and 
concerns about tribal co-management.  
A. Legal Roots 
The legal roots of tribal co-management of natural resources in 
the U.S. can be traced to the assertion of treaty-based fishing rights in the 
Pacific Northwest. As discussed above, among these reserved rights is the 
“the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places.”362 The states 
of Oregon and Washington took several actions to eliminate and restrict 
the nature and application of these treaty rights. The intensifying conflicts 
between states and tribes led to several interconnected judicial decisions 
that essentially compelled a co-management approach to fisheries 
management in the Northwest. 
Judicial review and close court supervision was necessary in order 
to ensure that the states did not continue to act in ways unfair and 
discriminatory.363 In Sohappy v. Smith, Judge Belloni encouraged the state 
 
362. See, e.g., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 
573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) and Treaty with the Yakamas, art. III, June 9, 
1855, 12 Stat. 951, 953 (1885). 
363. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provides 
background in United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978) 




of Oregon and the tribes, as sovereigns, to pursue a more “cooperative 
approach.”364 Co-management between the tribes and states resulted from 
the court’s continuing jurisdiction over implementation of the decree and 
its call for the state to ensure that the tribes have “meaningful 
participation” in the regulatory process.365 Several tribal-state co-
management plans for the Columbia River resulted from these processes 
and similar patterns explain co-management of fish and wildlife in 
Washington state, with the famous “Boldt decision” serving as a catalyst 
in 1974.366 Co-management was also “born in the shadow of the court” in 
the upper Great Lakes region,367 with decades of litigation focused on the 
Ojibwe Tribes reserved rights to hunt, fish, trap and gather resources on 
ceded territories in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin.368  
The co-management agreements stemming from these cases are 
between tribes and states. However, federal public land is an important 
factor because of the fish and wildlife habitat it provides and because 
 
(“The record in this case and the history set forth [in related cases] make it crystal 
clear that it has been [the] recalcitrance of Washington State officials (and their vocal 
non-Indian commercial and sports fishing allies) which produced the denial of Indian 
fishing rights requiring intervention by the District Court . . . The state’s extraordinary 
machinations in resisting the [previous] decree have forced the district court to take 
over a large share of the management of its decree. Except for some desegregation 
cases . . . the district court has faced the most concerted official and private efforts to 
frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century”). 
364. 302 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Or. 1969).  
365. Michael C. Blumm & Cari Baermann, The Belloni Decision and Its 
Legacy: United States v. Oregon and Its Far-Reaching Effects After a Half Century, 
50 ENVTL. L. 347, 382 (2020) (“The federal court thus became a central component in 
developing co-management plans, reworking federal-state relations along the way.”). 
366. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 
1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). The decision was ultimately upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fish 
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
367. Tom Busiahn & Jonathan Gilbert, The Role of Ojibwe Tribes in the 
Co-management of Natural Resources in the Upper Great Lakes Region: A Success 
Story, Great Lakes Indian Fish And Wildlife Commission, 3, 4 (2009), 
http://www.glifwc.org/minwaajimo/Papers/Co-management%20Paper%20Busiahn% 
20%20FINAL.pdf; see also The Chippewa Intertribal Agreement Governing 
Resource Management and Regulation of Off-Reservation Treaty Rights in the Ceded 
Territory called for “an effective intertribal mechanism for co-management of the 
resources subject to the treaty right” and assigned this responsibility to the Voigt 
Intertribal Task Force.  
368. See Ann McCammon-Soltis & Kekek Jason Stark, Fulfilling Ojibwe 
Treaty Promises—An Overview and Compendium of Relevant Cases, Statutes and 
Agreements, Great Lakes Indian Fish And Wildlife Commission (2009), 
http://www.glifwc.org/minwaajimo/Papers/Legal%20Paper%20-%20DIA.pdf. 
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several of the rights reserved by tribes at “usual and accustomed places” 
and “open and unclaimed lands” are managed by federal land agencies.  
As we discuss in Part I, off-reservation treaty rights include by 
implication the protection and perpetuation of the resource.369 In some 
cases, courts have enjoined activities, such as USFS timber sales, to 
protect treaty resources, such as deer herds reserved by treaty for Klamath 
Tribes.370 In other cases, federal agencies are more proactive and entered 
into a range of formal and informal agreements to more effectively 
administer off-reservation treaty rights. Examples include memoranda-of-
understanding between the USFS and Nez Perce Tribe that exempt tribal 
members from campground fees and stay limits when they are practicing 
treaty rights on ceded territory,371 and an agreement between the USFS 
and Yakama Tribe regarding exclusive use of an area on the Gifford 
Pinchot National Forest during huckleberry season.372  
A deeper formalized agreement exists between the Leech Lake 
Band of Ojibwe and the Chippewa National Forest in Minnesota. The 
history of this agreement is more complicated than most, due partly to the 
 
369. See, e.g., Jason D. Sanders, Comment, Wolves, Lone and Pack: 
Ojibwe Treaty Rights and the Wisconsin Wolf Hunt, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 1263 (2013) 
(recommending co-management as a way for Ojibwe Tribes to protect wolves in their 
ceded territory while recognizing the state of Wisconsin’s legitimate interest in wolf 
depredation and management).  
370. Klamath Tribes v. United States, 1996 WL 924509, *8 (D. Or. Oct. 
2, 1996) (the federal government has a “substantive duty to protect ‘to the fullest 
extent possible’ the Tribes’ treaty rights, and the resources on which those rights 
depend”);  see Nie, supra note 128, at 611 (a review of the agreement between the 
Klamath Tribes and the Fremont-Winema National Forest. The Memorandum of 
Agreement mandates government-to-government coordination at the regional 
forester-level and quarterly meeting between Tribal program directors and forest 
supervisors. It also creates a special process to be used by the USFS when considering 
tribally-initiated proposals and recommendations, and calls for Tribal involvement 
with USFS interdisciplinary teams.); see also Will Hatcher et al., Klamath Tribes: 
Managing Their Homeland Forests in Partnership with the USDA Forest Service, 
115(5) J. FORESTRY 447 (2017) (providing an update on contemporary developments, 
including development of a forest plan).   
371. See e.g., Robin Mark Stewart, Tribal Reserved Rights on Region One 
National Forests and Grasslands (Masters Thesis, University of Montana, College of 
Forestry and Conservation, 2011) (includes a collection of MOUs and Agreements 
with tribes having reserved rights in Region 1 of the National Forest System) (on file 
with authors). 
372. The “1932 Handshake Agreement” is further formalized in the 1990 
Gifford Pinchot Land and Resource Management Plan (1990). For a discussion see 
Lauren Goschke, Tribes, Treaties, and the Trust Responsibility: A Call for Co-
Management of the Huckleberries in the Northwest, 27 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & 
ENVTL. L. REV. 315, 341–42 (2016).  




fact that roughly ninety percent of the Leech Lake Indian Reservation is 
within the Chippewa National Forest and forty-five percent of the Forest 
is within the Reservation.373 The Chippewa was also the first national 
forest created by statute, with the Minnesota National Forest Act of 1908, 
including several provisions specifically related to the Chippewa 
Indians.374 The issue of reserved treaty rights on the Chippewa “has been 
a knotty and vexatious one for years.”375 To find a more cooperative path 
forward, the USFS and Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe of the Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe entered into a substantive MOU in 2019.376 The 
agreement calls for “developing a shared decision-making model,” 
“utilizing Traditional Ecological Knowledge,” and “expanding the Tribal 
Forest Protection Act to give voice to the Band’s land management 
objectives.”377 The MOU includes specific and mutually agreeable 
protocols for communication, consultation, monitoring and dispute 
resolution, among others.   
A key attribute of the agreement, and a core theme emphasized in 
this report, is the importance of early and meaningful tribal engagement 
and coordination in USFS decision making at the project and plan level. 
The MOU, for example, provides the Chippewa Tribe an opportunity to 
review contemplated projects or activities that are not on the USFS’s 
formal “Schedule of Proposed Actions.”378 It also provides for tribal 
coordination—through NEPA’s cooperating agency provision, structured 
participation at key meetings, and/or pre-decisional quarterly updates—
prior to public scoping; and a consultation framework that must precede 
the release of a NEPA-based categorical exclusion, environmental 
assessment, or draft environmental impact statement.379 As discussed 
below, the MOU has several core attributes of a tribal co-management 
model.   
 
373. Tribal Relations, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST SERV., 
https://www.fs.usda.gov/main/chippewa/workingtogether/tribalrelations (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2020). 
374. Minnesota National Forest Act, Pub. L. No. 60-137, 35 Stat. 268 
(May 23, 1908). 
375. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 
1003 (D. Minn. 1971); see also United States v. Michael D. Brown, 777 F. 3d 1025 
(8th Cir. 2015) (providing a history of the Forest and reserved treaty rights). 
376. Memorandum of Understanding Between the USDA Forest Service, 
Chippewa National Forest and the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe of the Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_ 
DOCUMENTS/fseprd672397.pdf. 
377. Id. at 1.  
378. Id. at 6.   
379. Id. at 7–10.   
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B. Tribal Co-Management by Statute and Treaty 
Congress can also authorize or compel the use of tribal co-
management and has done so most clearly with subsistence use in the State 
of Alaska. The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 was 
amended in 1994 with a co-management provision now found in Section 
119 of the MMPA: “The Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements 
with Alaska Native organizations to conserve marine mammals and 
provide co-management of subsistence use by Alaska Natives.”380 The 
MMPA permits grants and agreements with statutorily-established co-
management bodies—Alaska Native Organizations—for purposes 
including: “(1) collecting and analyzing data on marine mammal 
populations; (2) monitoring the harvest of marine mammals for 
subsistence use; (3) participating in marine mammal research conducted 
by the Federal Government, States, academic institutions, and private 
organizations; and (4) developing marine mammal co-management 
structures with Federal and State agencies.”381 
The term co-management is not defined in the statute or MMPA 
regulations. As a result, two assessments of MMPA-based co-management 
in Alaska, by the Marine Mammal Commission, found diverging 
interpretations of the term that can lead to inconsistent applications.382 As 
discussed in Part IV(A), Section 119 of the MMPA restricts the activities 
that are subject to co-management, especially in contrast to the MMPA’s 
provisions permitting the transfer of management authority to state 
governments.   
A more complicated example, including a mix of congressional 
and executive powers, is the 1995 to 1996 “Canada Protocol” amending 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) of 1918.383 The Protocol creates 
an exemption for “indigenous inhabitants” of Alaska and Canada to take 
 
380. 16 U.S.C. § 1388 (2018). 
381. Id. 
382. Review of Co-Management Efforts In Alaska, MARINE MAMMAL 
COMM’N (Feb. 6–8, 2008), https://www.mmc.gov/priority-topics/arctic/marine-
mammal-co-management-review/; J.C. Malek & V.R. Cornish, Co-Management of 
Marine Mammals In Alaska: A Case Study-Based Review: Final Report, MARINE 
MAMMAL COMM’N (2019), https://www.mmc.gov/wp-content/uploads/1Co 
-Management-Review-Final-Report.pdf.   
383. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a 
Protocol Between the U.S. and Canada Amending the 1916 Convention for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the U.S., Aug. 2, 1996, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 104-28 at viii, ix (1996); 16 U.S.C. § 712 (2020) authorizes the Department 
of Interior to promulgate regulations to implement the migratory bird treaties, with no 
additional statutory authority being required to implement the Protocol.   




migratory birds and their eggs during the closed season and created a 
management body—the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-Management 
Council—to develop recommendations for the management of these 
subsistence hunts. The body is “created to ensure an effective and 
meaningful role for indigenous inhabitants in the conservation of 
migratory birds” and includes “Native, Federal, and State of Alaska 
representatives as equals.”384 The body is “intended to provide more 
effective conservation of migratory birds in designated subsistence harvest 
areas without diminishing the ultimate authority and responsibility of 
DOI/FWS.”385  
Another Alaska example, built on a mixture of statutory and 
executive authorities, is the Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission (Commission) that was established in 2015 with the purpose 
of rebuilding declining salmon resources “to support and preserve a way 
of life that is vital for people’s nutritional, economical, and cultural 
needs,” using both “indigenous knowledge systems and scientific 
principles.”386 A MOU between the Commission and USFWS “formalizes 
a management partnership that begins to address the long-standing desire 
of Alaska Native Tribes in the Kuskokwim Drainage to engage as co-
managers of fish resources.”387 Several authorities are referenced to 
support the co-management approach, including the Subsistence Title of 
the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), but also 
multiple executive and secretarial orders focused on tribal consultation 
and the department’s federal trust responsibility (as reviewed in Part I),388 
once again demonstrating how existing authority can be used to fashion 
variations of tribal co-management.   
 
384. Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, at Art. II (4)(2)(b)(ii), U.S. SENATE (1995), https://www.fws.gov/ 
le/pdf/MigBirdTreatyCanada.pdf; see also 50 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2021) (“Co-management 
Council means the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-Management Council consisting of 
Alaska Native, Federal, and State of Alaska representatives as equals.”). 
385. Id.  
386. See History & Mission, Kuskokwim River Inter-tribal Fish 
Commission, https://www.kuskosalmon.org/mission-history (last visited Aug. 27, 
2020). 
387. Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service Alaska Region and Kuskokwim River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, 1 
(2016).  
388. Id. at 2.   
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C. Disputed Authority to Enable Tribal Co-Management 
Congress, having plenary powers over federal public lands and 
Indian affairs, possesses clear authority to sanction the use of tribal co-
management. Some members of Congress have recently asserted this 
power as a way to challenge executive actions that are perceived as 
authorizing tribal co-management. Jason Chaffetz (R-UT), then acting as 
Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
challenged Secretary of Interior Sally Jewell’s Order No. 3342 in 2016, 
entitled “Identifying Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative 
Partnerships with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management 
of Federal Lands and Resources.”389 Order No. 3342 focused on existing 
statutory authorities that permit “cooperative agreements” and 
“collaborative partnerships” with tribes and carefully distinguished these 
opportunities with co-management, which Interior defines “as a situation 
where there is a specific legal basis that requires the delegation of some 
aspect of Federal decision-making or that makes co-management 
otherwise legally necessary,” such as the co-management of the salmon 
harvest in the Pacific Northwest.390 “Despite claims to the contrary,” said 
Representative Chaffetz, “co-management of public lands requires 
approval by Congress,” and “[s]ome may inaccurately view your order as 
establishing a co-management relationship for control and use of the land. 
You do not have that authority.”391 
The same assertion was made by Secretary of Interior Ryan Zinke 
in his review of national monuments as ordered by President Trump.392 
The Secretary’s Monument Report recommended the President “request 
congressional authority to enable tribal co-management” for four existing 
monuments (Bears Ears, Gold Butte, Organ Mountains-Desert Peaks, and 
Rio Grande Del Norte) and for the Badger-Two Medicine area to be 
considered for designation and a candidate for tribal co-management in 
the future.393 Though the Secretary’s Report does not define co-
 
389. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Sally Jewell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 29, 
2016).  
390. Secretary of Interior Order No. 3342, 4 (2016).  
391. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Sally Jewell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Dec. 29, 
2016) (on file with the authors).  
392. Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, Exec. Order 
13792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017). 
393. Ryan K. Zinke, Memorandum for the President, Final Report 
Summarizing Findings of the Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, 9, 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/revised_final_report.pdf (last visited 




management, it insists that “such authority is not available to the President; 
it must be granted by Congress.”394 
D. Tribal Co-Management and Delegation of Authority 
These challenges to the executive branch’s authority to sanction 
tribal co-management are in large part based on the so-called 
“subdelegation doctrine.” This doctrine limits the ability of executive 
agencies to delegate the powers it was given by Congress to other actors.395 
As it is most commonly understood, the subdelegation doctrine basically 
forbids federal agencies from delegating final decision making authority 
to another party, meaning that federal delegations of authority may be 
permissible so long as the federal official retains final reviewing power. 
This authority “must be a meaningful retention of control over the activity 
of the private party, through oversight, veto, or otherwise” so that the 
“Federal agency may ensure that the actions it takes support the national 
interest, and that the Federal role is not subordinated inappropriately to 
parochial interests.”396  
Statutory authority is also important to understanding the limits of 
subdelegation because “the relevant inquiry in any delegation challenge is 
whether Congress intended to permit the delegatee to delegate the 
authority conferred by Congress.”397 Absent this statutory authority to 
subdelegate, the federal agency must retain final decision making 
authority.398  
Closely related to the subdelegation issue is the determination of 
what activities are “inherently governmental activities,”399 which as a rule 
cannot be delegated absent congressional authority. The Office of the 
Solicitor, in the Department of Interior, offers as examples delegating the 
final decision to grant or deny a permit or application and determining to 
whom a parcel of federal land may be sold as violating the restriction on 
 
Dec. 15, 2020) [hereinafter Secretary’s Report]. 
394. Id.  
395. Stated differently, subdelegation happens when an agency 
“redelegates” the authority it was delegated by Congress. Thus, the term “redelegation” 
is sometimes used in this context.   
396. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF SOLICITOR, PARTNERSHIP LEGAL 
PRIMER, 13 (2004).   
397. Nat’l Park and Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
398. Id. (“Delegations by federal agencies to private parties are, however, 
valid so long as the federal agency or official retains final reviewing authority.”). 
399. Partnership Legal Primer, supra note 396, at 13.   
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delegations of inherently governmental activity.400 This restriction, 
applied to tribal contracting, is also codified in the Tribal Self-Governance 
Act (TSGA) of 1994, which authorizes Interior agencies to delegate 
“functions” that are not “inherently federal” to participating tribes.401 As 
discussed in Part II(C), it is within this particular statutory context that the 
“inherently” governmental or federal issue has been most closely 
analyzed.    
We believe that the limits imposed by the subdelegation doctrine 
do not preclude the executive branch from using its powers to 
institutionalize variations of tribal co-management. Most of the definitions 
of co-management in Table 2 do not include a delegation of authority 
component or call for tribal unilateralism.402After all, a complete and 
unqualified delegation to tribes, in terms of transferring ownership or 
decision making authority, is best characterized as tribal management and 
not co-management. The definitions and cases reviewed herein are instead 
a call to end federal unilateralism in decision making; thus, the focus on 
shared governance and the strategic advantages of two sovereigns working 
together in a more coordinated and systematic fashion. “To share authority 
and responsibility” is the most common denominator in definitions of co-
management.403 
Discussed below are two variations of “co-management” using 
executive authority under the Antiquities Act. Both cases successfully 
navigated the subdelegation issue and we discuss in Part V other leverage 
points President Biden could use to enable tribal co-management on public 
lands. There, we also recommend that the Biden administration clarify 
 
400. Id.   
401. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(k) (2006) (providing that annual agreements 
cannot include programs, services, functions, or activities that are “inherently Federal 
or where the statute establishing the existing program does not authorize the type of 
participation sought by the tribe”);  see also Memorandum of Agreement Between 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Self-Governance, Office of Natural Resources 
Revenue, and Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 24, 2020) (providing examples of 
inherently and contractible functions for oil and gas development on Indian 
reservations) (on file with authors).  
402. Interestingly, one of the few conservation laws officially enabling 
tribal co-management, and administered by Interior—the Canada Protocol amending 
the MBTA—makes clear that co-management is intended to provide more effective 
conservation and subsistence management “without diminishing the ultimate authority 
and responsibility of DOI/FWS” Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds, at Art. II (4)(2)(b)(ii), U.S. SENATE (1995), 
https://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/MigBirdTreatyCanada.pdf. 
403. See, e.g., the collective work of Fikret Berkes, including Evolution of 
Co-Management: Role of Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organizations and Social 
Learning, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1692 (2009) (emphasis added).  




how the subdelegation doctrine and “inherently governmental/federal” 
limitation applies more specifically to Native Nations in light of recent 
case law and developments in tribal co-management, such as the case of 
Bears Ears discussed below.  
We believe that a reframing of this issue is in order, to distinguish 
what are more properly considered “sovereignty-affirming 
subdelegations” that “affirm tribal sovereignty by intermingling federal 
and tribal power.”404 We further advise a reconsideration of the term 
“delegation”—which can be defined as giving powers and duties to 
another, who is often less senior—when it comes to the management of 
rights that were reserved by Tribes. Furthermore, as we discuss below, the 
subdelegation issue must also be considered in the larger realm of political 
accountability,405 including the ability to seek legal redress, and we believe 
co-management frameworks can be constructed to hold tribes and federal 
agencies accountable.   
E. Co-Management and Executive Authority 
One national monument not reviewed by Secretary Zinke is 
Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks in New Mexico, established by President 
Clinton in 2001. The President Clinton’s Proclamation (Clinton’s 
Proclamation) emphasized the indigenous history of this area and made 
clear that the BLM shall manage the Monument “in close cooperation with 
the Pueblo de Cochiti.”406 An assistance agreement is used to fulfill this 
mandate, and applies to a range of management responsibilities of the 
Pueblo, from trail maintenance and visitor services to coordinating law 
enforcement with the BLM.  Though the term co-management is not used 
in Clinton’s Proclamation, Kasha Katuwe is widely regarded as an 
important early case study of co-management407 or what the Department 
of Interior labels “joint management.”408  
 
404. Samuel Lazerwitz, Sovereignty-Affirming Subdelegations: 
Recognizing the Executive’s Ability to Delegate Authority and Affirm Inherent Tribal 
Powers, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2020) (proposing a presumption that 
“sovereignty-affirming subdelegations” are permissible unless Congress has expressly 
indicated otherwise).  
405. See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F. 3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (reviewing subdelegation and its relationship to political accountability).   
406. Proclamation No. 7394, 66 Fed. Reg. 7343 (Jan. 22, 2001). 
407. Sandra Lee Pinel & Jacob Pecos, Generating Co-Management at 
Kasha Katuwe Tent Rocks National Monument, New Mexico, 49 J. ENVTL MGMT. 593 
(2012).  
408. Native American Sacred Places: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 18 (1st Sess. 2003) (statement of William D. Bettenberg, 
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The case of Kasha Katuwe demonstrates why there is no bright 
line that clearly distinguishes congressional and executive powers to 
authorize, compel or encourage tribal co-management. In this case, 
Clinton’s Proclamation built on previous actions by the Pueblo and BLM 
to share power and responsibility as permitted by law,409 and the agency 
uses assistance agreements that are already authorized by statute.410 Final 
decision-making power is retained by the BLM, but because there is a 
government-to-government partnership between the BLM and the Pueblo 
Tribal Council, the latter was able to participate early and substantively in 
shaping the area’s management plan and range of acceptable uses prior to 
public comment—not as another stakeholder, but as a sovereign 
government.411 
President Obama’s establishment of Bears Ears National 
Monument (Obama’s Proclamation) provides another example of 
executive authority to lawfully sanction and shape co-management.412 As 
in the case of Kasha Katuwe, the term co-management is not used in 
Obama’s proclamation, but Bears Ears nonetheless provides a truly 
collaborative and innovative framework of governance413—all within the 
authority provided by the Antiquities Act, and comporting with the 
subdelegation principles reviewed above. On a deeper level, this tribally-
led proposal shows how “public land laws can become vehicles for 
equality and justice, even if they initially served the interests of the 
politically and economically powerful.”414 
Obama’s Proclamation ensures tribal consultation, and that in 
developing and implementing the area’s management plan “the Secretaries 
shall maximize opportunities, pursuant to applicable legal authorities, for 
shared resources, operational efficiency, and cooperation.”415 Most 
significant, however, is the creation of a tribally-based “Bears Ears 
Commission:”  
 
Director, Office of Policy Analysis, Department of Interior), at 46. 
409. Pinel & Pecos, supra note 407, at 598.  
410. Section 307(b) of FLPMA provides that “the Secretary may enter into 
contracts and cooperative agreements involving the management, protection, 
development, and sale of public lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) (2018). 
411. Pinel & Pecos, supra note 407, at 599.   
412. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016). 
413. See Charles Wilkinson, “At Bears Ears We Can Hear the Voices of 
Our Ancestors in Every Canyon and on Every Mesa Top”: The Creation of the First 
Native National Monument, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 331 (2018). 
414. Krakoff, supra note 7, at 216. 
415. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016). 




In recognition of the importance of tribal participation to 
the care and management of the objects identified above, 
and to ensure that the management decisions affecting the 
monument reflect tribal expertise and traditional and 
historical knowledge, a Bears Ears Commission is hereby 
established to provide guidance and recommendations on 
the development and implementation of management 
plans and on management of the monument.416 
As for delegation of authority, Obama’s Proclamation differs from the 
proposal submitted to the him by the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition. 
The Coalition carefully dissected the issue of what constitutes a lawful 
delegation of authority to tribes and premised its proposal on the basis that 
a delegation of authority is permissible insofar as it is not total, and 
remains subject to the final decision-making authority of the Secretaries 
of Agriculture and Interior.417 Instead of delegating complete authority, 
“the Tribes and agency officials will be working together as equals to 
make joint decisions.”418  
Though a modification of the Coalition’s proposal, Obama’s 
Proclamation establishes a substantive framework for collaborative 
management of the Monument:  
The Secretaries shall meaningfully engage the 
Commission or, should the Commission no longer exist, 
the tribal governments through some other entity 
composed of elected tribal government officers 
(comparable entity), in the development of the 
management plan and to inform subsequent management 
of the monument. To that end, in developing or revising 
the management plan, the Secretaries shall carefully and 
fully consider integrating the traditional and historical 
knowledge and special expertise of the Commission or 
comparable entity. If the Secretaries decide not to 
incorporate specific recommendations submitted to them 
in writing by the Commission or comparable entity, they 
 
416. Id. 
417. Proposal to President Barack Obama for the Creation of Bears Ears 
National Monument, BEARS EARS INTER-TRIBAL COALITION, 27 (2015), https:// 
www.bearsearscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Bears-Ears-Inter-Tribal 
-Coalition-Proposal-10-15-15.pdf.   
418. Id. at 26.   
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will provide the Commission or comparable entity with a 
written explanation of their reasoning.419   
Events happening after Obama’s Proclamation demonstrate how the term 
co-management can be politically appropriated and purposefully misused. 
One of the concerns expressed by Secretary Zinke in his review of national 
monuments, and most clearly articulated in the context of  Bears Ears 
Monument, was the purported lack of executive authority to enable tribal 
co-management.420 Shortly after the revocation of Bears Ears Monument 
by President Trump, the Shásh Jaa’ and Indian Creek National Monument 
Act was introduced;421 it was partially framed as Congress authorizing 
tribal co-management of the two units, and was supported as such by the 
Department of Interior.422  
The problem, however, is that the bill did no such thing as it 
basically relegates sovereign tribes to stakeholder status and was 
developed without any tribal consultation. For these and other reasons, the 
Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition “adamantly opposes” the bill and views 
it as violating “basic tenets of federal Indian law and the United States’ 
treaty, trust and government-to-government relationship with Indian 
tribes.”423  
F. Core Principles and Attributes of Tribal Co-Management 
The Bears Ears Monument story advises that we carefully 
scrutinize conceptions of co-management and pay more attention to how 
it is operationalized. Though definitions are important, especially for the 
purpose of creating mutual understanding and common expectations, what 
matters most are the core principles or attributes of a co-management 
approach, regardless of whether the term is used or substituted for 
 
419. Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1144 (Dec. 28, 2016). 
420.  Secretary’s Report, supra note 393, at 10. 
421. Shásh Jaa’ National Monument and Indian Creek National 
Monument Act, H.R. 4532, 6–7 (Jan. 30, 2018). 
422. Statement of Casey Hammond, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land 
and Minerals Management, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Before the Natural Resources 
Committee, Subcommittee on Federal Lands, U.S. House of Representatives on H.R. 
4532 Shásh Jaa’ National Monument and Indian Creek National Monument Act, Jan. 
30, 2018, at 6–7.   
423. Testimony of the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition, Before the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on 
Federal Lands, Legislative Hearing on H.R. 4532 the Shásh Jaa’ National Monument 
and Indian Creek National Monument Act, Jan. 9, 2018.  




“cooperative management,” “collaborative management,” “joint 
management,” or some variation thereof.   
Thinking in terms of core principles may also lead to more 
consistent and less defensive uses of the term co-management by federal 
agencies. The current situation causes unnecessary conflict and confusion. 
Consider, for example, Secretary Jewell’s Order 3342 which distinguishes 
“cooperative and collaborative opportunities” with tribes from “co-
management.”424 One of the exemplary “partnerships” referenced in the 
Order is the Kuskokwim River Intertribal Fisheries Commission, which 
the Order says “functions in an advisory capacity.”425 But as discussed 
above, the MOU specifically sets up Alaska Native Tribes as co-managers 
of fish resources. Why? Because “[t]he people of the Kuskokwim River 
are no longer satisfied with serving in an advisory role to state and fishery 
managers.”426  
How the term is conceived by the USFS provides another 
example. The agency’s traditional line is that it has no co-management 
authority whatsoever because of the subdelegation principles reviewed 
above. For example, USFS responded to the Blackfeet Tribe’s interest in 
co-management of the Badger-Two Medicine by stating that “only 
Congress has the authority to change Federal land management agency 
jurisdiction.”427 Of course, the Blackfeet never requested a change in 
administrative jurisdiction, just a more meaningful and pro-active role in 
the management of their sacred lands and reserved rights. By contrast, the 
agency appears much more comfortable with the term co-management 
when Indian tribes are not the focus. For example, a very collaborative-
based forest plan in Puerto Rico “takes partnerships a step further” by 
embracing a “co-management approach” on the El Yunque National 
Forest.428 And, as discussed in Part IV(C), the USFS embraces the concept 
 
424. Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3342 (2016). 
425. Id. at 6.   
426. See History & Mission, Kuskokwim River Inter-tribal Fish 
Commission, https://www.kuskosalmon.org/mission-history (last visited Aug. 27, 
2020). 
427. U.S. Forest Service, Draft Record of Decision: Helena-Lewis and 
Clark National Forest 2020 Land Management Plan, 6 (2020).   
428. El Yunque National Forest Revised Land and Resource Management 
Plan Draft, U.S. FOREST SERV., at 9 (2016), https://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/ 
nepa/99076_FSPLT3_3892484.pdf (The Plan provides a very thoughtful and deliberate 
definition of co-management and makes clear that planners and the public clearly 
understood that it does not mean the agency had delegated its authority. Instead, “Co-
management is the strategic and site-specific engagement of FS and active partners 
working together in general forest operations, conservation and restoration activities 
with a practical sense of shared responsibilities to achieve the Mission [and] it goes one 
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as a way to “co-manage” fire risk when working with state governments 
in an atmosphere of “shared stewardship.”429 
We believe that much of this confusion and inconsistency can be 
alleviated with a clearer focus on the core principles of tribal co-
management. Here, we build on the insightful and groundbreaking work 
of attorney Ed Goodman who breaks co-management down into a set of 
fundamental principles. If applied, says Goodman, the principles could 
“clarify a process of shared management and decision making authority 
that fully incorporates the input and expertise of both parties into a mutual 
and participatory framework.”430 Though Goodman’s work focuses on 
reserved hunting and fishing rights, we believe that these principles can 
also be applied more broadly to tribal co-management on public lands. In 
Table 1, we describe Goodman’s principles while also providing our own 
observations from the cases reviewed in this Report.     
Table 1. Fundamental Principles of a Tribal Co-Management Approach 
1. Recognition of 




- Tribal co-management regime developed 




- Indian Self-Determination Act, NAGPRA, 
Treatment-as-State provisions of the Clean 
Air and Clean Water Act   
- Shared sovereignty as the legal basis of 
treaty fishing cases in Pacific Northwest 
and Upper Great Lakes States  
- Canada Protocol’s (MBTA) creation of co-
management body: “Native, Federal, and 
State of Alaska representatives as equals” 
 
 
step beyond partnering by increasing capacity based actions.”). 
429. U.S. Forest Service, Toward Shared Stewardship Across Landscapes: 
An Outcome-Based Investment Strategy, 3 (Washington, D.C.: USDA, August 2018). 
430. Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting 
and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279, 
343 (2000). 
 




2. Incorporation  
of U.S. Trust 
Responsibility 
- A substantive and procedural obligation to 
ensure that tribes are an integral part of 
decision making process; to include tribal 
institution and capacity building (and 
sufficient funding) to ensure that tribal 
participation as co-managers is effective  
 
Examples:  
- Kuskokwim River MOU authorization 
based on the FWS’s “government-to-
government relationship and trust 
responsibility” and the Department’s 
commitment to “programs that further 
tribal self-determination” 
3. Legitimation 
Structures for Tribal 
Involvement 
- Federal agencies and tribes must make 
community education regarding tribal  
role in decision making an integral part  
of co-management approach 
- Ensuring that institutional arrangements 




- Creation of co-management bodies such 
as the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish 
Commission, the Alaska Migratory Bird 
Co-Management Council, and the Bears 
Ears Commission 
- Bears Ears’ establishment of a 
stakeholder-based advisory committee to 
advise development of management plan 
and management of the Monument, as 
one way to address non-Indian concerns 
4. Integration of 
Tribes Early in the 
Decision-Making 
Process 
- Meaningful tribal participation includes 
integration of tribes at earliest phases of 
planning and decision making, to ensure 
that tribes can shape the direction of 
management and not just reactively 
comment on projects and decisions 
already developed by agencies  
 




- BLM’s early substantive engagement, via  
NEPA, with Pueblo de Cochiti in shaping 
Resource Management Plan for Kasha-
Katuwe National Monument 
- Memorandum of Understanding (2019) 
between the Chippewa National Forest 
and Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe 
- USFS’s Forest Plan for Badger-Two 
Medicine reflecting some of the  
Blackfeet Nation’s proposed desired 
conditions and standards for area 
- Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act’s 
provision related to consideration of  
tribal management proposals 
 
5. Recognition and 
Incorporation of 
Tribal Expertise 
- Incorporating tribal expertise and/or 
traditional ecological knowledge into 
federal decision making; including a 
significant degree of deference by  
federal agencies and the courts in  
matters concerning management  
of reserved tribal rights 
 
Examples:  
- Creation of Bears Ears Commission  
“to ensure that management decisions 
affecting the monument reflect tribal 






- Including mechanisms for resolving 
disputes among co-managers, as means to 
further legitimize approach and avoid 
situations of unilateralism and the use of 
veto power  
 





- Multiple dispute resolution clauses 
provided in the State/Tribal Protocols and 
Court Orders focused on off-reservation 
rights in Upper Great Lakes Region   
- Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act’s 
interconnected use of management plan 
for area, tribal coordination provision, 
consent of new uses provision, public 
involvement, and establishment of 
Badger-Two Medicine Advisory Council  
Our most substantive addition to Goodman’s set of core 
principles is recognition of the co-management institutions or decision-
making bodies that emerged as a result of court orders, legislation, or 
executive actions. These institutions, as we view them, are legitimation 
structures, and provide a means of incorporating tribal expertise and 
resolving disputes. They can be traced back to the treaty fishing cases of 
the Northwest and Great Lakes and the formation of organizations such 
as the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission and the Great Lakes 
Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission. Statutory-based co-management 
bodies include the “Alaska Native Organizations,” created by the 
MMPA, and the Alaska Migratory Bird Co-Management Council, 
created by the amendment to the MBTA. And finally, the proposed Bears 
Ears Commission provides an example of a co-management-like body 
created by the Executive.   
G. Common Questions and Concerns about Tribal Co-Management 
There are several common questions and concerns about tribal co-
management, especially if practiced on federal public lands. On one ugly 
level are the racist beliefs, bigotry, and animosity often displayed towards 
Indians and tribes, especially when they assert their sovereign powers and 
reserved treaty rights.431 But setting those aside, there are reasonable 
concerns about co-management and it is important to address them in a 
more candid and constructive fashion.  
 
431. See, e.g., Responses of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
to Public Comments on the Tribes’ Draft “National Bison Range Transfer and 
Restoration Act of 2016,” at 6, https://bisonrange.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ 
Public-Comment-Responses-July-2016.pdf (responding to various sentiments 
towards Indians and Indian Tribes).  
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Precedent, and what it means for federal public lands, is one of the 
most common concerns about tribal co-management. Hundreds of treaties, 
many with off-reservation use rights, precede the creation of public lands, 
and these systems are essentially based on aboriginal territory. Given this, 
the question asked is what piece of public land might not be subject to this 
approach in the future? Similar concerns are often raised in opposing 
efforts to protect native sacred sites on public lands, with some interests 
fearing a sort of tribal land-grab432 or “religious servitude” on public lands 
as a result.433 And the apprehension is most palpable when debating those 
rare instances when public lands are restored into tribal or trust ownership 
and this explains why so many of those transfer statutes included a debate 
over the precedent established.434   
Our response to the precedent concern is to recommend that co-
management is done right, so that it establishes a positive precedent that 
all parties want replicated and modified to fit unique situations and 
particular places. Learn from the failures, practice innovation, and make 
improvements over time. From a conservation standpoint, co-management 
builds on the measurable successes of indigenous-led conservation in the 
United States and internationally.435 
 
432. Former Acting Director of the BLM, William Perry Pendley, made 
this argument frequently when he served as president of the Mountain States Legal 
Foundation; see William Perry Pendley, The Establishment Clause and the Closure of 
“Sacred” Public and Private Lands, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023 (2006). He viewed the 
protection of “purportedly sacred federal land” as a cover for land protection and 
restricting use and says that as long as “pantheism” is the law, “[M]illions of acres of 
federal land and goodness know how much private land could be declared sacred and 
off-limits to the public and the people who own it.” Id. at 1031, 1038.  
433. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 904 
(2006). 
434. See Nie, supra note 128, at 638–40.   
435. The literature is vast, but see the following for references to the 
science of indigenous-led conservation: Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, Summary for Policymakers of the Global 
Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of the Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (2019), 
https://www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/202002/ipbes_global_assessment_report_ 
summary_for_policymakers_en.pdf; The Nature Conservancy, Strong Voices, Active 
Chocies: TNC’s Practitioner Framework to Strengthen Outcomes for People and 
Nature, (June 11, 2018), https://www.nature.org/en-us/what-we-do/our-insights/ 
perspectives/strong-voices-active-choices/. Comparison studies in the United States 
context are rarer, but see Donald M. Waller & Nicholas J. Reo, First Stewards: 
Ecological Outcomes of Forest and Wildlife Stewardship by Indigenous Peoples of 
Wisconsin, USA, 23(1) ECOLOGY & SOCIETY 45 (2018) (“Lessons from tribal 
forestlands could help improve the sustainable management of nontribal public 
forestlands.”). 




Closely related to this concern are significant trends in the 
devolution and privatization of public lands, trends that have become only 
more acute since the land seizure movement was revived in 2012. A 
selective application of (red) states’ rights, coupled with environmental 
deregulation, was the defining feature of the Trump Administration’s 
approach to public lands and wildlife conservation.436 When viewed 
collectively, these executive actions make federal law subservient to more 
narrow state, local, and economic interests; and they threaten the integrity 
of the federal public lands system and the national interest that serves as 
its unifying principle.  
One of the most unfortunate consequences of pushing this version 
of states’ rights and decentralization so aggressively is that even some 
moderate political interests rightfully question any effort, even if built on 
a different set of historical facts and legal principles, to surrender any 
federal authority in the future. We believe this concern can be most fairly 
addressed in the context of federalism and we do that in the next Part. 
There, we show that federal land laws generally fail to recognize tribal 
rights and interests, and they extend to state governments authorities and 
opportunities that are not provided to tribes to the same degree. That 
problem must be rectified, and it can be done in a way that carefully 
balances tribal rights and interests and the national interest in public lands.   
A third prevalent concern is based on the assumption that tribal 
co-management is by nature an open-ended and discretionary framework. 
Among conservation groups, Public Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility (PEER) is perhaps most vocal in its criticism of tribal co-
management, much of it stemming from its opposition to the tribal 
contracting arrangements on the National Bison Range. According to 
PEER: “New proposals to jointly manage federal lands with local Indian 
tribes do not address the major practical difficulties of dealing with 
disputes that inevitably arise [. . .] [n]or do they specify tribal powers to 
limit public access, harvest resources, or veto federal decisions on federal 
lands they would co-manage.”437 “Two sovereigns under one roof is a 
house divided,” states PEER’s Executive Director Jeff Ruch, and “[i]f it is 
true co-management, then any disagreement could lead to utter 
 
436. Martin Nie, Reclaiming The National Interest In Federal Public 
Lands And Wildlife Conservation, BOLLE CTR. FOR PEOPLE & FORESTS (Jan. 2020).   
437. Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Co-Managing 
Federal Lands with Tribes No Walk in the Park (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.peer.org/ 
co-managing-federal-lands-with-tribes-no-walk-in-the-park/. 
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impasse.”438 “Co-management sounds good but ignoring the details can 
lead to devilish complications,” he says.439   
PEER raises the important issue of accountability, which we agree 
should be a fundamental concern in any co-management regime. But the 
examples of co-management reviewed above, and those elsewhere, show 
why it is wrong to assume that co-management must be a discretionary, 
open-ended, and ill-defined mandate.  
The root precedent for co-management—reserved fishing rights 
in the Pacific Northwest—provide a case-in-point. The management 
agreements negotiated by states and tribes specify performance measures, 
commitments and assurances by both co-managers.440 Accountability and 
enforcement mechanisms are also provided in the dozens of agreements 
signed between Ojibwe Tribes and the states of Minnesota, Michigan and 
Wisconsin—building on years of successful co-management.441 Co-
management of marine mammals and migratory birds in Alaska, as 
governed by the MMPA and MBTA, provide other examples, as both laws 
significantly limit the scope and purposes of co-management. Even the 
national monument examples challenge this claim. The Bears Ears 
Proclamation, for example, is among the most detailed designations made 
pursuant to the Antiquities Act. It requires various management activities 
to be consistent “with the care and management of the objects identified” 
in the Proclamation’s poetic description of the landscape.442  
We return to the issue of accountability, in the context of our 
recommendations for tribal co-management legislation in Part V. 
 
438. Id.  
439. Id.  
440. See, e.g., 2008–2017 United States v. Oregon Management Agreement, 
Part F (May 2008), https://www.critfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/US-v-OR 
-Agreement.pdf; see also Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, Regional and 
International Salmon Agreements, https://plan.critfc.org/2013/spirit-of-the-salmon 
-plan/about-spirit-of-the-salmon/the-accords-pacific-salmon-treaty-and-u-s-v-oregon-
agreements/ (covering the Columbia Basin Fish Accords, the Pacific Salmon Treaty, and 
United States v. Oregon Agreements). 
441. The “1854 Treaty Authority,” for example, provides an inter-tribal 
program that manages the off-reservation hunting, fishing and gathering rights of the 
Grand Portage and Bois Forte bands of the Lake Superior Chippewa in the territory 
ceded under the Treaty of 1854. It includes an “1854 Conservation Code” that is 
enforced by an “1854 Treaty Authority Conservation Court.” See 1854 Treaty Authority, 
https://www.1854treatyauthority.org/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2020). 
442. Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, Proclamation 
No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 28, 2016). 




Table 2. Selected Definitions & Interpretations of Tribal Co-Management 
Definitions & Interpretations Source/Authority & Notes 
“The purpose of this Management 
Agreement is to provide a framework 
within which the Parties may exercise 
their sovereign powers in a coordinated 
and systematic manner in order to 
protect, rebuild, and enhance upper 
Columbia River fish runs while 
providing harvests for both treaty 
Indian and non-treaty fisheries.” 
2008–2017, United States  
v. Oregon Management 
Agreement (May 2008) 
 
Court-approved successor 
to the 1988 Columbia River 
Fish Management Plan, 
stemming from Sohappy v. 
Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. 
Or. 1969) 
“Two or more entities, each having 
legally established management 
responsibility, working together to 
actively protect, conserve, enhance, or 
restore fish and wildlife resources.” 
 
“A partnership based on trust and 
respect, established between an Alaska 
Native Organization, as defined by the 
MMPA, and either NMFS or FWS, 
with shared responsibilities for the 
conservation of marine mammals and 









Reviewing implementation  
of co-management authority 
provided in § 119 of the 
Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (co-management not 
defined in Act or 
regulations) 
“Management bodies will be created to 
ensure an effective and meaningful role 
for indigenous inhabitants in the 
conservation of migratory birds. These 
management bodies will include 
Canada Protocol, amending 




443. Report of the Marine Mammal Commission, Review of Co-
Management Efforts in Alaska (Feb. 6-8, 2008), at 39.   
444. J.C. Malek & V.R. Cornish, Co-Management Of Marine Mammals 
In Alaska: A Case Study-Based Review: Final Report (2019), at 12 (providing a 
“working definition” of co-management).  
445. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a 
Protocol Between the U.S. and Canada Amending the 1916 Convention for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the U.S., Aug. 2, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 104-28 at viii, ix (1996).   
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Native, Federal, and State of Alaska 
representatives as equals, and will 
develop recommendations for, among 
other things: seasons and bag limits; 
law enforcement policies, population 
and harvest monitoring; education 
programs; research and use of 
traditional knowledge; and habitat 
protection…Creation of these 
management bodies is intended to 
provide more effective conservation of 
migratory birds in designated 
subsistence harvest areas without 
diminishing the ultimate authority and 
responsibility of DOI/FWS.”  
Leads to creation of the  
Alaska Migratory Bird  
Co-Management Council 
“This Order focuses on developing 
cooperative and collaborative 
opportunities with tribes and does not 
address ‘co-management’ which the 
Department defines as a situation where 
there is a specific legal basis that 
requires the delegation of some aspect 
of Federal decision-making or that 
makes co-management otherwise 
legally necessary. For example, in some 
instances, such as management of the 
salmon harvest in the Pacific 
Northwest, co-management has been 
established by law.” 
Secretary of Interior, Order 




with Federally Recognized 
Indian Tribes in the 
Management of Federal 
Lands and Resources 
(2016) 
“Co-management—two or more 
entities, each having legally established 
management responsibilities, working 
collaboratively to achieve mutually 
agreed upon, compatible objectives to 
protect, conserve, use, enhance, or 
restore natural and cultural resources.” 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service, Tribal Consultation 
Handbook (2018)446 
 
446. Tribal Consultation Handbook, 52 (U.S. FWS 2018). 





“Comanagement embodies the concept 
and practice of two (or more) 
sovereigns working together to address 
and solve matters of critical concern to 
each. [It] is not a demand for a tribal 
veto power over federal projects, but 
rather a call for an end to federal 
unilateralism in decision making 
affecting tribal rights and resources. It 
is a call for a process that would 
incorporate, in a constructive manner, 
the policy and technical expertise of 
each sovereign in a mutual, 
participatory framework.” 
Ed Goodman, Protecting 
Habitat for Off-Reservation 
Tribal Hunting and Fishing 
Rights: Tribal 
Comanagement as a 
Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. 
LAW 279, 284–85 (2000) 
IV. TRIBAL CO-MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT  
OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
This Part places tribal co-management in the context of federalism 
and intergovernmental relations and shows the different ways that 
Congress has reconciled federal and state interests in public lands 
management. Doing so helps reframe our thinking about tribal co-
management and makes clear the disadvantaged position of Indian tribes 
when contrasted to the often-privileged role provided to state governments 
in federal public lands and wildlife law. We conclude the Report by 
discussing how some of the most common mechanisms used in federalism 
could inform future tribal co-management legislation and rulemaking.   
A. The Privileged Position of States and Disadvantaged  
Position of Tribes in Federal Public Land Laws 
In 1970, the Public Land and Law Review Commission provided 
to Congress and the President its comprehensive review of federal public 
lands law and management.447 It was the last time such a commission was 
used and its work laid the foundation for the Federal Lands and Policy 
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976. The Commission’s report begins 
with a chapter entitled, “To Whom the Public Lands Are Important,” and 
answers the question with a review of the national public, regional public, 
 
447.  ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND 
TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 3. 
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federal government (as sovereign and proprietor), state and local 
governments, and users of public lands.448 Entirely missing from this 
answer is any reference to Indian tribes and their rights and interests on 
federal public lands.   
Most federal public land statutes enacted in the 1960s and 1970s 
similarly treat Indian tribes as invisible. Several of these laws include 
“savings clauses” that disclaim a federal intention to completely displace 
state laws related to water, wildlife, or other resources so long as the state 
law does not conflict or undermine federal prerogatives. At their core, they 
are about accommodating state interests—or Congress instead punting on 
controversial issues pitting federal versus state authority. Yet, most of 
these laws are entirely void of provisions related to Indian tribes.  
In other cases, these laws extend to state and private actors 
authorities and opportunities not provided to tribes, some with great 
potential consequence to the cultural resources found on federal lands. 
FLPMA, for example, authorizes the sale of “a tract of the public lands” 
to states, local governments, adjoining landowners, individuals, and “any 
other person.”449 But the law, which is similar to other land conveyance 
statutes, fails “to afford Indian tribal governments the same process to 
restore federal lands of legal and cultural importance to Indian 
Country.”450 Fifty years later, it is time to correct this deficiency and 
address the intergovernmental dimensions of public lands management—
this time, by including sovereign tribal governments.  
Before turning to the particulars of federalism, it is important to 
recognize the complicated mosaic of different interests, both public and 
private, operating on public lands.451 The current situation is one where 
even private interests have rights that are not provided to sovereign tribal 
governments. Consider the extent of private interests operating on public 
lands: grazing lessees, timber contractors, commercial guides and 
outfitters, national park concessioners, and hardrock mining claimants that 
essentially determine what unwithdrawn public lands will be explored and 
possibly developed.  
 
448. Id. at 33–38.  
449. 43 U.S.C. § 1713 (2018). 
450. National Congress of American Indians, Resolution #DEN-18-035, 
Supporting Legislation to Improve Protections and Authorize the Restoration of 
Native Sacred Places on Federal Lands (2018), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/ 
Resolution_PYCnwKpRbfWPiYzlKHPLmgHJMNoHiIZVffWZqBIifEouNkSdFeS_
DEN-18-035%20Final.pdf.  
451. See, e.g., Sally Fairfax et al., The Federal Forests Are Not What They 
Seem: Formal and Informal Claims to Federal Lands, 25 ECOLOGY L. Q. 630 (1999).   




An irony in many contemporary threats facing tribal cultural 
resources on public lands is that they stem from private interests operating 
with federal governmental license. Thus, while some interests question the 
legality and purported dangers of asserting tribal rights and interests, little 
is said about the nature of private rights on public lands. Nowhere is the 
corporate footprint bigger than in the context of oil and gas leasing, with 
more than 22 million acres currently leased across the western United 
States.452 Private companies drive this process, starting with the power 
granted to them by Congress to nominate public lands to be leased for 
drilling through an “expression of interest.”453 Several of these leases 
threaten tribal rights and cultural resources, with Chaco Canyon being one 
prominent example. Our point here is to expose the inequity of the status 
quo and to make clear that there is already a sharing of management on 
public lands. However, it has not yet been extended to tribes to the same 
degree as states and private interests. 
B. Cooperative Federalism and Tribes-as-States  
in Federal Pollution Control Laws 
“Federalism” refers to the distribution of power between national 
and state and tribal governments. Congress’s plenary power over federal 
lands means that “states have legal authority to manage federal lands 
within their borders to the extent that Congress has chosen to give them 
such authority.”454 “Cooperative federalism” characterizes several federal 
public land and wildlife laws. This means that while federal laws promote 
a national interest and provide mandates regarding the management of 
public lands and wildlife, they also carve out a role for state governments 
to play in effectuating the purposes of these laws or in informing their 
implementation.   
Cooperative federalism is most well-known in the area of federal 
pollution control law, such as the Clean Air and Clean Water acts, whereby 
states participate in the implementation of standards established by federal 
law. Federal monies are provided to states but they are contingent on the 
 
452. See The Wilderness Society and Center for Western Priorities, 
America’s Public Lands Giveaway (Apr. 2020), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/ 
stories/36d517f10bb0424493e88e3d22199bb3 (providing data on oil and gas leasing 
on public lands). 
453. See Bureau of Land Management, Expression of Interest (EOI), 
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/leasing/parcel 
-nominations (last visited Apr. 2021). 
454. Carol Hardy Vincent & Alexandra M. Wyatt, State Management of 
Federal Lands: Frequently Asked Questions,  CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 5 
(2016). 
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development of state regulations that meet federal requirements. These 
laws preempt less stringent state and local requirements, referred to as 
“floor preemption,” but do not prohibit the states from adopting 
requirements that are more stringent and protective than the federal 
government’s program (a presumption against “ceiling preemption”).   
Although tribes were not initially considered or included in this 
structure of cooperative federalism, amendments to those foundational 
environmental laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s authorized a tribal 
role similar to that of states.455 Pursuant to those amendments, tribes—like 
states—may petition the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to assume the primary role for environmental regulation within 
their reservation boundaries and, therefore, the provisions authorize their 
“treatment as [a] state” or “tribes as states” (TAS).456 With that authority, 
tribes could adopt their own water quality standards pursuant to the Clean 
Water Act, to be enforced on their own or by the EPA, to regulate and 
control drinking water quality, and to assume primacy under the Clean Air 
Act in the same ways that those original environmental laws have 
empowered states.457 As a result, tribes may set their own environmental 
regulatory standards and if seek and recieve the EPA’s approval, enforce 
those standards, potentially even beyond the reservation’s boundaries.458 
In interpreting these provisions, the EPA has recognized a distinction 
between inherent tribal sovereign power to exercise environmental 
regulatory authority and the exercise of such authority pursuant to a 
delegation of federal authority by the EPA to tribes.459 Most recently, the 
EPA revised its interpretation of the Clean Water Act to be consistent with 
the Clean Air Act, both of which the agency now views as authorizing the 
 
455. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2018); Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(a) (2018); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7601(d)(2)(B) 
(2020); see also Hillary M. Hoffmann, Congressional Plenary Power and Indigenous 
Environmental Stewardship: The Limits of Environmental Federalism, 97 OR. L. REV. 
354, 383 (2019). 
456. See Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws: Treatment as a State (TAS), 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribal-assumption-federal-laws 
-treatment-state-tas (last visited July 12, 2020). 
457. Hoffmann, supra note 455, at 383. 
458. See id. at 389; City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 424 
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that upstream, non-tribal municipal wastewater facility had 
to comply with water quality standards adopted by downstream Pueblo of Isleta). 
459. See, e.g., Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision, 
81 Fed. Reg. 30,183 (May 16, 2016) (announcing EPA’s revised interpretation of the 
Clean Water Act tribal provisions to include an “express delegation of authority by 
Congress to Indian tribes to administer regulatory programs over their entire 
reservations” provided tribes meet relevant eligibility criteria). 




express delegation of federal authority to eligible tribes to regulate their 
entire reservations without regard to land-status-based jurisdictional 
limitations imposed upon their inherent authority by the United States 
Supreme Court.460 
C. Cooperative Federalism in Public Lands and Wildlife Law 
This type of cooperative regulatory scheme found in federal 
pollution control laws is not as prevalent in federal public lands law 
because the Property Clause of the United States Constitution provides for 
more exclusive federal authority over federal lands and resources. 
Nonetheless, Congress has provided multiple ways for states to participate 
in public lands and resources management. These are best viewed on a 
continuum, from laws providing no required state involvement461 to those 
providing more substantive opportunities.462 An example of the latter is 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968), which provides protection of rivers 
through a process of congressional designation or by state nomination to 
the Secretary of Interior. The latter pathway requires a river to first be 
designated as wild or scenic by a state legislature, the state proposal is then 
reviewed and possibly approved by the Secretary of Interior, and then the 
designated river is administered by a state agency.463  Though less than ten 
percent of river designations go the state proposal route, the law provides 
states an opportunity to play a substantive role in the designation and 
management of wild and scenic rivers.464 
“Coordination areas” managed by the USFWS provide “the most 
extreme example of [Fish and Wildlife] Service deference to state wildlife 
programs.”465 In contrast to National Wildlife Refuges, these areas are 
 
460. Id. at 30,190 (noting that “such a territorial approach that treats Indian 
reservations uniformly promotes rational, sound management of environmental 
resources that might be subjected to mobile pollutants that disperse over wide areas 
without regard to land ownership”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
461. The Antiquities Act, 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2018), for example, does 
not mention the role that states should play in the presidential designation of national 
monuments, as the purpose of this law was to provide Presidents an expedited way to 
protect by proclamation “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and 
other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated on land owned or 
controlled by the Federal Government to be national monuments.” 
462. For a more nuanced view, see Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative 
Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 179 (2005). 
463. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a) (2018). 
464. Sandra L. Johnson & Laura B. Comay, The National Wild and Scenic 
Rivers System: A Brief Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 4 (2015). 
465. ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: 
COORDINATING A CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 88 (2003). 
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federally-owned lands but are managed, with nearly full jurisdiction, by 
states under cooperative agreements or long-term leases from the 
USFWS.466 Most of these areas were established during the 1950s when 
there was no legal mechanism for the USFWS to enter into cooperative 
agreements with states.467 Though part of the National Wildlife Refuge 
System, coordination areas are excluded from provisions of the 1997 
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, from planning 
requirements to the statute’s compatibility determination framework.468 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) provides another 
example. As discussed in Part III(B), Section 119 of the Act authorizes co-
management between the federal government and Alaska Native 
Organizations for a relatively narrow set of purposes, such as collecting 
and analyzing data and monitoring the harvest of marine mammals for 
subsistence use. In contrast, Section 109 of the MMPA authorizes the 
federal government to transfer management authority to the States, for 
broadly defined species “conservation and management,” if certain criteria 
are met.469 The arrangement, in short, is “much more demanding of the 
receiving state, but also provides a much greater breadth of authority” than 
the Act’s co-management provision.470 As is the case with other federalism 
provisions in environmental law, this does not mean states get to use their 
transfer authorities to undermine the purposes of the statute in question, as 
the transfer authority must be “consistent with the purposes, policies, and 
goals of [the Act] and with international treaty obligations.”471 But it does 
provide for significant power-sharing with the states, including 
authorizing the Secretary to delegate to a state the “administration and 
enforcement” of the MMPA.472 
Several federal public land and wildlife laws provide states with 
an opportunity to “cooperate” in management and “coordinate” with states 
 
466. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(5) (2020). The term “coordination area” means “a 
wildlife management area that is made available to a State—(A) by cooperative 
agreement between the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and a State agency 
having control over wildlife resources pursuant to section 664 of this title; or (B) by 
long-term leases or agreements pursuant to title III of the Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant Act” (50 Stat. 525; 7 U.S.C. § 1010, et seq. (2020)).  
467. National Wildlife Refuge System, Coordination Areas, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, https://www.fws.gov/refuges/about/coordareas.html (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2020). 
468. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(3); 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a)) (2020). 
469. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(b)(1). 
470. Julie Lurman Joly, Tribal Management Under the MMPA: A Way 
Forward for Local Control, 4 AM. IND. L. J. 200, 207 (2016). 
471. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(b)(1)(A). 
472. Id. § 1379(k). 




in federal planning processes. For example, the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) provides that federal agencies “shall cooperate to the maximum 
extent practicable with the States.”473 Under ESA Section 6, federal 
agencies may also enter into cooperative agreements with any state that 
establishes and maintains an “adequate and active” program for the 
conservation of listed species.474 
USFS and BLM management provide two additional examples. 
The Forest Service’s Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960 
is typical of the public land statutes of that era that fail to recognize any 
tribal rights and interests. In effectuating the multiple use mandate, the 
MUSYA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture “to cooperate with 
interested State and local governmental agencies and others in the 
development and management of the national forests.”475  
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) also provides for 
the development of forest plans “coordinated with the land and resource 
management planning processes of State and local governments and other 
Federal agencies.”476 The provisions are limited insofar as they pertain to 
state engagement in forest and rangeland planning processes and they do 
not extend to USFS management across the board.  A similar provision 
requires the Secretary of Agriculture to “coordinate land use plans for 
lands in the National Forest System with the land use planning and 
management programs of and for Indian tribes by, among other things, 
considering the policies of approved tribal land resource management 
programs.”477 
The Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) includes a 
similar provision encouraging the coordination and consistency of federal 
and state land use plans: 
[T]o the extent consistent with the laws governing the 
administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use 
inventory, planning, and management activities of or for 
such lands with the land use planning and management 
programs of other Federal departments and agencies and 
of the States and local governments within which the 
lands are located . . .478   
 
473. Id. § 1535(a). 
474. Id. § 1535(c)(1). 
475. Id. § 530. 
476. Id. § 1604(a); 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(1) (2021). 
477. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(b) (2018). 
478. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2020). 
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The section goes on to explain that “[l]and use plans of the Secretary under 
this section shall be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum 
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act.”479  
These provisions provide state governors the opportunity to advise BLM 
of their positions on draft land use plans. BLM must consider this advice 
in so-called “consistency reviews.”480  
FLPMA’s coordination and consistency provision recognizes 
tribal coordination but not to the same degree as provided to state and local 
governments. The Secretary “shall, to the extent practical, keep apprised 
of State, local, and tribal land use plans . . . [and] assist in resolving, to the 
extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal 
Government plans . . .”481 The section then provides “meaningful public 
involvement of State and local government officials,” with Indian tribes 
once again not included.482 
 
479. Id. 
480. See, e.g., New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
565 F.3d 683, 721 (10th Cir. 2009) (“A meaningful opportunity to comment is all the 
regulation requires.”). This case focused on the mineral development of Otero Mesa 
in New Mexico, with the Governor using FLPMA’s consistency review provision. 43 
C.F.R. § 1610.3-2(e) (2020). Though the court found that a “meaningful opportunity 
to comment is all the regulation requires,” New Mexico, 565 F.3d at 721, it is 
nonetheless an opportunity not provided to the tribes in the area.   
481. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9). 
482. Id. (The section in its entirety: [T]o the extent consistent with the laws 
governing the administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use inventory, 
planning, and management activities of or for such lands with the land use planning 
and management programs of other Federal departments and agencies and of the 
States and local governments within which the lands are located, including, but not 
limited to, the statewide outdoor recreation plans developed under chapter 2003 of 
title 54, and of or for Indian tribes by, among other things, considering the policies of 
approved State and tribal land resource management programs. In implementing this 
directive, the Secretary shall, to the extent he finds practical, keep apprised of State, 
local, and tribal land use plans; assure that consideration is given to those State, local, 
and tribal plans that are germane in the development of land use plans for public lands; 
assist in resolving, to the extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and non-
Federal Government plans, and shall provide for meaningful public involvement of 
State and local government officials, both elected and appointed, in the development 
of land use programs, land use regulations, and land use decisions for public lands, 
including early public notice of proposed decisions which may have a significant 
impact on non-Federal lands. Such officials in each State are authorized to furnish 
advice to the Secretary with respect to the development and revision of land use plans, 
land use guidelines, land use rules, and land use regulations for the public lands within 
such State and with respect to such other land use matters as may be referred to them 
by him. Land use plans of the Secretary under this section shall be consistent with 
State and local plans to the maximum extent he finds consistent with Federal law and 




Another common approach in cooperative federalism is 
authorizing non-federal actors to enter into cooperative agreements and 
contracts with federal land agencies. The MUSYA, for example, allows 
the Secretary of Agriculture  “to negotiate and enter into cooperative 
agreements with public or private agencies, organizations, institutions, or 
persons’” for various purposes, including pollution control and forest 
protection, “when he determines that the public interest will be benefited 
and that there exists a mutual interest other than monetary 
considerations.”483 FLPMA’s provision is more open-ended, allowing the 
Secretary to “enter into contracts and cooperative agreements involving 
the management, protection, development, and sale of public lands.”484 
“Each agency has its own vocabulary for describing how these 
arrangements work on the ground, but several types of contracts, 
cooperative agreements, assistance agreements, and memorandums-of-
understanding (MOU) are used to share some management, and even 
financial, responsibilities.”485 In some cases, such as with Kasha-Katuwe 
in New Mexico, assistance agreements are used for implementing the 
purposes of joint management of the monument.   
In recent years, state governments have received even greater 
authority to “share stewardship” and “co-manage fire risk” on public lands 
with the USFS and BLM.486 “Good neighbor authority,” for example, 
permits the USFS and BLM to partner with states—via cooperative 
agreements with a state governor or county—to performing a wide range 
of forest, rangeland, and watershed restoration services, including 
activities to treat insect- and disease-infected trees, reduce hazardous fuels, 
and “any other activities to restore or improve forest, rangeland, and 
watershed health, including fish and wildlife habitat.”487 This includes 
permitting states to administer timber sales on federal land and for federal 
agencies to use the value of wood products to purchase restoration services 
from state agencies.488 
The Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA) of 2004 provides an 
example of how agreements and contracting authority could be reshaped 
to facilitate tribal, as opposed to state, co-management in the future. Tribes 
 
the purposes of this Act.). 
483. 16 U.S.C. § 565a-1 (2018). 
484. 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b).   
485. For a review with examples, see Nie, supra note 128, at 610–12.   
486. Toward Shared Stewardship Across Landscapes: An Outcome-Based 
Investement Strategy, No. FS–118 (USFS 2018). 
487. 16 U.S.C. § 2113a. 
488. See Tyson Bertone-Riggs et al., Understanding Good Neighbor 
Authority: Case Studies from Across the West, RURAL VOICES FOR CONSERVATION 
COAL., Sept. 2018. 
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and the USFS share roughly 2,675 miles of common boundary.489 The 
TFPA is designed to protect tribal forest assets by authorizing tribes to 
propose work and enter into agreements and contracts with the USFS and 
BLM to reduce threats posed by fire on federal land. The statute 
establishes a framework in which tribes can “propose projects that would 
protect their rights, lands, and resources by reducing threats from wildlife, 
insects, and disease.”490 Among other restrictions, the TFPA requires tribal 
proposals to focus on USFS land that (1) is adjacent to federal land, (2) 
poses a fire, disease, or other threat to Indian trust land or community or 
is in need of restoration, and (3) involves a “feature of circumstance unique 
to that Indian tribe (including treaty rights or biological, archeological, 
historical, or cultural circumstances).”491 When evaluating tribal 
proposals, the Act allows the USFS to use a “best value basis” and give 
specific consideration to tribally-related factors, such as the cultural, 
traditional, and historical affiliation of the tribe with the land, reserved 
treaty rights, and the indigenous knowledge of tribal members, among 
other factors.492   
Relatively few TFPA proposals have been accepted and 
implemented by the USFS.493 However, as we discuss in Part V, the design 
of this law is instructive to tribal co-management because it “sends a 
strong message that tribes need not wait for the federal agency to develop 
and consult on national forest projects,” but instead “supports tribes taking 
the lead in developing project proposals and requesting an agency 
response.”494 
D. Tribal Co-Management as Next Step in Cooperative Federalism 
The principles and strategies employed in cooperative federalism 
should be extended to Indian tribes and modified to affirm tribal 
 
489. Fulfilling the Promise of The Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004, 
Vol. I: An Analysis by the Intertribal Timber Council in Collaboration with USDA 
Forest Service and Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2 (Apr. 2013) [hereinafter Intertribal 
Timber Council Report]. 
490. Id. at 1. 
491. § 2(c), Pub. L. No. 108-278, 118 Stat. 868 (July 22, 2004).  
492. Id. at § 2(e). 
493. The Intertribal Timber Council Report, supra note 489, at 2–3 
(identifying 11 projects accepted by the USFS, with six being successfully 
implemented). It is clear, the Council found, that “the TFPA authority has been 
scarcely used.”   
494. Stephanie A. Lucero & Sonia Tamez, Working Together to 
Implement the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004: Partnerships for Today and 
Tomorrow, 115(5) J. FORESTRY 468, 469 (2017).   




sovereignty and safeguard the cultural resources and reserved treaty rights 
found on federal public lands. Though more contemporary statutes include 
tribal participation in provisions related to federalism and collaboration, 
there remains a bias and privileging of state and local governments in 
federal public land law. This is especially problematic when we consider 
that tribal, and not state governments, are the sovereigns with treaty rights, 
property interests and a trust relationship on federal lands.  
That so many federal public land laws fail to adequately recognize 
tribal rights and interests provides an opening for administrative rule and 
policymaking. The history of TAS authority is instructive. As discussed 
above, Congress amended a number of environmental statutes authorizing 
Indian tribes to apply for TAS authority. In those cases where, because of 
judicial divestiture,495 tribal inherent authority might not fulfill the broad 
congressional purposes of comprehensive environmental regulation, the 
EPA has lawfully used its rulemaking powers to interpret those statutes as 
delegating federal power—even over non-tribally owned lands—to tribes 
to do so.496  
The ESA provides another example. Outside of the taking of listed 
species by Alaska Natives for subsistence purposes, the law is silent on its 
applicability to Indian tribes and treaty rights. In 1997, under President 
Clinton, the secretaries of Interior and Commerce negotiated and drafted 
with tribal representatives—on a government-to-government basis—the 
Joint Secretarial Order on “American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal 
Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act.”497 Order 3206 
attempts to harmonize “the [f]ederal trust responsibility to tribes, tribal 
sovereignty, and statutory missions of the [d]epartments, and strives to 
ensure that Indian tribes do not bear a disproportionate burden for the 
conservation of listed species, so as to avoid or minimize the potential for 
conflict and confrontation.”498 Several principles are stated in the Order 
encouraging “cooperative assistance,” “consultation,” “the sharing of 
information,” the “creation of government-to-government partnerships to 
promote healthy ecosystems,” and use of the “intergovernmental 
agreements.”499   
 
495. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 16, § 4.02(3)(a).  
496. See, e.g., Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provision, 
supra note 459. 
497. American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust 
Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act, Secretarial Order No. 3206 (June 
5, 1997). 
498. Id.   
499. Id. § 4 (“The Departments shall, when appropriate and at the request 
of an Indian tribe, pursue intergovernmental agreements to formalize arrangements 
involving sensitive species (including candidate, proposed, and listed species) such as, 
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Order 3206 demonstrates the type of leadership that can be 
asserted by the next President. From a tribal and endangered species 
standpoint, the Order is far from perfect.500 But it did result from the 
Secretary of Interior initiating the process and making its bilateral 
negotiation a priority. As captured by law professor Charles F. Wilkinson, 
who participated in the process: 
The Order is no dramatic breakthrough, no Olympian 
moment in federal Indian policy. It is just a sensible, fair 
approach to a thorny area of policy developed by people 
who took the time to listen, negotiate, open up their 
minds, and take some chances. But, in a complicated 
world, this is exactly where progress is often made—in 
measured, collaborative approaches to particular 
problems. And the worth of the process stands out in sharp 
relief because it was set against the long and mostly 
dreary canvas of federal-tribal relations. The pageantry in 
the Indian Treaty Room did not commemorate some epic 
event, but it did rightly celebrate a solid accomplishment 
that holds out promise for those who believe that an 
honest, open, and hardworking mutuality ought to serve 
as the foundation for Indian policy.501  
This type of mutuality can also be combined with more traditional 
statutory and regulatory frameworks employed in cooperative federalism 
in crafting new tribal co-management legislation. The most important 
principle perhaps is to recognize the parameters and criteria provided by 
Congress when transferring or sharing management authority with non-
federal actors. States are not delegated carte blanche discretion in these 
statutes, but must rather meet certain standards and criteria upon receiving 
federal funding and assuming management responsibilities.  As discussed 
in Part III, the tribal co-management regimes now in place are similarly 
 
but not limited to, land and resource management, multi-jurisdictional partnerships, 
cooperative law enforcement, and guidelines to accommodate Indian access to, and 
traditional uses of, natural products.”); id. § 6 (“Such agreements shall strive to 
establish partnerships that harmonize the Departments’ missions under the Act with 
the Indian tribes own ecosystem management objectives.”).  
500. See, e.g., Drew Kraniak, Conserving Endangered Species in Indian 
Country: The Success and Struggles of Joint Secretarial Order 3206 Nineteen Years 
On, 26 COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENVTL L. REV. 321 (2015).  
501. See Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the 
Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial 
Order, 72 U. WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (1997). 




circumscribed and used to achieve the purposes set forth in judicial 
decrees, statutes, and presidential proclamations.   
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING TRIBAL  
CO-MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS 
The history, context, and framework of federal public land law is 
predicated on the removal and marginalization of tribal claims to and 
interests in those lands. While various approaches and strategies have been 
developed to re-engage tribes and their historical connections to public 
lands and resources, none of those options has yet resulted in an equitable 
balance of tribal and federal management or responsibilities. To reach that 
objective, federal land management agencies must be compelled to more 
effectively work with tribes on a co-management basis, much like they are 
compelled to fulfill their other obligations and priorities in managing and 
protecting the lands for which they are responsible.  
A. Executive Actions 
A future presidential administration should use its authority to 
affirm tribal sovereignty and effectuate the federal government’s treaty 
and trust obligations through innovations in tribal co-management and 
shared governance on federal public lands. Without new tribal co-
management legislation, the clearest path for doing so is by building and 
strengthening those bridges to tribal co-management examined in this 
Report. Importantly, because the foundations for those bridges are already 
in place, progress can be made even without the additional actions 
recommended here. However, the proactive measures described below 
would not only reinvigorate the traditional tools of tribal engagement and 
implementation, but more strategically link them together as a way to 
harmonize federal Indian and public lands law and management. That our 
public land laws are generally silent about tribal rights and interests should 
be viewed not as an obstacle but as an opening for presidential leadership.  
1.  To Issue a New Executive Order or Joint Secretarial  
Order on Tribal Co-Management 
Such leadership can start with an executive order or jointly issued 
order by the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture on tribal co-
management on federal public lands. The Order should pick up where 
SecretaryJewell’s Order 3342 left off. Order 3342, focused on “Identifying 
Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships with 
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Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal Lands 
and Resources,” provides a limited review of existing legal authorities for 
tribal cooperation and directs Interior bureaus to “identify opportunities 
for cooperative management arrangements and collaborative partnerships 
with tribes and undertake efforts, where appropriate, to prepare their 
respective bureau staffs to partner with tribes in the management of the 
natural and cultural resources over which the bureaus maintain jurisdiction 
and responsibility.”502 As we discuss in Part III(C), Jewell’s Order makes 
a distinction between co-management and “cooperative and collaborative 
partnerships” with tribes, emphasizing the limitations imposed by the 
delegation doctrine and the “inherently federal function” threshold. In this 
context, the Order calls for the development of a working group in the 
Office of Solicitor to advise bureaus on the relevant legal issues.  
As we explain in Part III(D), we believe the Solicitor should 
update their advice on these matters, with a clearer focus on their 
application to sovereign Indian tribes in contrast to state and private actors 
operating on federal lands. Distinguishing between what constitutes an 
unlawful delegation of authority and what are instead “sovereignty-
affirming subdelegations” that “affirm tribal sovereignty by intermingling 
federal and tribal power”503 would help clarify matters and give agencies 
in both departments more confidence in utilizing their existing authorities. 
With such clarification, agencies could then be charged to negotiate and 
enter a certain number of such agreements each year—a more proactive 
accountability measure than the annual reporting of available functions 
and agreements currently in place.504 The Office of the Solicitor may also 
wish to consider the findings in this Report, including the fact that most 
definitions and applications of tribal co-management do not include a total 
delegation of authority or call for tribal unilateralism. Solicitors should 
assist in identifying additional, legally-sufficient co-management options 
that are short of a total delegation of authority.   
Secretary Jewell’s Order provides an incomplete list of legal 
authorities on which to base collaborative partnerships with tribes, 
focusing on the use of “cooperative agreement” clauses in federal land 
laws. It also provides a list of exemplary collaborative partnerships 
 
502. Identifying Opportunities for Cooperative and Collaborative 
Partnerships with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the Management of Federal 
Lands and Resources, Secretarial Order No. 3206, § 5 (2016). 
503. See Lazerwitz, supra note 404, at 1046.  
504. See List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements 
Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2020 Programmatic Targets, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,326 (Mar. 
2, 2020) (2020 List). 




between Interior bureaus and Indian tribes. Needed next is an order going 
deeper, drawing from first principles of federal Indian law and more recent 
cases of innovation to explain how existing authorities and processes can 
serve as a bridge to tribal co-management. We have provided examples of 
how those bridges could be constructed in the future, such as strategically 
linking consultation, compacting, or contracting; NHPA designations and 
processes; and public lands planning. Federal land agencies can help 
identify additional bridges and opportunities in this regard. 
Tribal co-management can be further prioritized and rewarded 
through specific performance measures for agency leadership and by 
evaluating a public land manager’s engagement with tribes and efforts in 
co-management in annual performance reviews. Such changes, coming 
from agency headquarters and regional offices, will help ensure that this 
new era of tribal relations will be institutionalized and incentivized.   
2.  To Provide Oversight and Ensure that Federal Land Use  
Plans Adequately Account for Tribal Rights and Interests  
and that Early and Meaningful Tribal Engagement is  
Used to Inform the Desired Conditions, Objectives, and  
Legal Constraints of Federal Lands Management 
The opportunities presented by federal lands planning should be 
part of the joint order on tribal co-management. As we recommend in Part 
II(D)(3), the President should ensure that federal land planning regulations 
and agency-specific manuals, handbooks, and policies related to cultural 
resources and tribal relations comport with the first principles of federal 
Indian law and the core principles of tribal co-management. The process 
for doing so must include early and substantive tribal engagement and, 
potentially, inter-agency consultation with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
The USFS and BLM are in the process of revising plans throughout the 
country, many of which are now decades old and fail to adequately account 
for tribal rights and interests on federal lands. Guidance from the highest 
levels of the executive branch can help ensure that every plan revision is 
viewed as an opportunity to do things differently, to better integrate the 
National Historic Preservation Act, and to effectuate the purposes of the 
joint order.   
3.  To Connect the Tribal Consultation Responsibilities of Federal 
Agencies to the Public Lands Missions of those Agencies 
Similarly, whether part of the proposed joint secretarial order or 
through additional executive orders, further guidance and mandates for 
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agencies to improve their approach to tribal consultation are necessary to 
better fulfill the promising potential for tribal co-management. These 
additional directives could draw on the 2017 interagency report regarding 
consultation on infrastructure projects (described above) but should focus 
specifically on linking agency consultation obligations to the public lands 
management missions of those agencies. The long history of separation 
between public land law and the federal government’s trust obligations to 
Indian tribes has resulted in agency practices that often prioritize the 
former while the latter is viewed as external to those priorities. Thus, tribal 
consultation must be implemented as a federal objective on equal standing 
with existing federal land management priorities focused on multiple-use, 
wilderness, refuge, or other goals. In other words, executive actions should 
be taken to integrate tribal consultation as a fundamental objective of 
federal public land management agencies that promotes long-term, 
ongoing, and co-equal federal-tribal relations.  
In conjunction with this integration, additional accountability 
measures should also be developed in order to ensure their workability and 
success. Incorporating consultation mandates into personnel evaluations, 
especially for agency leaders, will help incentivize and ensure 
accountability at the institutional and employee level. In addition, 
however, procedural accountability measures, such as basing decisions 
upon mutual concurrence with interested tribes or requiring written 
explanations of agency decisions that respond to tribal input during the 
consultation process, would help support improvements to consultation 
relationships and ensure more robust, timely, and meaningful federal-
tribal relationships. 
4.  To Develop Protocols for Tribal Involvement in  
Monument Designations under the Antiquities Act 
Consistent with executive actions to advance tribal co-
management, improve public lands planning, and enhance the 
effectiveness of tribal consultation, further executive action could be taken 
to build on the promise of the Antiquities Act shown by the Bears Ears 
Intertribal Coalition and its work to propose and support the designation 
of the Bears Ears National Monument. As described above, that proposal 
was the first of its kind in that it represented and was developed by tribal 
voices and suggested using the executive authority allowed by the 
Antiquities Act to protect an area for its continuing tribal cultural values 
and connections. In addition, the Coalition’s proposal included a 
framework for tribal co-management that, while not ultimately included in 
the proclamation, offered a new opportunity for enhancing that concept.  




While the Antiquities Act gives the President broad discretion to 
designate new national monuments, future exercises of that discretion 
should rely on the Bears Ears example to ensure that tribes with historical, 
cultural, or other connections to areas being considered for designation as 
a national monument are involved in the review and designation process. 
While the Bears Ears Intertribal Coalition took it upon itself to develop 
and pursue a national monument proposal, future uses of the Antiquities 
Act should work to ensure that similar consideration is given to the 
protection of tribal uses and connections to national monuments and, 
where appropriate, that newly proclaimed national monuments include 
provisions calling for a tribal role in management of those monuments. 
5.  To Hold Agencies Accountable for Supporting, Implementing,  
and Enhancing Tribal Contracting and Compacting Authorities  
to Assume Responsibilities for Public Lands Management 
As described above, since the passage of the Tribal Self 
Government Act (TSGA) in 1994, the Secretary of the Interior has been 
obligated to annually review and report on the success of agencies within 
Interior in compacting with tribes to transfer previously federal 
obligations.505 Review of these annual reports demonstrates the lackluster 
success of agencies in doing so, particularly regarding the transfer of 
meaningful public land management responsibilities to tribes.506 In 
conjunction with other executive actions promoting meaningful tribal co-
management opportunities, the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture 
should also issue additional directives to the public land management 
agencies within their purview that will serve to reinvigorate the purposes 
and intent of the TSGA as envisioned by Congress in 1994.  
Rather than simply reporting on available programs and existing 
compacts, the secretaries should demand and publicly report on the 
number of compacts entered into by their agencies, seek tribal and agency 
input on barriers to successful compacting for broader co-management 
authority, and, consistent with those findings, direct additional technical 
assistance, accountability, or other resources toward expanding the use 
and effectiveness of the TSGA (and its TFPA and 2018 Farm Bill 
 
505. 25 U.S.C. § 5365(c) (2018).  
506. Compare, e.g., the 2020 List, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,326 (Mar. 2, 2020) 
(listing six total compacts between the three Interior agencies—BLM, NPS, USFWS) 
with List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Funding 
Agreements to be Negotiated With Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other 
than the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,032 (Mar. 8, 1999) (describing two 
compacts entered into by the NPS). 
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counterparts for the USFS) as a bridge to tribal co-management. As with 
improving accountability for consultation, performance metrics for agency 
leaders and staff could incorporate contracting and compacting to 
incentivize improvement of those practices. 
B. Congressional Actions 
The most effective and efficient way to enable tribal co-
management is through congressional lawmaking. We sketch out two 
potential pathways in this regard: (1) tribal co-management through place-
based legislation, and (2) tribal co-management through system-wide 
legislation.  
Another pathway not explored herein is by amending the suite of 
federal public land statutes referenced throughout the Report. Most of 
these statutes fail to reference, never mind protect, tribal treaty rights, 
sacred places, or cultural resources. Each could be amended to reconcile 
the past and adequately account for tribal rights and interests on public 
lands. If our federal public land statutes were ever to be systematically 
reviewed again, by a commission or comparable entity, this approach 
would be feasible and warranted. However, we are aware of the political 
dangers posed by opening these statutes and believe that there are more 
efficient legislative approaches that can be taken.   
Accountability mechanisms can be built into both legislative 
approaches. Laws that provide for tribal co-management will confront the 
fundamental questions and tensions that are baked into public lands 
lawmaking writ large, including: (1) how to balance the need for 
prescription, accountability, and enforceability with administrative 
discretion, (2) how best to hold governments—including federal and 
tribal—accountable, including through appropriate dispute resolution 
procedures; and (3) what are the purposes and constraints of tribal co-
management. The place-based and system-wide options are premised on 
the same vision. Each would shift the reactionary tribal consultation 
paradigm to a more pro-active and affirmative model in which Indian 
tribes can submit their own proposals and plans and “expressions of 
interest” for re-envisioning management of treaty rights, sacred places, 
and cultural resources on public lands. The cases reviewed in this report 
make clear that the core principles of co-management can be configured 
into creative and accountable ways of governing that fit unique historical 
and legal contexts, political realities, and landscapes. 




1.  Place-based Legislation 
 Place-based legislation could be used to codify forms of tribal co-
management that are specific to a particular unit in the federal public land 
system. Establishment or site-specific enabling legislation specifies how 
one particular place or unit of public lands is managed. This individualized 
approach is most common in the National Park and National Wildlife 
Refuge systems, but is also applied to lands managed by the USFS and 
BLM.507 Congress has used all types of “conservation overlays” in the 
past, such as “protected area” designations with special provisions, 
“special management areas,” “conservation areas,” “recreation areas,” or 
whatever names Congress deems fit.   
There is a history of using the place-based approach to protect 
tribal treaty rights, sacred areas, and cultural resources on public lands.508 
In 1987, for example, Congress used three land use designations—a 
national monument, national conservation area, and wilderness areas— to 
protect the el malpais (“badlands” in Spanish) region of New Mexico, a 
place of historical, religious, and cultural importance to the Acoma and 
Zuni Pueblos and other tribes.509 The T’uf Shur Bien Preservation Trust 
Area Act (2003) provides another example. The law created the T’uf Shur 
Bien Preservation Trust Area within the Cibola National Forest and Sandia 
Mountain Wilderness “to preserve in perpetuity the national forest and 
wilderness character of the Area”510 and provides the Pueblo of Sandia 
special authorities regarding how the area will be managed. To guarantee 
“perpetual preservation” of the area, “the Act provides the Pueblo the right 
to consent or withhold consent—veto power—over any new use of the 
area that might be proposed by the U.S. Forest Service in the future.”511 
A more recent example is provided by proposed legislation to 
protect the Greater Chaco region in the Southwest from increased oil and 
gas development adjacent to the Chaco Culture National Historical Park. 
The Chaco Cultural Heritage Area Protection Act, introduced by all five 
members of New Mexico’s congressional delegation, would prevent 
 
507. See Martin Nie & Michael Fiebig, Managing the National Forests 
through Place-Based Legislation, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (2010) (providing a history and 
review of the approach, from the Bull Run Watershed Management Unit in the Mount 
Hood National Forest to the Valles Caldera National Preserve and Trust).  
508. See Nie, supra note 128, at 626–38. 
509. An Act to Establish the El Malpais National Monument and the El 
Malpais National Conservation Area in the State of New Mexico, to Authorize the 
Masau Trail, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539 (Dec. 31, 
1987); 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-21 (2006). 
510. Id. § 404(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11 (Feb. 20, 2003). 
511. See Nie, supra note 128, at 629–30.  
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leasing and development on federal lands within a ten-mile radius of the 
Park, which serves as a proposed Chaco protection zone.512 This place-
based bill and its proposed mineral withdrawal is mostly defensive in 
nature and stems in large part from the BLM’s inadequate NHPA 
consultation and protection of sacred lands and traditional cultural 
properties in the area.513   
The proposed “Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act,” introduced 
by Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) in July 2020, provides a more precedent-
setting example that not only provides permanent protection for a sacred 
area but also a model for future governance.514 Like the Intertribal Bears 
Ears Proposal discussed in Part III(E), the proposal demonstrates a form 
of carefully-crafted, innovative shared governance that could enable tribal 
co-management in the future. And like Bears Ears, the Badger-Two 
Medicine Protection Act emanates from Blackfeet values and vision for 
the area, most recently articulated in a 2017 Proposal to Establish 
Permanent Protections by the Blackfeet Tribal Historic Preservation 
Office and the Tribal Business Council.   
The legislative proposal strategically builds on the existing 
designations and protections already afforded to the Badger-Two 
Medicine, from the National Forest and travel management plans for the 
area to the TCD designation.515 In many respects, the latter is the linchpin 
of the proposal because it is designed to “permanently protect the cultural 
values, attributes, and integrity of the Badger-Two Medicine Traditional 
Cultural District.”516 It also provides the purpose of the bill’s tribal 
coordination provision, essentially linking a procedural consultation 
requirement to the substantive determination of “whether management is 
compatible with the values and attributes of the Badger-Two Medicine 
[TCD].”517 
 
512     H.R. 2181, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1079, 116th Cong. (2019).  
513. See, e.g., Uncited Preliminary Brief (Deferred Appendix Appeal) of 
Amici Curiae All Pueblo Council of Governors and National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, in Support of Appellants,” Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t, et 
al. v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 2019) (describing BLM NHPA violations in 
failing to consult with Pueblo tribal governments when considering applications for 
permits to drill and how they would potentially affect traditional cultural properties in 
the area).   
514. Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act, S. 4288, 116th Cong. (as 
introduced July 22, 2020).  
515. See Martin Nie, Selected Law and Policy Provisions of Relevance to 
Permanent Protection and Management of the Badger-Two Medicine, BOLLE CENTER 
FOR PEOPLE AND FORESTS (2019) (on file with authors). 
516. Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act, supra note 514, § 4(2). 
517. Id. § 6(a)(1).  




Though the term “co-management” is not found in the bill, it 
reflects the fundamental principles of a tribal co-management approach. 
The bill also showcases how to provide for political and legal 
accountability and how to reconcile the values and uses of the area by 
tribal and non-tribal people. It begins with a clearly defined set of 
management purposes, permitted uses, and prohibitions, all helping to 
define the objectives and legal constraints of co-management. Provisions 
related to roadbuilding, motorized and mechanized use, vegetation 
management, grazing, wildfire, water resources, and Native American 
cultural and religious use, among others, are addressed in the bill.  
Not all potential problems and uses can be anticipated in 
legislation, so the bill creates a new mechanism for the Blackfeet Tribe to 
grant or deny consent for new proposed uses and authorizes the Tribe to 
perform management functions using self-determination contracting 
authorities. Representation of non-tribal values and interests are 
incorporated into the bill, with opportunities provided through an advisory 
council focused on preparation and implementation of a management plan 
and via existing accountability mechanisms provided by NEPA and APA-
based judicial review.  
In short, the Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act demonstrates 
one way that co-management can be purposed, structured, and constrained 
in place-based legislation. 
2.  System-wide Legislation 
Tribal co-management on federal public lands can also be enabled 
through new legislation creating a structured framework that provides 
tribes an opportunity to submit their own proposed co-management plans 
for consideration by the secretaries of Interior and Agriculture. This 
legislative approach is used within federal Indian and public lands law and 
various features of these statutes could be modified to enable and prioritize 
tribal co-management. The law’s findings would be based on and reaffirm 
the first principles of federal Indian law, including the unique relationship 
between the federal government and the governments of Indian tribes, the 
federal trust responsibility, and the fiduciary responsibilities of the United 
States as found in the specific commitments made in treaties and 
agreements. 
The law could establish a demonstration program in which tribal 
co-management applications and proposed plans would be submitted by 
governing bodies of Indian tribes and vetted through some type of review 
process that would hue to the specified requirements provided in the 
umbrella statute. The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act (ITARA) of 2016 
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provides an example of how a new co-management statute might be 
structured in this regard.518 Although that law applies only to trust 
resources already owned by the federal government for the benefit of 
Indian tribes or tribally owned lands,519 it authorizes a tribe to develop a 
trust asset management plan that, subject to approval by the Secretary of 
the Interior, would guide tribal management of those resources.520 The law 
specifies what contents must be included in proposed Indian trust asset 
management plans, with technical assistance and information provided by 
the Secretary of Interior on receipt of a written request from an Indian 
tribe.521  
Three crux issues in negotiating and drafting this legislation will 
be determining: (1) the process for approval and disapproval of proposed 
plans; (2) determining the scope and content requirements of submitted 
co-management proposals, and (3) securing long-term funding 
commitments. We discuss each in turn.   
The system-wide co-management approach would encourage and 
facilitate tribes submitting their own proposals for co-management, which 
may or may not be prepared in collaboration with other interests and 
partners. Accountability will be a primary concern that must cut in both 
directions: to ensure that those implementing tribal co-management 
proposals are accountable for protecting public lands and to ensure that the 
secretaries of Interior and Agriculture are held accountable for their 
decisions to approve and disapprove of proposed plans.   
As we discuss in Part II(C), an important limitation on TSGA 
compacting and contracting is the broad discretion provided to non-BIA 
bureaus to deny tribal proposals without justification and methods of 
remedy. The Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA), discussed in Part IV(C), 
provides another example of a program not reaching its potential, in part 
because of the discretionary nature of the selection process. If a tribal 
request is denied under the Act: 
[T]he Secretary may issue a notice of denial to the Indian 
tribe, which (1) identifies the specific factors that caused, 
and explains the reasons that support, the denial; (2) 
identifies potential courses of action for overcoming 
specific issues that led to the denial; and (3) proposes a 
schedule of consultation with the Indian tribe for the 
purpose of developing a strategy for protecting the Indian 
 
518. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5601 et seq. (2018). 
519. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5613, 5614(a). 
520. Id.  
521. Id. § 5613(a)(2)–(3). 




forest land or rangeland of the Indian tribe and interests 
of the Indian tribe in Federal land.522 
Introduced in 2016, the Tribal Forestry Participation and Protection Act 
would amend the TFPA to ensure more prompt consideration of tribal 
requests with mandated timelines for secretarial responses and completion 
of relevant environmental reviews.523   
ITARA provides a stronger mechanism to ensure tribal proposals 
are duly considered by the Secretary, with a presumption of approval 
unless specific requirements are not met in proposed plans by tribes.524 A 
process for resubmission is also provided along with a judicial review 
provision, based in the APA, once the “Indian tribe has exhausted all other 
administrative remedies.”525  
Determining the scope and content requirements of submitted 
tribal co-management plans will be another key factor in this legislative 
approach. The purposes of the legislation must be stated broadly enough 
to cover the full array of tribal rights and interests on federal public lands 
and not be unduly limited and too narrowly defined.526 At the same time, 
however, the law must provide some sideboards for tribal co-management, 
for the purpose of securing both tribal self-determination and the 
conservation of public lands.  
The point is to avoid a situation where tribal co-management is 
viewed in a strict dichotomous fashion—as only a tool for conservation 
and protection or resource use and management. While some tribal co-
management proposals may be strictly focused on conserving the integrity 
of sacred lands, cultural resources or protecting the habitat important to 
reserved treaty rights, other proposals may include some degree of 
resource management and use, such as the case with co-management of 
 
522. Id. § 3115a(d). 
523. S. 3014, 114th Cong. (2016).  
524. 25 U.S.C. § 5613(b). 
525. Id. § 5613(b)(4). 
526. For reference, Identifying Opportunities for Cooperative and 
Collaborative Partnerships with Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the 
Management of Federal Lands and Resources, Secretarial Order No. 3206, § 5 (2016) 
is relatively broad in stating the scope of activities subject to tribal cooperation and 
collaboration: “(1) Delivery of specific programs and services; (2) Management of 
fish and wildlife resources; (3) Identification, protection, preservation, and 
management of culturally significant sites, landscapes, and resources; (4) 
Management of plant resources, including collection of plant material; (5) 
Management and implementation of maintenance activities; (6) Management of 
information related to tribal, cultural, and/or educational materials related to bureau 
units.”  
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salmon in the Northwest and subsistence use in Alaska. Tribal 
representation will be crucial in negotiating and drafting this legislation, 
and can help prevent a situation where tribal co-management is 
appropriated and co-opted by a particular set of interests.  
We hope to return to the particulars of this legislative approach in 
subsequent phases of the project. At that point, it will be important to 
address the co-management law’s intersection with NEPA and the 
layering of tribal co-management plans with federal public land use plans.   
Funding tribal co-management must also be addressed. The most 
sure-fire way to doom tribal co-management, or any effective management 
of public lands for that matter, is through inadequate funding. One lesson 
from similarly structured demonstration programs in operation on public 
lands, such as the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program 
(CFLRP) is the necessity of a long-term funding commitment.527 The Act 
creating this program allocates funding through a competitive process and 
establishes a dedicated “Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration 
Fund.”528  
Another possibility in this regard is to consider the types of 
revenue-sharing that are common in cooperative federalism and public 
lands law, such as the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965529 
and the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937.530 While 
the latter provides an important stream of wildlife funding for state 
governments, tribal governments have been ineligible to receive 
Pittman-Robertson funds for conservation on tribal lands. Federal 
inducements, incentives, and revenue-sharing mechanisms are common 
methods used to promote cooperative federalism, even though state and 
county governments are most often the beneficiaries.531 Lawmakers 
could use a similar approach as a way to fund and incentivize tribal co-
management.   
The design of CFLRP is instructive in other ways as well, 
including the establishment of an advisory panel that evaluates and 
provides recommendations on submitted landscape restoration 
proposals.532 In addition to using an advisory panel to screen and select 
 
527.  See Courtney A. Schultz et al., Strategies for Success Under Forest 
Service Restoration Initiatives, ECOSYSTEM WORKFORCE PROGRAM (2017). 
528. Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-11, 
123 Stat. 991. 
529. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seq. (2018). 
530. Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669a–i (2018). 
531. See Nie, supra note 436, at 40. 
532. See generally Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program, 
U.S. Forest Service, https://www.fs.fed.us/restoration/CFLRP/ (last visited Aug. 27, 




submitted co-management proposals, the system-wide co-management 
law could also incorporate methods of external accountability and review, 
such as the use of a Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committee 
or third-party evaluation of some type. The external role played by the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, as discussed in Part II(D), 
demonstrates how such a body could be used to help ensure the new law 
is effectively implemented. There are several possible ways to design such 
a statute, but the goal in this regard is to ensure that ill-conceived proposals 
for tribal co-management do not advance and the good ones do not 
languish in the halls of federal bureaucracy.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1970, the last Public Land Law Review Commission drew a 
stark line between federal public lands and Indian law. The Commission 
viewed these bodies of law as “wholly separate,” and thus the 
Commission’s report makes no reference to the historical underpinning of 
federal lands or to the tribal rights and interests that are tied to them.533 
The federal public land and wildlife laws enacted before, during, and since 
the Commission’s report similarly disregard the connections between 
many Native Nations and public lands. The cases and examples used in 
this Report demonstrate the ramifications of doing so and the lost potential 
of a more holistic and inclusive approach to public lands management. As 
other cases have shown, especially those resulting from the treaty-based 
collaborative management of fisheries in the Pacific Northwest and Great 
Lakes, a meaningful tribal role in resource management results in the 
benefit of generations of applied knowledge and, through the harmonizing 
of tribal self-determination and public lands management and 
conservation, the potential for reckoning with—and reconciliation of—the 
“dark side of our conservation history.”534   
From those successes, tribal efforts to expand the avenues 
through which those benefits can flow have only increased. As Professor 
Sarah Krakoff describes in relating the history of the Bears Ears National 
Monument, the coalition of tribes moving that effort forward “made 
public land laws bend toward equality and justice, and that legacy 
 
2020).  
533. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 
3, at 158 n.5. 
534. Krakoff, supra note 7, at 215.   
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endures even if the current Bears Ears boundaries do not.”535 Therein 
remains, in Krakoff’s words, the “enduring promise of public lands”: 
For decades, public land laws, whether through policies 
of disposition or conservation, had similar effects on 
American Indian Tribes. Disposition policies, which 
distributed public domain lands to homesteaders, miners, 
railroads, and states, eroded the tribal land base and had 
devasting effects on tribal culture and self-governance. 
Conservation policies . . . also displaced Tribes and 
severed their connections to cultural practices, with 
enduring negative impacts. But disposition policies 
privatized indigenous lands, and removed them 
permanently (barring tribal reacquisition) from tribal 
access. Public lands—whether National Parks, 
Wilderness, National Monuments, or otherwise—
remained open for contests over their use. Public lands, 
by remaining public, left open the space for Tribes to 
renegotiate their rights to their aboriginal lands, and 
thereby to nudge conservation policies toward justice. As 
long as the federal government retains one third of the 
Nation’s lands, there will be terrain (literally) for similar 
efforts.536  
Fifty years after President Nixon’s Special Message to Congress on Indian 
Affairs and the Public Land Law Review Commission’s influential report, 
the time has come for a broader movement in support of reckoning, 
reconciliation, and justice. Concurrent with the broader national dialogue 
on these issues, enhancing tribal co-management of federal public lands 
presents an opportunity to make real progress toward fulfilling those 
ideals. The next presidential administration can do so by expeditiously 
building on previous actions, such as Interior Secretary Jewell’s Order No. 
3342 and strategically linking existing authorities and strategies that 
would build bridges to a new era in tribal relations and public lands 
management. By enacting system-wide and/or place-based tribal co-
management legislation, Congress can also affirm tribal sovereignty and 
effectuate the federal government’s treaty and trust obligations through 
innovations in cooperative governance.  
 
535. Id. at 217.   
536. Id. at 257.   




This report provides a framework for putting tribal co-
management in its historical and legal context. All the divergent 
definitions, interpretations, and applications of tribal co-management have 
caused a fair deal of confusion about what it means in practice and the 
implications for public lands and conservation more generally. A more 
constructive approach is to focus on the core principles of co-management; 
those key attributes that can be configured into different types of 
governing arrangements fitting particular places and connections.   
For those cautious or leery of the co-management approach, we 
recommend it be considered in the context of more familiar questions and 
themes of federal public lands and wildlife law. First is the issue of 
accountability. Our report makes clear that co-management is not by 
nature an open-ended, discretionary, and unenforceable framework that 
fails to hold governments—federal, state, and tribal—accountable for their 
actions. Finding the right balance between the level of prescription and 
discretion is a core tension in public lands law writ large and proposals for 
tribal co-management will be debated in a similar fashion. Similarly, these 
debates will be bounded by the framework of public land law, from the 
more protection-oriented statutes governing the national parks and wildlife 
refuges to the more discretionary multiple use systems of the USFS and 
BLM. But this framework must no longer be divorced from and exclude 
tribes and tribal interests; instead, within this statutory space exists 
sufficient room to work more creatively and substantively with Native 
Nations and to incorporate the core principles of tribal co-management 
into the next chapter of public lands.   
Situating tribal co-management in the context of federalism and 
intergovernmental relations also helps reframe the debate by placing it 
in more familiar terrain. We should first acknowledge the disadvantaged 
position of Indian tribes when contrasted to the often-privileged role 
provided to state governments in federal public lands and wildlife law. 
In some cases, private interests even have more influence and 
opportunities to operate on federal lands than do sovereign tribal nations 
with legal rights, interests, and cultural ties to those lands. To be sure, 
there is already a sharing of management on public lands, but the 
opportunities have not yet been extended to tribes like those offered to 
states and private interests.  
Bridging into a new era of tribal relations does not entail 
surrendering the national interest in public lands and, instead, portends a 
future of increased engagement and enhanced protection for those 
resources. Prominent cases referenced in this report, such as the Badger-
Two Medicine and Bears Ears, more deeply support those interests by 
reframing their history and reshaping a new, more collaborative way to 
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better protect places that are valued by Indians and non-Indians alike. They 
are innovative and constructive efforts at harmonizing sometimes 
divergent values and interests and more effectively draw upon the long-
standing tribal connections to, and knowledge of, those places.537 These 
and the many other efforts toward tribal co-management of federal public 
lands demonstrate the potential for tribes to engage with the federal 
government in new ways while enmeshing tribal values and connections 
into the law and management of public lands.  
Ultimately, enhancing opportunities for tribal co-management of 
federal public lands is about justice, reconciliation, healing, and sharing.538 
Thus, beyond the direct benefits to the public lands, tribal co-management 
also offers a path to a more equitable future in which those core values are 
promoted and sustained for all Americans. Rather than continue the long 
history of division between tribes and public lands, the time has come to 
build bridges to that path and to a new and brighter future. 
 
537. The Proclamation designating Bears Ears National Monument, for 
example, celebrates the cultural, ecological and recreational values of the region and 
makes clear that “it is in the public interest to preserve the objects of scientific and 
historic interest on the Bears Ears lands.” Establishment of the Bears Ears National 
Monument, Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139, 1143 (Dec. 28, 2016). The 
Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act similarly celebrates the far-ranging values of 
the area, values that are cherished by tribal and non-tribal people: “[T]he Badger-Two 
Medicine is sacred land, a living cultural landscape, a hunting ground, a refuge, a 
wildlife sanctuary, a place of refuge for wild nature, and an important part of both 
tribal and non-tribal community values.” Badger-Two Medicine Protection Act, supra 
note 514, § 3(1). 
538. See Tim Davis (Chair, Blackfeet Tribal Business Council), John 
Murray (Blackfeet Tribal Historic Preservation Officer), Terry Tatsey (Blackfeet Tribal 
Business Council member), Tyson Running Wolf (member of Pikuni Traditionalists 
Association), Darrell Hall Blackfeet Brave Dog Society), Badger-Two Medicine Needs 
Permanent Protection from Development, MISSOULIAN (July 5, 2020), 
https://missoulian.com/opinion/columnists/badger-two-medicine-needs-permanent 
-protection-from-development/article_bc90325b-afeb-573c-9033-63c1f282958f.html 
(“The Badger-Two Medicine is, above all else, a place of healing, and our world needs 
it as much as it needs us.”). 
